The Need for Fast Near-Term Climate Mitigation to Slow Feedbacks and Avoid Tipping Points

*Critical Role of Short-lived Super Climate Pollutants To Address the Climate Emergency*

**Background Note**

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About the Institute for Governance & Sustainable Development (IGSD)
IGSD’s mission is to build resilience by accelerating fast climate mitigation actions to slow near-term warming and self-reinforcing climate feedbacks, avoid catastrophic climate and societal tipping points, and limit global temperature to 1.5°C—or at least keep this temperature guardrail in sight.

IGSD’s latest research shows that decarbonization alone is insufficient to slow near-term warming to keep us below 1.5°C or even the more dangerous 2°C guardrail, and that the fastest and most effective strategy is to combine the marathon to zero out carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions from decarbonizing the energy system with the sprint to rapidly cut non-CO₂ super climate pollutants and protect carbon sinks. The super climate pollutants include four short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs)—methane (CH₄), black carbon soot, tropospheric ozone (O₃), and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs)—as well as the longer-lived nitrous oxide (N₂O).

Combining the fast mitigation sprint with the decarbonization marathon would help address the ethical issues of intra- and inter-generational equity by giving societies urgently needed time to adapt to unavoidable changes and build resilience. The latest science suggests that the window for exceeding the 1.5°C guardrail could close as soon as the early 2030s, making this the decisive decade for fast action to slow warming. IGSD’s theory of action is anchored in the urgency of responding rapidly and effectively in order to avoid irreversible damage to the climate system with catastrophic consequences for all.

The fastest way to reduce near-term warming in the next decade is to cut SLCPs. Because they only last in the atmosphere from days to 15 years, reducing them will prevent 90 percent of their predicted warming within a decade. Strategies targeting SLCP reductions can avoid four times more warming at 2050 than targeting CO₂ alone. Reducing HFCs can avoid nearly 0.1 °C of warming by 2050 and up to 0.5 °C by the end of the century. The initial phasedown schedule in the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol will capture about 90 percent of this. Parallel efforts to enhance energy efficiency of air conditioners and other cooling appliances during the HFC phasedown can double the climate benefits at 2050. Cutting methane emissions can avoid nearly 0.3 °C by the 2040s, with the potential for significant avoided warming from emerging technologies to remove atmospheric methane faster than the natural cycle.

Combining the fast mitigation sprint with the decarbonization marathon would reduce the rate of global warming by half from 2030 to 2050, slow the rate of warming a decade or two earlier than decarbonization alone, and make it possible for the world to keep the 1.5°C guardrail in sight. It would also reduce the rate of Arctic warming by two-thirds. This would help slow self-reinforcing climate feedbacks in the Arctic, and thus avoid or at least delay the cluster of projected tipping points beyond 1.5°C. Reducing climate risks and staying withing the limits to adaptation are critical to building resilience.

IGSD approaches to fast mitigation include science, law and policy, and climate finance. IGSD works at the global, regional, national and subnational levels.
About the Center for Human Rights and Environment (CHRE/CEDHA)

Originally founded in 1999 in Argentina, the Center for Human Rights and Environment (CHRE or CEDHA by its Spanish acronym) aims to build a more harmonious relationship between the environment and people. Its work centers on promoting greater access to justice and to guarantee human rights for victims of environmental degradation due to the non-sustainable management of natural resources, and to prevent future violations. To this end, CHRE fosters the creation of public policy that promotes inclusive socially and environmentally sustainable development, through community participation, public interest litigation, strengthening democratic institutions, and the capacity building of key actors.

CHRE addresses environmental policy and human rights impacts in the context of climate change through numerous advocacy programs including initiatives to promote fast action climate mitigation policies to contain and reverse climate change; to reduce emissions of short-lived climate pollutants such as black carbon, HFCs and methane; and to protect glaciers and permafrost environments for their value as natural water storage and basin regulators, to avoid their melt impacts on sea level and subsequent influence on ocean currents and air streams, as well as for their global albedo value and for the many other roles glaciers play in sustaining planetary ecological equilibrium. CHRE also fosters corporate accountability and human rights compliance to address the social and environmental impacts of key climate polluting industries such as oil and gas (including hydraulic fracturing), mining, paper pulp mills and artisanal brick production.

Institute for Governance & Sustainable Development
Center for Human Rights and Environment (CHRE/CEDHA)

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1. Introduction and summary

This Background Note summarizes the science supporting the need for fast climate mitigation to slow warming in the near term (2022–2041). It focuses on the importance of cutting super climate pollutants and protecting carbon sinks to slow self-reinforcing feedbacks and avoid tipping points. It also explains why winning a fast mitigation sprint to 2030 is critical for addressing the climate emergency and how the sprint complements the marathon to decarbonize the economy and achieve net-zero emissions by 2050 or earlier.

Climate change presents two challenges, or races, that we must simultaneously run: the race to stabilize the climate in the longer term, and the race to slow the rate of warming in the near term to reduce the risk of climate extremes that scale with the rate of warming and threaten to accelerate feedbacks and trigger a cascade of irreversible tipping points. Cutting super climate pollutants, in particular the short-lived climate pollutants—black carbon, methane (CH₄), tropospheric ozone, and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs)—can avoid four times more warming at 2050 than CO₂ cuts alone can, and reduce projected warming in the Arctic by two-thirds and the rate of global warming by half. Reducing climate risks and staying withing the limits to adaptation are critical to building resilience.

A. The window is closing for keeping within a safe climate zone

- The window for effective mitigation to slow feedbacks and avoid tipping points is shrinking to perhaps 10 years or less, including the window to prevent crashing through the 1.5 ºC guardrail.
  - The world could hit the 1.5 ºC guardrail by the early 2030s due to rising emissions, declining particulate air pollution that unmasks existing warming, and natural climate variability (Figure 1). The probability of exceeding 1.5 ºC by 2026 for at least one year has doubled since 2020, with a likely-as-not (48%) chance that at least one year could be 1.5 ºC warmer, according to the World Meteorological Organization.
  - Today the Earth is trapping twice as much heat as it did in 2005, with loss of reflective sea ice and changes in clouds contributing significantly to the extra heat the planet is now retaining. Climate-driven changes in clouds act as a self-reinforcing feedback leading to more warming and higher climate sensitivity.
  - Even at 1.1–1.2 ºC of global warming in 2020–2021, weather extremes are becoming more frequent and more severe.

![Figure 1. Projected warming](source)

B. Only a dual assault on CO₂ and super climate pollutants, particularly methane, would make it possible for the world to keep 1.5 °C in sight and stay below 2 °C

- The CO₂ and SLCP strategies are complementary and not exchangeable. Achieving 2050 Net Zero CO₂ targets is essential for stabilizing the climate by the end of the century due to the long lifetime of CO₂ in the atmosphere but cannot by itself prevent global temperatures from exceeding 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, the guardrail beyond which the world’s climate is expected to pass irreversible tipping points.
  - The recent AR6 reports confirm that cutting fossil fuel emissions—the main source of CO₂—by decarbonizing the energy system and shifting to clean energy, in isolation, actually makes global warming worse in the short term. This is because burning fossil fuels also creates sulfate aerosols, which act to cool the climate. These cooling sulfates fall out of the atmosphere fast, while CO₂ lasts much longer, thus leading to overall warming for the first decade or two.⁹
- Reducing SLCPs is the only currently known way to cut the rate of warming in the near-term, slow self-reinforcing feedbacks, and avoid irreversible tipping points. In addition to zeroing out CO₂ emissions to curb long-term warming, it’s essential to slow near-term warming by reducing short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs)—methane (CH₄), black carbon (BC) soot, tropospheric ozone (O₃), and hydrofluorocarbons (HFC). (These short-lived pollutants are often referred to as “super pollutants” because of their potency and ability to quickly reduce warming. N₂O is also a super pollutant but is not short-lived.)

C. It’s time to broaden the strategy to avoid climate catastrophe

- Addressing the near-term climate emergency requires selecting fast mitigation solutions¹⁰ that provide the most avoided warming in the shortest period of time over the next decade or two; slow the self-reinforcing feedbacks and avoid tipping points;¹¹ and protect the most vulnerable people and ecosystems¹² from heat, drought, flooding, and other extremes that will dramatically increase in severity and frequency with every increment of additional warming.¹³
  - In addition to cutting CO₂ and SLCPs, other fast mitigation strategies must be employed, including protecting sinks;¹⁴ this combined approach is essential for achieving near-term and long-term climate targets.
- According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), keeping the planet livable by limiting warming to 1.5 °C with no or limited overshoot requires reducing global human-caused methane emissions by 34% in 2030 and 44% in 2040 relative to modelled 2019 levels, in addition to cutting global CO₂ emissions in half in 2030 and by 80% in 2040, and deep cuts to other SLCPs and nitrous oxide.¹⁵
  - AR6 WGIII further finds that “[d]eep GHG [greenhouse gas] emissions reductions by 2030 and 2040, particularly reductions of methane emissions, lower peak warming, reduce the likelihood of overshooting warming limits and lead to less reliance on net negative CO₂ emissions that reverse warming in the latter half of the century… Due to the short lifetime of CH₄ in the atmosphere, projected deep reduction of CH₄ emissions up until the time of net zero CO₂ in modelled mitigation pathways effectively reduces peak global warming. (high confidence)”¹⁶
- These findings build on the conclusions of the IPCC’s Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C that identified the three strategies that are essential for keeping the planet livable:
  i. reaching net zero CO₂ by mid-century;
  ii. making deep cuts to SLCPs super pollutants in the next decades; and
  iii. removing up to 1,000 billion tons of CO₂ from the atmosphere by 2100.¹⁷
2. Feedbacks and tipping points are key to understanding planetary emergency

Evidence from feedbacks and tipping points suggests that we are already in a state of planetary emergency, where both the risk and urgency of the emergency are acute. The IPCC defines a tipping point as “a critical threshold beyond which a system reorganizes, often abruptly and/or irreversibly.” Earth system models project a cluster of six such abrupt shifts between 1°C and 1.5°C of warming and another eleven between 1.5°C and 2°C, as confirmed by two IPCC Special Reports. A recent assessment finds that exceeding 1.5°C increases the likelihood of triggering or committing to six self-propagating climate tipping points (Figure 2). Domino-like interactions among these systems are projected to lower thresholds and increase the risk of triggering a global cascade of tipping points (Figure 3). Additional as-yet-undiscovered tipping points are possible due to limitations in current models and exclusion of processes such as those related to permafrost and other biogeochemical feedbacks. Self-reinforcing feedbacks, including the loss of Arctic sea ice, are among the most vulnerable links in the chain of climate protection. Extremes triggered by these feedbacks pose further systemic risks including financial and societal collapse. Mapping of projected extreme heat to the Fragile State Index points to significant potential for conflict and vulnerability currently excluded from most economic analyses of social costs of climate pollution.

Figure 2. Abrupt climate changes as global temperatures increase

- The “evidence from tipping points alone suggests that we are in a state of planetary emergency: both the risk and urgency of the situation are acute….”
- Even with a 1.5°C overshoot where the temperature limit is only temporarily breached, some of the impacts will be irreversible, even if warming is reduced.
- An April 2022 preprint that analyzes four interacting climate tipping points—the Greenland and West Antarctic Ice Sheets, the Atlantic Meridional Overturning
Circulation, and the Amazon rainforest—finds that even temporarily overshooting 2 °C can increase the risk of crossing these tipping points by up to 72%.  

- Greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere continue to increase at record rates despite the pandemic and economic slowdown.
  - Atmospheric methane concentrations set records in 2020 and 2021 for the fastest rate of increase since records started in 1983, and preliminary data shows methane exceeding 1,900 parts per billion (ppb) for the first time in September 2021.
  - Global atmospheric CO₂ concentrations reached a new high of 420 parts per million (ppm) in April 2022, a 50% increase over pre-industrial levels and 2.5 ppm higher than 2020. For comparison, the average increase of CO₂ was 1.5 ppm/year in the 1990s.

- Weather extremes are already becoming more frequent and more severe.
  - According to AR6 WGI, “[i]t is virtually certain that hot extremes (including heatwaves) have become more frequent and more intense across most land regions since the 1950s... with high confidence that human-induced climate change is the main driver of these changes.”
  - The record-breaking June 2021 heatwave in the Pacific Northwest (U.S. and Canada) would have been virtually impossible absent human-caused climate change and would have been much less severe to human health. The probability of such heat waves will increase by up to 200 times by the 2040s, occurring every 5 to 10 years, given our current emissions trajectory.
  - In 2053, an “extreme heat belt” affecting over 100 million people is expected to form in the central U.S., where temperatures will exceed 125 °F (∼52 °C) at least once a year, placing it on the “extreme danger level” of the National Weather Service’s heat index.
  - Global warming made the 2019 heatwaves in Western Europe up to 100 times more likely. As Europe sizzled under another heatwave in 2021, the Mediterranean region was evolving into a “wildfire hotspot.”
  - Heatwaves in Europe are increasing in frequency and intensity faster than most of the planet due to a warming climate and changes in the jet stream. Climate change made the record-breaking 40 °C (104 °F) in the UK at least 10-times more likely. The record-breaking 2022 heatwaves will be considered an “average” summer in Europe by 2035, even if current climate commitments are met.
  - With unprecedented long-duration heatwaves afflicting over a billion people in India and Pakistan in 2022, scientists note that “the current climate has changed so significantly that the pre-industrial world becomes a poor basis of comparison.”
  - Night-time fire intensity has increased globally by 7.2% in the last two decades due to rising temperatures, causing more intense, longer-lasting, and larger fires.
  - Catastrophic flooding inundating a third of Pakistan in 2022 was very likely made more severe due to climate change increasing rainfall, glacier melt, and extending a La Niña event in the Pacific for a rare third year.

- The probability of “record-shattering” climate extremes “depends on warming rate, rather than the global warming level, and is thus pathway-dependent.”
  - According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “[t]he seven warmest years since 1880 have all occurred since 2014, while the 10 warmest years have occurred since 2005.” Continued record [GHG] emissions mean that the rate of warming could increase from 0.2 °C per decade to 0.25–0.32 °C per decade over the next 25 years.
A. The Arctic may be the weakest link in safeguarding our climate

The Arctic is critical for climate stabilization, yet it may be the weakest link in the chain of climate protection. The Arctic’s sea ice provides a “great white shield” that reflects incoming solar radiation safely back to space. As the extent of the Arctic’s reflective sea ice continues to shrink, the amount of heat going into the darker ocean is increasing, which in turn is causing more ice to melt in a self-reinforcing feedback loop. The Arctic air temperature is warming at a rate four times faster than the global average. Only half of the summer Arctic sea ice in September remains, with the risk that September will be ice-free within 10 to 15 years. If all of the Arctic sea ice were lost for the sunlit months, it would add the warming equivalent of a trillion tons of carbon dioxide, or 25 years of climate emissions at today’s rate. The Arctic’s land-based snow and ice is also melting and is expected to add a similar amount of warming. The intrusion of warmer ocean water from both the Atlantic and the Pacific is also contributing to Arctic warming and the melting of the sea ice, intensifying the impacts of late summer cyclones and further accelerating sea ice loss.

i. A rapidly warming Arctic

- Arctic air temperature is warming at a rate four times faster than the global average.
  - Arctic mean surface temperatures may rise by up to 10 °C by the end of the century above the 1985–2014 average.
  - In 2020, Siberia experienced heat extremes that would have been “almost impossible” without human-caused global warming, including the first 100 °F
temperature recorded north of the Arctic Circle, and record-breaking 118 °F ground
temperature, with similar extremes being observed in the first half of 2021.61
  o The Arctic’s “Last Ice Area,” the Wandel Sea, saw unprecedented sea ice loss in
August 2020 primarily due to abnormal weather patterns and warmth from the
exposed ocean surfaces.62 Summer sea ice in this area north of Greenland was
thought to be more resilient and expected to persist decades longer than the rest of
the Arctic,63 providing a refuge for the region’s ice-dependent flora and fauna.64
  o Between 1991–2020, surface air temperature in the Barents Sea area experienced
record high annual warming of up to 2.7 °C per decade, with the Northern Barents
Sea area warming at a rate 5–7 times the global warming averages.65 During the
warmer autumn season, the Northern Barents Sea area reached accelerated warming
of up to 4.0 °C per decade between 2001–2020.66

- Only half of the summer Arctic sea ice in September remains,67 with the risk that September
will be ice-free within 10 to 15 years.68 If all the Arctic sea ice were lost for the sunlit
months, it would add the warming equivalent of a trillion tons of carbon dioxide.69
  o Arctic sea ice reaches its minimum extent, or coverage, every September. Between
1982–2020, the September minimum extent has decreased significantly, reducing
at a rate of 13% per decade.70 In addition to extent, the thickness and volume of
Arctic sea ice have also decreased. During the September minimums of 1982–2020:
    ▪ Arctic sea ice extent decreased by 44% (from 7.6 million km² in 1982 to 4.3
      million km² in 2020).71 This is equivalent to a third of the entire U.S.,
      including non-contiguous states and territories.72
    ▪ Arctic sea ice thickness decreased by 48%.73
    ▪ Arctic sea ice volume decreased by 72%.74
    ▪ The 16 Septembers with the least Arctic sea ice extent have all been in the
      last 16 years; on 15 September 2020, the Arctic sea ice reached the second
      lowest extent in the satellite record.75 18 September 2022 is tied for 10th
      lowest ice minimum on record, while 16 September 2021 was the 12th
      lowest at the time with one of the lowest recorded levels of multi-year ice.76
  o The viability of the summer sea ice is further jeopardized by the loss of the strong,
very old (>4 years old) Arctic sea ice, which comprised only 4.4% of the Arctic
Ocean in March 2020; young, first-year ice—which is thinner, more fragile, and
more susceptible to decline—now comprises about 70% of the ice pack.77 Between
1985–2018, multiyear Arctic sea ice has reduced by 95%.78

- Land-based snow and ice in the Arctic is also melting and is expected to add a similar
amount of warming. According to Dr. Peter Wadhams:79
  o The loss of reflective land-based snow and ice is “of the same magnitude as the sea
ice negative anomaly during the same period, and the change in albedo is roughly
the same between snow-covered land and snow-free tundra as it is between sea ice
and open water.”
  o “[T]he similarity of the magnitudes means that snowline retreat and sea ice retreat
are each adding about the same amount to global warming.”
- Glaciers and ice sheets around the world are disappearing with serious implications for the
climate, sea level rise, and water security.
  o Between the periods of 1992–1999 and 2010–2019, the rate of glacier and ice sheet
loss increased by a factor of four, and along with glacier mass loss, was the majority
contributor to sea level rise between 2006–2018.80
A study that combined satellite observations with numerical models found that, between 1994 and 2017, glaciers and ice sheets have lost 28 trillion tonnes of ice.\textsuperscript{81} (One trillion tonnes of ice is equivalent to a cube of ice taller than Mount Everest.\textsuperscript{82}) According to the authors of the study, “there can be little doubt that the vast majority of Earth’s ice loss is a direct consequence of climate warming.”\textsuperscript{83}

\textbf{Figure 4. Monthly sea ice extent anomalies}

\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure4.png}

\textit{Source:} National Snow and Ice Data Center, \textit{Sea Ice Index}, “Monthly Sea Ice Extent Anomaly Graph” (last visited 10 May 2022) (“This graph shows monthly ice extent anomalies plotted as a time series of percent difference between the extent for the month in question and the mean for that month based on the January 1981 to December 2021 data. The anomaly data points are plotted as plus signs and the trend line is plotted with a dashed grey line.”).

\textbf{ii. Amplification of Arctic warming and sea ice loss—feedbacks and impacts}

- Arctic sea ice is declining at an accelerating rate.
  - The rate of decline in Arctic sea ice thickness from 2002 to 2018 may be underestimated by 60–100% in four of the seven marginal seas, according to a recent study using “snow data with more realistic variability and trends.”\textsuperscript{84}
  - Warmer oceans are also accelerating sea ice loss, with warmer Atlantic\textsuperscript{85} and Pacific\textsuperscript{86} water transporting “unprecedented quantities of heat” into the Arctic Ocean, further reducing sea ice thickness. The warmer, saltier waters from the Atlantic Ocean are increasingly entering the Arctic in a process called “Atlantification of Arctic Ocean”\textsuperscript{87} that is propagating northward. The strength of this warming is likely underestimated in CMIP6 models.\textsuperscript{88}
  - In the Northern Barents Sea, winter sea ice loss due to warmer waters transporting heat from the Atlantic Ocean is more pronounced, and as the waters become warmer and saltier, ocean stratification weakens, further preventing the formation of sea ice.\textsuperscript{89}
  - Less sea ice in the Arctic Ocean allows ocean waves to grow larger, allowing for an acceleration of ice breakup and retreat,\textsuperscript{90} which is further exacerbated by late summer cyclones that continue to break up ice.\textsuperscript{91}
The winter of 2020/21 was characterized by exceptionally high wind forcing that resulted in the record loss of the Arctic’s multi-year ice driven into the Beaufort Sea, “where ice increasingly can’t survive the summer.”

Arctic warming also leads to a greater number of cyclones and to more intense cyclones, which further exacerbate Arctic sea ice decline and vice-versa.

Figure 5. Late winter sea ice in the Arctic


iii. We are perilously close to losing our Arctic climate control

- The Arctic could become nearly sea ice-free in September within 10–15 years, further reducing its heat-reflecting ability.
  - Ice-free conditions over multiple summer months likely occurred during the last interglacial period, providing further support for predictions of ice-free conditions in late summer by 2035.
  - The Barents Sea and Greenland Sea could become ice-free year-round by the end of the century under high emissions scenarios.
- In the extreme case when all Arctic sea ice is lost for the sunlit months, as could happen as early as mid-century, it would be the warming equivalent to one trillion tons of CO₂—on top of the forcing from the 2.4 trillion tons of CO₂ added in the 270 years since the Industrial Revolution, advancing warming by 25 years.
- This additional warming would be the equivalent of adding 56 ppm of CO\textsubscript{2} to the current CO\textsubscript{2} concentration\textsuperscript{101}.
- The added forcing in the Arctic would be 21 W/m\textsuperscript{2}; averaged globally this would equal 0.71 W/m\textsuperscript{2} of global forcing\textsuperscript{102} compared to the 2.16 W/m\textsuperscript{2} added by anthropogenic emissions of CO\textsubscript{2} since the Industrial Revolution\textsuperscript{103}.
- If all of the cloud cover over the Arctic dissipates along with the loss of all sea ice, the added Arctic warming could be three times as much—the equivalent of three trillion tons of CO\textsubscript{2}; in contrast, even if clouds increase to create completely overcast skies over the Arctic, the warming would still add the equivalent of 500 billion tons of CO\textsubscript{2} to the atmosphere\textsuperscript{104}.

- Additional factors contribute to further snow and ice loss in the Arctic.
  - Reduced Arctic snow cover is increasing risk of wildfires, which emit black carbon, another super climate pollutant, while destroying sinks and emitting CO\textsubscript{2};\textsuperscript{105} wildfires and permafrost thawing can “act together to expose and transfer permafrost C to the atmosphere very rapidly.”\textsuperscript{106}
  - The warming Arctic is also experiencing three-times more lightning in the last decade,\textsuperscript{107} sparking more fires and threatening to accelerate permafrost thaw.\textsuperscript{108} Boreal fires which smolder in organic soils and remerge after months, called “zombie fires” or “overwintering fires,” emitted about 3.5 million metric tons of carbon between 2002 and 2018.\textsuperscript{109}
  - Rapid melting in the Arctic opens up new shipping lanes, which trigger further pollution and warming as increased shipping traffic, oil and gas exploration, and tourism burn heavy fuel oil and emits black carbon.\textsuperscript{110} Increased Arctic shipping lanes also introduce geopolitical problems and other evolving security risks.\textsuperscript{111}

B. Permafrost thaw feedback could rival major emitters for CO\textsubscript{2}, CH\textsubscript{4}, and N\textsubscript{2}O

The accelerated Arctic warming and loss of sea ice risks triggering another self-reinforcing feedback—permafrost thaw\textsuperscript{112}—which would further amplify warming by releasing CO\textsubscript{2} and methane (CH\textsubscript{4}),\textsuperscript{113} as well as nitrous oxide (N\textsubscript{2}O), which also destroys stratospheric ozone.\textsuperscript{114}

- Between 2007 and 2016, globally averaged permafrost ground temperature increased by 0.29 °C; within that period, permafrost in mountains warmed by 0.19 °C and in Antarctica by 0.37 °C.\textsuperscript{115}
- The amount of carbon stored in permafrost is nearly twice what is already in the atmosphere—1,700 Gt (gigatons) carbon in permafrost versus 850 Gt carbon in the atmosphere.\textsuperscript{116}
  - Record high temperatures have been observed in the upper layer of permafrosts, with sites recording more than a 1 °C increase from 1978 levels.\textsuperscript{117}
  - AR6 WGI assesses that the permafrost CO\textsubscript{2} feedback per degree of global warming can be as high as 41 PgC °C\textsuperscript{-1} through 2100. Additionally, methane emissions from permafrost thaw are projected to be up to 19 Gt CO\textsubscript{2e} °C\textsuperscript{-1} [5.3 Pg C\textsubscript{eq} °C\textsuperscript{-1}] by 2100; and beyond 2100, the magnitude of the permafrost carbon feedback strengthens under a high-emissions scenario.\textsuperscript{118}
  - Of the approximately 15 million square kilometers of permafrost on land,\textsuperscript{119} 3.4 million square kilometers have already thawed; and with warming of 1.5 °C approaching, another 4.8 million square kilometers could thaw gradually.\textsuperscript{120}
Under the no-mitigation RCP8.5 scenario, gradual permafrost thaw alone could release as much CO2 as the remaining carbon budget for a likely chance of remaining below 1.5 °C by the end of the century.\textsuperscript{121}

However, abrupt thaw “will probably occur in <20% of the permafrost zone but could affect half of permafrost carbon,” and “models considering only gradual permafrost thaw are substantially underestimating carbon emissions” by 40%.\textsuperscript{122}

Moreover, thawing subsea permafrost beneath the Arctic Ocean could add 20% more emissions by 2100 under an RCP8.5 scenario according to expert judgement.\textsuperscript{123}

Carbon budgets for pathways targeting 1.5 or 2 °C this century underestimate potential permafrost feedbacks, where a 0.5 °C overshoot could result in a two-fold increase in emissions from permafrost thaw.\textsuperscript{124}

In addition to accelerating permafrost thaw, heatwaves in the Siberian Arctic in 2020 that peaked at 6 °C above normal temperatures may also be causing fossil methane gas to leak from rock formations.\textsuperscript{125}

- If permafrost were a country: by 2100, its emissions could equal as much as the cumulative emissions of the United States, yet 82% of IPCC models do not include carbon emissions from permafrost thaw.\textsuperscript{126}

\textbf{Figure 6. Changes in permafrost}

\textit{Source: Chadburn S. E., Burke E. J., Cox P. M., Friedlingstein P., Hugelius G., & Westermann S. (2017) An observation-based constraint on permafrost loss as a function of global warming, NAT. CLIM. CHANGE 7(5): 340–344 (“Figure 4 | Changes in spatial patterns of permafrost under future stabilization scenarios. a,b. The shaded areas show estimated historical permafrost distribution (1960–1990), and contours show the plausible range of zonal boundaries under 1.5 C stabilization (a) and under 2 C stabilization (b).”).}

- In addition to the permafrost feedback that accelerates warming, losing permafrost impacts human settlements and health:
  - 3.3 million people, 42% of settlements, and 70% of current infrastructure in the permafrost domain is at risk of severe damage due to permafrost thaw by 2050, including 45% of oil and gas production fields in the Russian Arctic.\textsuperscript{127}
  - Damage to Russian infrastructure alone due to permafrost thaw could cost $69 billion by 2050.\textsuperscript{128}
C. An additional methane threat is lurking on the East Siberian Arctic Shelf

There also is a risk that methane will be emitted from the shallow seabed of the East Siberian Arctic Shelf as the Arctic Ocean warms, which would speed up other global warming impacts.  

- Measurements in October 2020 by an international expedition on a Russian research vessel are showing elevated methane release from the Arctic Shelf, according to a story by Jonathan Watts in The Guardian. The story quotes Swedish scientist Örjan Gustafsson of Stockholm University, stating that the “East Siberian slope methane hydrate system has been perturbed and the process will be ongoing.” Analysis of elevated methane measured in the area in 2014 suggest a fossil methane source beneath the seabed that “may be more eruptive in nature.”

- According to an earlier isotopic analysis of methane from an Antarctic ice core record, up to 27% of methane emissions during the last deglaciation may have come from old carbon reservoirs of permafrost and hydrates; while this “serves only as a partial analog to current anthropogenic warming,” the authors stated that it is “unlikely” that today’s anthropogenic warming will release the carbon in these old reservoirs.  

D. The approaching ice sheet tipping points

Several climate tipping points are likely at risk if warming exceeds 1.5 °C for more than several decades, with the Greenland Ice Sheet and West Antarctic Ice Sheet both already showing signs of approaching tipping thresholds estimated around 1.5 to 2 °C. Once triggered, significant ice loss is irreversible even with carbon dioxide removal strategies. In 2021, Greenland and Antarctica reached record low levels of ice mass, with glaciers losing 31% more snow and ice per year than they did just 15 years ago. The melting Greenland Ice Sheet is already the largest single contributor to the rate of global sea level rise, and is expected to lose 110 trillion tons of ice by the end of the century, which would raise global sea levels by nearly a foot (27 cm). AR6 WGI was unable to exclude the possibility of sea level rise of up to 7.5 feet (2.3 meters) by 2100 due to uncertainties in ice sheet processes.  

i. The Greenland Ice Sheet is melting at an accelerating rate

- Early warning signs suggest the Greenland Ice Sheet is close to a tipping point. Currently, the best estimate of the threshold for irreversible melting of the Greenland Ice Sheet is around 1.6 °C (0.8–3.2 °C).
  - In the past two decades, the melt rate across Greenland increased 250–575%, and the ice discharge from the Greenland Ice Sheet substantially increased; this will likely persist in the coming years. On 28 July 2021, Greenland experienced a massive melt event that alone would be enough to cover the state of Florida by two inches of water.
  - If all of Greenland melted, it would contribute 5–7 meters of sea level rise; and while it may take thousands of years to see the full extent of the sea level rise, the “timescale of melt depends strongly on the magnitude and duration of the temperature overshoot.”  
  - On 14 August 2021, rainfall occurred at the highest point on the Greenland Ice Sheet, which has never been recorded before at that location (72.58°N 38.46°W).
- A new analysis calculated that 3.3% of the Greenland Ice Sheet (equivalent to 110 trillion tons of ice) will inevitably melt by the end of the century regardless of any climate
emissions scenario, triggering at least 27.4 cm (10.8 in) of global sea level rise and reaching as much as 78.2 cm (30.8 in).\textsuperscript{147}

- The melting of Greenland also contributes to the weakening of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC), which has reached a critical “overturning” stage; the observational data suggest that “this decline may be associated with an almost complete loss of stability of the AMOC over the course of the last century, and that the AMOC could be close to a critical transition to its weak circulation mode.”\textsuperscript{148}
  - According to AR6 WGI, it is “very likely” that the AMOC will weaken in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, with “medium confidence” that it will not collapse by 2100.\textsuperscript{149}
  - The collapse of AMOC can lead to faster sea level rise along parts of the Eastern United States and Europe, stronger hurricanes in the Southeastern United States, and reduced rainfall across the Sahel.\textsuperscript{150} If the sea level along U.S. coasts increased by 10–12 inches by 2050, the occurrence of destructive floods would increase five-fold.\textsuperscript{151} Such a collapse would shift weather patterns around the world, with potentially devastating consequences.\textsuperscript{152}

\textbf{ii. The West Antarctic Ice Sheet is destabilizing}

- In West Antarctica, losing the Thwaites glacier, which is currently the size of Florida or Britain, could raise sea levels by over two feet (65 cm).\textsuperscript{153} Once the Thwaites glacier retreats past a ridge 50 km upstream, the retreat of the glacier would “become unstoppable.”\textsuperscript{154}
  - A new study warned that the Thwaites glacier has melted faster than previously observed and that a similar pace of rapid melt could occur in the future.\textsuperscript{155}
  - The Thwaites glacier is already contributing to 4% of sea level rise.\textsuperscript{156} In the last 20 years, the glacier has lost more than 1,000 billion tons of ice and is continuing to lose ice at a rapidly increasing rate.\textsuperscript{157}
  - One glaciologist found that the ice shelf buttressing the Thwaites glacier could collapse in as little as five years due to massive fractures caused by warmer ocean water weakening the ice shelf, setting off a “chain-reaction” that could eventually add 2 to 10 feet of sea level rise over centuries.\textsuperscript{158}

\textbf{E. The ocean is a heat battery}

Compounding the risk from self-reinforcing feedbacks and tipping points, warming will continue well after emissions stop; about 93\% of the energy imbalance accumulates in the oceans as increased heat,\textsuperscript{159} and this will return to the atmosphere on a timescale of decades to centuries after emissions stop.\textsuperscript{160} Between 2003–2018, the rate of ocean warming increased tenfold from 1958–1973 levels.\textsuperscript{161} As noted in AR6 WGI:

“It is \textit{virtually certain} that the global ocean has warmed since at least 1971, representing about 90\% of the increase in the global energy inventory... and is currently warming faster than at any other time since at least the last deglacial transition \textit{(medium confidence)}... It is \textit{extremely likely} that human influence was the main driver of ocean warming. Ocean warming will continue over the 21st century \textit{(virtually certain)}... [and] is irreversible over centuries to millennia \textit{(medium confidence)}.”\textsuperscript{162}
3. Cutting CO₂ alone will not slow warming in the near term

Decarbonizing the energy system and achieving net-zero emissions is critical for stabilizing the climate and keeping temperatures below 1.5 °C by the end of this century. However, stopping burning fossil fuels, like coal and diesel, also means cutting co-emitted cooling aerosols. These cooling aerosols fall out of the atmosphere in days to months, and this offsets reductions in warming from decarbonization until around 2050, and likely even accelerates warming over the first decade or more. As stated by climate scientist and IPCC author Joeri Rogelj: “The removal of air pollution, either through air quality measures or because combustion processes are phased out to get rid of CO₂, will result in an increase in the resulting rate of warming… The only measures that can counteract this increased rate of warming over the next decades are methane reductions.”

- Air pollution that is co-emitted with CO₂ when sulfur-containing coal and oil are burned results in particles that reflect sunlight. These “cooling aerosols” currently “mask” warming of about 0.51 °C; and while the accumulated CO₂ in the atmosphere will continue to cause warming for decades to centuries, the cooling aerosols will fall out of the atmosphere within days to months, unmasking more of the existing warming.
  - The temporary cooling effects of aerosols have been demonstrated in the past. The 1991 Mount Pinatubo eruption injected 15 million tons of sulfur dioxide into the atmosphere, temporarily cooling the planet by 0.5 °C for nearly two years.
  - A recent assessment of satellites and other evidence finds that the net effect of anthropogenic aerosol forcing has changed sign from negative (cooling) to positive (warming) over the last two decades, contributing the equivalent of 15–50% of the increase in forcing due to CO₂ over the same time period, and concluding that “[t]his signal will most likely continue in the future, increasing the urgency for strong measures on reducing greenhouse gas emissions… ”
- A previous study calculated that fast cuts to CO₂ could avoid 0.1 °C of warming by 2050 and up to 1.6 °C by 2100, not accounting for warming due to the unmasking.
  - This would require CO₂ emissions to peak in 2030 and decline by 5.5% per year until carbon neutrality is reached around 2060–2070, after which emissions level off.
  - If CO₂ emissions were to peak in 2020 and decline at 5.5% per year until carbon neutrality is reached (around mid-century) then level off, this extreme scenario could avoid 0.3 °C of warming by 2050 and up to 1.9 °C by 2100, although unmasking of the cooling aerosol would still lead to net warming in the near term.
  - A separate study calculated near-term warming within the next two decades of 0.02–0.10 °C due to cuts to fossil fuel CO₂ emissions and associated reductions in cooling aerosols.
4. Targeting short-lived super climate pollutants is the only way to slow warming in the near term

Aggressive mitigation of short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs)—methane, tropospheric ozone, black carbon, and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs)—is critical for near- and long-term climate protection. These SLCPs also are known as “super climate pollutants.” AR6 WGI included a chapter on short-lived climate pollutants for the first time, which finds that “[s]ustained methane mitigation, wherever it occurs, stands out as an option that combines near- and long-term gains on surface temperature (high confidence) and leads to air quality benefits by reducing surface ozone levels globally (high confidence)…. Additional CH₄ and BC mitigation would contribute to offsetting the additional warming associated with SO₂ reductions that would accompany decarbonization (high confidence).”¹⁷³

- Cutting SLCPs is the only plausible way to limit warming due to unmasking of cooling aerosols over the next 20 years.¹⁷⁴
• Accounting for the co-emission of cooling aerosol from fossil fuel burning, a new study finds that strategies focusing exclusively on reducing fossil fuel emissions could result in “weak, near-term warming” which could potentially cause temperatures to exceed the 1.5°C level by 2035 and the 2 °C level by 2050. In contrast, the dual strategy that simultaneously reduces the non-carbon dioxide pollutants, especially the short-lived pollutants, would result in net avoided warming by 2050 four times larger than the net effect of decarbonization alone, and would enable the world to stay well below the 2 °C limit, and significantly improve the chance of remaining below the 1.5 °C guardrail.\textsuperscript{175}

• In contrast to the limited amount of warming reduced at 2050 by cutting CO\textsubscript{2} from fossil fuel emissions, fast cuts to SLCPs could avoid up to 0.6 °C of warming by 2050, and up to 1.2 °C by 2100,\textsuperscript{176} which would reduce projected warming in the Arctic by two-thirds and the rate of global warming by half.\textsuperscript{177}

  o AR6 WGIII finds that limiting warming to 1.5 °C with no or limited overshoot requires deep cuts to SLCPs, in particular reducing methane emissions by 34\% in 2030 and 44\% in 2040 relative to modelled 2019 and reducing HFC emissions by 85\% by 2050 relative to 2019.\textsuperscript{178} This re-affirms the conclusion by the IPCC’s \textit{Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C} that cutting SLCPs is essential for staying below 1.5 °C.\textsuperscript{179}

  o Similarly, the warning of the climate emergency issued in November 2019 from 11,000 scientists also emphasizes the importance of cutting SLCPs:

    “We need to promptly reduce the emissions of short-lived climate pollutants, including methane (figure 2b), black carbon (soot), and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). Doing this could slow climate feedback loops and potentially reduce the short-term warming trend by more than 50\% over the next few decades while saving millions of lives and increasing crop yields due to reduced air pollution (Shindell \textit{et al.} 2017\textsuperscript{180}). The 2016 Kigali amendment to phase down HFCs is welcomed.”\textsuperscript{181}

  o In their 2021 update, the scientists stress the urgency of “massive-scale climate action” due to growing severity of impacts and risks from “the many reinforcing feedback loops and potential tipping points” and call for “immediate and drastic reductions in dangerous short-lived greenhouse gases, especially methane.”\textsuperscript{182}
Box. Time and temperature methane metrics: GWP\textsubscript{20} is an improvement, temperature is even better!

Reducing the risks associated with accelerating warming requires mitigation strategies, like cutting methane emissions, that can slow warming in the near term. Assessing how strategies affect near-term warming requires considering individual emissions by pollutant in units of mass, as required under United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) reporting guidelines and recommended by climate scientists.\textsuperscript{183} It also requires accounting for co-emissions by source, since policies act on sources, not on individual pollutants.

An ideal option for assessing temperature impact is to convert emissions by source in terms of pollutant and co-emissions to temperature impacts using tools such as the Assessment of Environmental and Societal Benefits of Methane Reductions Tool or the CCAC Temperature Pathway Tool. Alternatively, when comparing climate impacts for short-lived climate pollutants like methane, using the 20-year global warming potential (GWP\textsubscript{20}) better captures near-term warming impact than the 100-year GWP, in addition to being more aligned with meeting the 1.5 °C target.\textsuperscript{184} While the UNFCCC currently requires using the GWP\textsubscript{100} metric when reporting aggregated emissions or removals, which systematically undervalues the climate impact of methane, reporting Parties may use other metrics in addition, such as GWP\textsubscript{20} or absolute temperature potentials.\textsuperscript{185} AR6 has updated the metrics for methane as follows: GWP\textsubscript{20} is 81.2 and GWP\textsubscript{100} is 27.9.\textsuperscript{186} Table 1 below summarizes GWP values for methane from IPCC reports.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AR6</th>
<th>AR5</th>
<th>AR4</th>
<th>TAR</th>
<th>SAR</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Methane (CH\textsubscript{4})</td>
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<tr>
<td>GWP\textsubscript{20}</td>
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<td>84</td>
<td>86*</td>
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<tr>
<td>GWP\textsubscript{20}</td>
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<tr>
<td>GWP\textsubscript{100}</td>
<td>29.8 ± 11</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>--</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-fossil CH\textsubscript{4}</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWP\textsubscript{20}</td>
<td>80.8 ± 25.8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWP\textsubscript{100}</td>
<td>27.2 ± 11</td>
<td>--</td>
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* with carbon cycle feedback. All methane AR6 values include carbon cycle feedback. 

\textsuperscript{AR6} = 2021 Sixth Assessment Report WGI (Table 7.SM.7; Table 7.15); \textsuperscript{AR5} = 2013 Fifth Assessment Report WGI (Table 8.A.1; Table 8.7); \textsuperscript{AR4} = 2007 Fourth Assessment Report (Table 2.14); \textsuperscript{TAR} = 2001 Third Assessment Report (Table 6.7); \textsuperscript{SAR} = 1995 Second Assessment Report (Table 2.9).

Most aggregation metrics are designed for comparison with long-lived CO\textsubscript{2}. Metrics such as CO\textsubscript{2}-equivalence in terms of GWP and GWP* are based on mathematical relationships that are intended to make short-lived pollutants like methane comparable to the longer-term warming impact of CO\textsubscript{2} emissions.\textsuperscript{187} These aggregate metrics generally ignore co-emitted pollutants with significant near-term climate impacts such as cooling aerosols. The GWP* metric seeks to account for the shorter lifetime of methane by differentiating historical emissions from changes in the rate of emissions.\textsuperscript{188} One criticism of this approach is that it essentially “grandfathers” historical emissions, so when applied at the scale of regional or individual methane emitters, sources with high historical emissions can claim negative GWP* by reducing their rate of emissions. This is the case even if their emissions in a given year are equivalent to a new source with no historical emissions. This has led to the misuse of these metrics to claim that some sectors with large historical emissions and stable or decreasing current rates of emissions have contributed less to global warming.\textsuperscript{189}

For these reasons, this Background Note follows the convention of the UNEP/CCAC Global Methane Assessment in using mass-based metrics, such as million metric tonnes of methane (MtCH\textsubscript{4}), and temperature impacts rather than GWP metrics.
A. Methane (CH₄)

Methane pollution has already caused 0.51 °C of warming, and this will increase if emissions continue to increase, of the total observed warming for 2019 of 1.06 °C (0.88–1.21 °C). Methane also is an indirect climate forcer as a precursor to other GHGs, notably tropospheric ozone. As noted by the U.S. White House, “Methane is a potent greenhouse gas and, according to the latest report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, accounts for about half of the 1.0 degree Celsius net rise in global average temperature since the pre-industrial era.” More leaders are starting to recognize the importance of methane, including former U.S. President Barack Obama, who declared at the 26th Conference of the Parties (COP26) that “curbing methane emissions is currently the single fastest and most effective way to limit warming.”

Global Methane Assessment

- Cutting methane emissions is the biggest and fastest strategy for slowing warming and keeping 1.5 °C within reach. A Global Methane Assessment (GMA) from the CCAC and UNEP led by Dr. Drew Shindell concludes that available mitigation measures could reduce human-caused methane emissions by 45% by 2030 and avoid nearly 0.3 °C warming by the 2040s.
  - This would prevent 255,000 premature deaths, 775,000 asthma-related hospital visits, 73 billion hours of lost labour from extreme heat, and 26 million tonnes of crop losses globally (annual value beginning in 2030). Each tonne of methane reduced generates US $4300 in health, productivity, and other benefits. In addition, methane mitigation strategies provide further cost reductions and efficiency gains in the private sector, create jobs, and stimulate technological innovation.
  - Roughly 60% of available targeted measures have low mitigation costs (defined as less than US $21 per tonne of CO₂e for GWP₁₀₀ and US $7 per tonne of CO₂e for GWP₂₀), and just over 50% of those have negative costs.

Table 2. Methane mitigation potential in 2030 by sector in MtCH₄/yr and Mt/yr of CO₂e

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>CH₄/yr</th>
<th>CO₂e/yr GWP₁₀₀</th>
<th>CO₂e/yr GWP₂₀</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oil &amp; gas</td>
<td>29–57</td>
<td>812–1,596</td>
<td>2,436–4,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste</td>
<td>29–36</td>
<td>812–1,008</td>
<td>2,436–3,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>10–51</td>
<td>280–1,428</td>
<td>2,840–4,284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>12–25</td>
<td>336–700</td>
<td>1,008–2,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


- As the GMA notes, “any action taken to reduce emissions will have an immediate pay off for climate in addition to the current and near-future human health and agricultural production…. Indeed, the expectation that a reduction in emissions will yield quick results, in the order of a decade, is confirmed and emphasizes the importance of methane.”
- Fast action to pursue all available methane mitigation measures now could slow the global rate of warming by 30% by mid-century. This is consistent with the 2011 UNEP/WMO Assessment that showed that fully implementing measures targeting methane and black carbon could halve the rate of global warming and reduce Arctic warming by two-thirds.
Strategies to cut methane emissions have 60% more avoided warming in the Arctic than the global average, with the potential to avoid 0.5 °C by 2050.\textsuperscript{200} Rapid reductions in methane emissions could also reduce the risk of losing the reflective summer Arctic sea ice.\textsuperscript{201}

AR6 WGII and WGIII confirm the findings of the GMA that “[s]ustained methane mitigation, wherever it occurs, stands out as an option that combines near- and long-term gains on surface temperature (high confidence) and leads to air quality benefits by reducing surface ozone levels globally (high confidence).” Measures specifically targeting methane are essential, as broader decarbonization measures can only achieve 30% of the needed reductions.\textsuperscript{202}

The most recent report on climate solutions, AR6 WGIII, reinforces the conclusion that deep and rapid cuts to methane emissions are essential to limiting warming in the near-term and shaving peak warming from overshooting 1.5 °C.\textsuperscript{203} Limiting warming to 1.5 °C with little or no overshoot requires reducing emissions by 34% below 2019 levels in 2030 and 44% below 2019 levels in 2040.\textsuperscript{204}

\textbf{Figure 8. Methane reductions compared to global mean surface temperature responses to changes in fossil-fuel-related emissions (CO\textsubscript{2} + SO\textsubscript{2})}


\textbf{Mitigation and Removal}

- Anthropogenic emissions, which make up 60% of total global methane emissions,\textsuperscript{205} come primarily from three sectors: energy production (~35%), agriculture (~40%), and waste (~20%).\textsuperscript{206} Currently available mitigation measures could reduce emissions from these major sectors by about 180 million metric tonnes of methane per year (MtCH\textsubscript{4}/yr), approximately 45%, by 2030.\textsuperscript{207}

- Specific measures to reduce methane emissions include:
  - Strengthening methane mitigation policies by implementing readily available technologies, laws, and governance structures to their fullest and considering ways to expand methane mitigation through other available avenues;\textsuperscript{208}
  - Reducing leaks\textsuperscript{209} and venting\textsuperscript{210} in the oil and gas sector. The Clean Air Task Force states that prohibiting venting of natural gas can reduce emissions by 95%;\textsuperscript{211}
Eliminating flaring from oil and gas operations, while shifting to clean energy.\textsuperscript{212}

Improving feeding and manure management on farms. In the U.S., this could cut emissions from manure by as much as 70\% and emissions from enteric fermentation by 30\%;\textsuperscript{213}

Upgrading solid waste and wastewater treatment;\textsuperscript{214} and

Reducing food waste, diverting organic waste from landfills, and improving landfill management, which could reduce landfill emissions in the U.S. by 50\% by 2030.\textsuperscript{215}

There also is research underway on the best approach for removing atmospheric methane.\textsuperscript{216} This is especially important, as 35–50\% of methane emissions are from natural sources.\textsuperscript{217} Methane removal is discussed further in \textbf{Section 5C}.

A modelling study by a Stanford University-led team calculates that removing around three years’ worth of human-caused methane emissions would reduce warming by 0.21 °C.\textsuperscript{218} The nonprofit Methane Action has stated that removing methane in conjunction with methane emissions reductions can trim an estimated 0.4–0.6 °C of warming.\textsuperscript{219}

\textbf{Global Methane Pledge}

The \textbf{Global Methane Pledge} was formally launched at the high-level segment of COP26 on 2 November 2021.\textsuperscript{220} Initially announced by the United States and the European Union at the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate hosted by President Biden on 17 September 2021,\textsuperscript{221} the Pledge commits governments to a collective goal of reducing global methane emissions by \textit{at least} 30\% below 2020 levels by 2030 and moving towards using the highest-tier IPCC good practice inventory methodologies to quantify methane emissions, with a particular focus on high emission sources. In addition to the U.S. and European Union, over 100 initial countries signed on to the pledge, representing 70\% of the global economy and nearly half of anthropogenic methane emissions.\textsuperscript{222} At least 20 global philanthropic organizations pledged $328 million to support methane reduction efforts.\textsuperscript{223}

Successful implementation of the Global Methane Pledge would reduce warming by at least 0.2 °C by 2050,\textsuperscript{224} and would keep the planet on a pathway consistent with staying within 1.5 °C.\textsuperscript{225} This reduction is roughly equivalent to a reduction of 35\% below projected 2030 levels. Deploying all available and additional measures, as described in the GMA, could lead to a 45\% reduction below 2030 levels to achieve nearly 0.3 °C in avoided warming by the 2040s.\textsuperscript{226}

In June 2022, the U.S., EU, and 11 other countries launched the Global Methane Pledge Energy Pathway, which includes $59 million in funding to support methane reductions in the oil and gas sector.\textsuperscript{227} The funding includes $4 million to support the World Bank Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership, $5.5 million to support the Global Methane Initiative, up to $9.5 million from the UNEP International Methane Emissions Observatory to support scientific assessments of methane emissions and mitigation potential, and up to $40 million annually from the philanthropic Global Methane Hub to support methane mitigation in the fossil energy sector.

In August 2022, the Inflation Reduction Act was signed into law, allocating $369 billion for climate and clean energy policies, including about $20 billion in incentives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions including methane from the agriculture sector and $1.5 billion in support for reducing methane emissions from the oil and gas sector through the Methane Emissions Reduction Program and a fee on methane leaks.\textsuperscript{228} This Act is estimated to reduce U.S. GHG emissions by 40\% below 2005 levels by 2030.\textsuperscript{229}
IGSD’s (2022) *Primer on Cutting Methane: The Best Strategy for Slowing Warming in the Decade to 2030* provides further information on the science of methane mitigation and why action is urgent; current and emerging mitigation opportunities by sector; national, regional, and international efforts that can inform emergency global action on methane; and financing initiatives to secure support for fast methane reduction.

**B. Tropospheric ozone (O\(_3\))**

Tropospheric ozone is a local air pollutant and significant GHG. Ozone is not directly emitted but is a product of atmospheric reactions with precursor pollutants, notably methane and other volatile organic compounds and nitrogen oxides (NO\(_x\)). In addition to contributing to warming, it is responsible for millions of premature deaths,\(^{230}\) billions of dollars’ worth of crop losses annually,\(^{231}\) and weakening of carbon sinks.\(^{232}\)

*Mitigation*

- Reducing methane has the added effect of reducing tropospheric ozone levels. A recent study estimated methane’s contribution to the present-day tropospheric ozone burden at 35%.\(^{233}\) Methane is likely to play a greater role in tropospheric ozone formation as emissions of other precursors decrease due to air pollution controls.\(^{234}\)
  - Through tropospheric ozone, methane could be added to the 1999 Protocol to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication, and Ground-Level Ozone (Gothenburg Protocol) to the UNECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP).\(^{235}\) LRTAP is a regional treaty framework between Europe, North America, Russia, and former Eastern Bloc countries for reducing transboundary air pollution and understanding related science.\(^{236}\) Methane is the last remaining major ozone precursor not explicitly controlled under the Gothenburg Protocol, as currently amended.\(^{237}\)
  - Stopping methane leaks from oil and gas also reduces non-methane ozone precursors and contributes to improving local air quality.\(^{238}\)
- As a local air pollutant, tropospheric ozone (and black carbon, discussed in the next section) can be addressed under national or regional air pollution laws.

**C. Black carbon**

Black carbon and tropospheric ozone are local air pollutants and are typically addressed under national or regional air pollution laws, as well as through the voluntary programs of the CCAC.\(^{239}\) Black carbon is not a greenhouse gas, but a powerful climate-warming aerosol that is a component of fine particulate matter (specifically, PM\(_{2.5}\)) that enters the atmosphere through the incomplete combustion of fossil fuels, as well as biofuels and biomass.\(^{240}\) Fossil fuel combustion is the largest source of air pollution particles and tropospheric ozone, which kills about 8–10 million people per year. Cutting black carbon and tropospheric ozone can save up to 2.4 million lives every year and increase annual crop production by more than 50 million tons, worth US$4–33 billion a year, as calculated in 2011.\(^{241}\)

*Mitigation*

- It is possible to reduce 70% of global black carbon emissions by 2030,\(^{243}\) including by implementing the following measures:
o Ensuring fast ratification of the Gothenburg Protocol and the 2012 amendment that includes controls for black carbon;\textsuperscript{244}
o Reducing on-road and off-road diesel emissions by mandating diesel particulate filters while eliminating diesel and other high-emitting vehicles and shifting to clean forms of transportation;\textsuperscript{245}
o Eliminating flaring, while shifting to clean energy;\textsuperscript{246}
o Switching to clean cooking and heating methods;\textsuperscript{247} and
o Banning heavy fuel oil in the Arctic and establishing black carbon emission standards for vessels by amending Annex VI of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL).\textsuperscript{248}

D. Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs)

Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) are factory-made chemicals primarily produced for use in refrigeration, air conditioning, insulating foams, and aerosol propellants, with minor uses as solvents and for fire protection.

\textit{Mitigation}

\begin{itemize}
  \item The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol) has successfully phased out the production and use of ozone-depleting and potent climate pollutants chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), preventing GHG emissions that otherwise could have equalled or exceeded the emissions of CO\textsubscript{2} in 2010.\textsuperscript{249}
    o By end of the century, the Montreal Protocol’s steady progress over its 33 years of operation will avoid up to 2.5 °C of warming that otherwise would have already pushed the planet past irreversible tipping points. This is in addition to achieving its original objective of putting the stratospheric ozone layer on the road to recovery.\textsuperscript{250}
    o About 1.7 °C of this avoided warming comes from the Protocol’s mandatory reduction of super polluting chemicals—CFCs, HCFCs, and now HFCs—used primarily as refrigerants in cooling equipment.
    o An additional 0.85 °C of warming will be avoided by protecting our planet’s forests and other carbon “sinks” from damaging ultraviolet radiation that reduced their ability to pull CO\textsubscript{2} out of the atmosphere and store it safely in terrestrial sinks.
  \item HFCs are now being phased down under the Montreal Protocol’s Kigali Amendment, with the potential to avoid up to 0.5 °C of warming by 2100.\textsuperscript{251}
    o The initial phasedown schedule of the Kigali Amendment would lock in reductions limiting warming from HFCs in 2100 to about 0.04 °C, avoiding about 90% of the potential, or up to 0.44 °C.\textsuperscript{252}
    o Accelerating the phasedown could reduce HFC emissions by an additional 72% in 2050, increasing the chances of staying below 1.5 °C this century.\textsuperscript{253}
    o More mitigation is available from a faster phasedown schedule; collecting and destroying HFCs at end of product life; recycling and destroying HFC “banks” embedded in products and equipment; early replacement of older inefficient cooling equipment using HFC refrigerants; and reducing refrigerant leaks through better design, manufacturing, and servicing.\textsuperscript{254}
\end{itemize}
o The Kigali Amendment also requires Parties to destroy HFC-23, a by-product of the production of HCFC-22, to the extent practicable, and this will provide additional mitigation not included in the 0.5 °C calculation.\textsuperscript{255}

o Improving energy efficiency of cooling equipment during the HFC phasedown can more than double the climate benefits in CO\textsubscript{2}e by reducing emissions from the power plants that provide the electricity to run the equipment.\textsuperscript{256}

o As of August 2022, 137 countries have accepted, ratified, or approved the Kigali Amendment, including China and India.\textsuperscript{257}

o The U.S. is implementing the Kigali phasedown schedule through the American Innovation and Manufacturing (AIM) Act signed into law in December 2020. The AIM Act and related implementing regulations will reduce the production and consumption of HFCs by 85% by 2036.\textsuperscript{258} Twelve states have instituted HFC prohibitions for products and equipment where low-GWP alternatives are available, and six more proposed HFC bans.\textsuperscript{259} On 21 September 2022 the U.S. Senate approved ratification of the Kigali Amendment.\textsuperscript{260}

E. Nitrous oxide (N\textsubscript{2}O)

While not an SLCP, long-lived nitrous oxide (N\textsubscript{2}O) is the most significant anthropogenic ozone-depleting greenhouse gas not yet controlled by the Montreal Protocol.\textsuperscript{261} Through mandatory control measures, the Montreal Protocol could spur adoption of technologies to reduce N\textsubscript{2}O emissions, which are contributing the equivalent of about 10% of today’s CO\textsubscript{2} warming.\textsuperscript{262}

Mitigation

- Controlling N\textsubscript{2}O emissions could provide climate mitigation of about 1.67 GtCO\textsubscript{2}e GWP\textsubscript{100} by 2050 with 0.94 GtCO\textsubscript{2}e from agriculture and about 0.6 GtCO\textsubscript{2}e from industry in 2050.\textsuperscript{263} In the industrial sector, abatement technology has been available and utilized by manufacturers in developed countries since the 1990s.\textsuperscript{264} Moreover, only five countries produce 86% of industrial N\textsubscript{2}O: China, the United States, Singapore, Egypt, and Russia.\textsuperscript{265}
- In the agriculture sector, several solutions have been found to be cost-effective in reducing N\textsubscript{2}O emissions from agricultural processes: precision farming using variable rate technology and nitrogen inhibitors that suppress the microbial activity that produces N\textsubscript{2}O. Studies have found that variable rate technology can increase yields by 1–10% while reducing 4–37% of nitrogen fertilization.\textsuperscript{266} Moreover, allowing a continued increase in N\textsubscript{2}O emissions while reducing CO\textsubscript{2} and CH\textsubscript{4} emissions could reverse progress on recovery of the stratospheric ozone layer.\textsuperscript{267}
  - Another solution, the SOP product line,\textsuperscript{268} stimulates nitrogen uptake in crops and inhibits GHG emissions from manure.\textsuperscript{269}

5. Other fast mitigation strategies can complement efforts to slow warming in the near term

A. Protecting the Arctic albedo and permafrost

Rapid reductions in SLCPs are key to protecting the Arctic. The Global Methane Assessment calculated that strategies to cut methane emissions by 40–45% by 2030 could avoid nearly 0.3 °C by the 2040s, and 0.5 °C in the Arctic by 2050, 60% more than the global average.\textsuperscript{270} The 2011 UNEP/WMO Integrated Assessment of Black Carbon and Tropospheric Ozone calculated that
fully implementing measures targeting methane and black carbon could reduce the rate of global warming by half and reduce Arctic warming by two-thirds.\textsuperscript{271}

- The Arctic is nearly five times more sensitive to black carbon emitted in the Arctic region than from similar emissions in the mid-latitudes.\textsuperscript{272} In the Arctic, black carbon not only warms the atmosphere but also facilitates additional warming by darkening the snow and ice and reducing albedo, or reflectivity, allowing the darker surface to absorb extra solar radiation and cause further melting.\textsuperscript{273}
  - Heavy-Fuel Oil (HFO) used in shipping is a significant source of black carbon, and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) will ban HFO use in the Arctic beginning in July 2024 for some ships, with waivers and exemptions for others until July 2029.\textsuperscript{274} (HFO has been banned in the Antarctic since 2011.\textsuperscript{275})
  - Because of the exemptions, the HFO ban will not have a big impact this decade. If the measures that will go into effect in July 2024 had been in effect in 2019, they would have banned only 16\% of HFO used in the Arctic and reduced only 5\% of the black carbon.\textsuperscript{276} However, if the Arctic HFO ban were imposed without the waivers or exemptions, black carbon emissions could have been reduced by 30\%.\textsuperscript{277}
  - In 2019, Arctic Council countries set a collective target of reducing black carbon emissions by 25–33\% by 2025 compared to 2013 levels.\textsuperscript{278} Adopting best available techniques could halve black carbon emissions by 2025 and surpass the current goal.\textsuperscript{279} These reductions would improve air quality by reducing exposure of fine particle concentrations from 18 million to 1 million people by 2050 and avoid 40\% of air pollution-related deaths in Arctic Council countries by mid-century.\textsuperscript{280}
  - In 2021, the IMO adopted a voluntary resolution to reduce black carbon emissions in the Arctic after the annual meeting of the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee. In addition to this resolution, the Committee also agreed to revise their GHG Strategy, adopt a voluntary resolution on using cleaner fuel in the Arctic, and address marine plastic litter from ships.\textsuperscript{281}
  - Banning investments in oil and gas development in the Arctic can help to further protect the region. All the major U.S. banks—Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Citi, and Morgan Stanley—have committed not to fund oil and gas exploration in the Arctic.\textsuperscript{282} Insurance companies are also starting to commit to banning coverage of Arctic oil projects, including AXA, Swiss RE, and Zurich Insurance.\textsuperscript{283}

- For Arctic ice management, additional strategies being investigated for protecting and restoring Arctic ice include enhancing albedo of Arctic sea ice and thickening sea ice.\textsuperscript{284}

**B. Protecting forests and other sinks**

Deforestation combined with global warming risks enhancing warming feedbacks and crossing ecosystem tipping points. Halting the destruction of our forests and other carbon sinks\textsuperscript{285} so they continue to store carbon and do not turn into sources of CO\textsubscript{2} can provide fast mitigation, while also protecting biodiversity.\textsuperscript{286}

- Already, 17\% to 20\% of the Amazon forest has been destroyed,\textsuperscript{287} and there is an expected tipping point when 20 to 40\% is lost.\textsuperscript{288} Continued deforestation and drying in the Amazon under high-emissions scenarios could result in up to a 50\% loss in forest cover by 2050.\textsuperscript{289}
Changes to the global water cycle may be pushing the Amazon to a tipping point.\textsuperscript{290} The combination of drier conditions, deforestation, and warming have been reducing Amazon forest resilience since 2000, increasing the risk of dieback.\textsuperscript{291}

With increased deforestation, including from fires, greater disturbances, and higher temperatures, there is a point beyond which the Amazon rainforest would be difficult to reestablish,\textsuperscript{292} with recent measurements suggesting that the southeastern area of the Amazon has already shifted to a net carbon source as tree mortality increases and photosynthesis decreases.\textsuperscript{293}

Tropical and Boreal forest dieback could contribute up to 200 PgC [733 GtCO\textsubscript{2}] by 2100.\textsuperscript{294}

- Conservation International estimates that Earth’s ecosystems contain 139 billion metric tons (Gt C) [510 GtCO\textsubscript{2}] of “irrecoverable carbon,” defined as carbon stored in natural systems that “are vulnerable to release from human activity and, if lost, could not be restored by 2050.” The highest concentrations of irrecoverable carbon are in the Amazon (31.5 Gt C) [115.5 GtCO\textsubscript{2}], the Congo Basin (8.1 Gt C) [29.7 GtCO\textsubscript{2}], and New Guinea (7.3 Gt C) [26.8 GtCO\textsubscript{2}], with additional reserves in boreal forests, mangroves, and peatlands.\textsuperscript{295}

- Under current warming trends, the global land sink, which now mitigates ~30\% of carbon emissions, could be cut by half as early as 2040, as increasing temperatures reduce photosynthesis and speed up respiration,\textsuperscript{296} calling into question national pledges under the Paris Accord, which rely heavily on land uptake of carbon to meet mitigation goals.\textsuperscript{297}

Nature-based solutions help limit warming in three ways: first, protecting forests and sinks prevents the release of carbon; second, restoring critical forests and sinks sequester carbon; and third, improving land management can both reduce emissions of carbon, methane, and nitrous oxide and sequester carbon.\textsuperscript{298}

- Effective ways to protect forests, peatlands, and other sinks include:
  - Promoting forest protection and proforestation to allow existing forests to achieve their full ecological potential;\textsuperscript{299}
  - Preserving existing peatlands and restoring degraded peatlands;\textsuperscript{300}
  - Restoring coastal “blue carbon” ecosystems;\textsuperscript{301} and
  - Prohibiting bioenergy.\textsuperscript{302}

- Global government-led efforts to protect forests are increasing.
  - At COP26, world leaders agreed to halt deforestation by 2030 in the \textbf{Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration on Forests and Land Use}. As of August 2022, 145 countries have committed to this agreement, including Brazil, China, Russia, and the United States, covering about 91\% of the world’s forests.\textsuperscript{303} This declaration includes $12 billion in funding for forest-related climate finance between 2021–2025, an additional $7 billion in funding from private companies, and a global roadmap to make 75\% of forest commodity supply chains sustainable.\textsuperscript{304}
  - The U.S. launched a parallel domestic \textbf{Plan to Conserve Global Forests: Critical Carbon Sinks}; this is an “all-of-government effort” to end natural forest loss, preserve global ecosystems, including carbon sinks, and restore at least an additional 200 million hectares of forests and other ecosystems by 2030 with a dedicated fund of $9 billion to support this effort.\textsuperscript{305}
C. Removing super pollutants from the atmosphere

Scientists and funders are developing a research agenda for removing methane and other non-CO\(_2\) greenhouse gases from the atmosphere.\(^{306}\) Pathways under consideration for methane removal include catalytic oxidation, microbial filters, and augmentation of natural sinks.\(^{307}\) Catalytic systems are likely to involve technology already being developed for application to environments with heightened methane concentrations, such as coal mines and dairy barns.

- The U.S. government has started to explore options to remove methane from the atmosphere.
  - In April 2021, the Department of Energy’s Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E) announced a $35 million program to reduce methane emissions, called REMEDY (Reducing Emissions of Methane Every Day of the Year). This three-year research program looks to reduce methane emissions from the oil, gas, and coal sectors. According to ARPA-E, these three sources contribute to at least 10% of U.S. anthropogenic methane emissions.\(^{308}\) In developing the REMEDY program, ARPA-E recognized the need for further research on methane capture from the air in parallel with efforts to capture CO\(_2\).\(^{309}\)
  - In December 2021, ARPA-E awarded grants for a catalytic oxidation system targeting lean-burn natural-gas-fired engine exhaust, multiple catalysis-based systems for coal-mine ventilation, and the development of a low-cost, copper-based catalyst.\(^{310}\)
  - In July 2022, ARPA-E’s budget was doubled by the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) and Science Act.\(^{311}\)
- Other methane removal interventions might target natural methane sources.
  - One company is testing the possibility of installing passive systems to capture and flare methane bubbling from Arctic lakes.\(^{312}\)
- These methane and non-CO\(_2\) removal efforts could complement carbon removal projects in the U.S.,\(^{313}\) Europe,\(^{314}\) and elsewhere.

IGSD’s (2022) *Background Note on Methane Removal* provides further information on proposed and active research efforts.

6. Conclusion

Global warming is projected to cross the 1.5 °C guardrail as soon as the early 2030s. Policies that rely on decarbonization alone are insufficient to slow the near-term warming to keep the planet even below the more dangerous 2.0 °C threshold. *We need to urgently broaden our approach to climate mitigation to target both carbon dioxide (CO\(_2\)) and other largely neglected pollutants to address the near-term and long-term impacts of climate disruption, reduce the risk of crossing irreversible tipping points, and maintain a livable planet.*

Combining efforts to cut CO\(_2\) emissions by decarbonizing the energy system with mitigation measures targeting non-CO\(_2\) SLCPs methane, HFC refrigerants, black carbon soot, and ground-level ozone smog, as well as nitrous oxide, would reduce the rate of warming by half from 2030 to 2050, which would slow the rate of warming a decade or two earlier than decarbonization alone and *make it possible for the world to stay below the 1.5 °C guardrail.*\(^{315}\) This strategy of a sprint this decade to slow warming in the near term by cutting SLCPs and protecting carbon sinks through nature-based solutions complements the marathon to net zero by 2050 to stabilize temperatures in the longer term.\(^{316}\)
AR6 is a “code red” for the climate emergency. The IPCC’s 2018 *Special Report on 1.5 °C* presented the three essential strategies for keeping the planet relatively safe: reducing CO$_2$, reducing SLCPs, and removing up to 1 trillion tons of CO$_2$ from the atmosphere by 2100. Cutting SLCPs is the only known strategy that can slow warming and feedbacks in time to avoid catastrophic and perhaps existential impacts from Hothouse Earth, other than perhaps solar radiation management, which carries its own risks.

In 2021, more leaders and policymakers recognized the importance and potential of targeting super climate pollutants than ever before. A new climate architecture is starting to emerge, as demonstrated in the realignment of goals of the delayed COP26 in 2021 compared to the goals announced in 2020:

> “Four shifts in focus reflect this new architecture; first, the near-unanimous recognition of the impending climate emergency and the need to limit warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius; second, the recognition “that 2030 is the new 2050,” as French President Emmanuel Macron said, and that major emission cuts have to be made in this decade (note also that the U.S.-China Joint Glasgow Declaration marked the first time that the United States and China acknowledged the urgency of climate action in this “critical decade” of the 2020s); third, the recognition that cutting non-CO$_2$ emissions (particularly methane) is essential for slowing warming in the next couple of decades and that cuts to CO$_2$ alone cannot address the near-term emergency; and fourth, the addition of sector-specific approaches in recognition that it is often more efficient and effective to address individual sectors of the economy in reaching climate solutions.”
aggressive decarbonization to achieve net-zero CO₂ emissions in the 2050s (as in the decarb-only scenario) results in weakly accelerated net warming compared to the reference case, with a positive warming up to 0.03 °C in the mid-2030s, and no net avoided warming until the mid-2040s due to the reduction in co-emitted cooling aerosols (Figure 3a). By 2050, decarbonization measures result in very limited net avoided warming (0.07°C), consistent with Shindell and Smith (43), but rise to a likely detectable 0.25°C by 2060 and a major benefit of 1.4°C by 2100 (Table S5). In contrast, pairing decarbonization with mitigation measures targeting CH₄, BC, HFC, and N₂O (not an SLCP due to its longer lifetime) independent from decarbonization are essential to slowing the rate of warming by the 2030s to under 0.3°C per decade (Table 1, Figure 3b), similar to the 0.2°C to 0.25°C per decade warming prior to 2020 (38, 53). Recent studies suggest that rate of warming rather than level of warming controls likelihood of record-shattering extreme weather events (54, 55). By 2050, the net avoided warming from the targeted non-CO₂ measures is 0.26°C, almost 4 times larger than the net benefit of decarbonization alone (0.07°C) (Table S5).”). See also Xu Y. & Ramanathan V. (2017) Well below 2 °C: Mitigation strategies for avoiding dangerous to catastrophic climate changes, Proc. Nat’l. Acad. Sci. 114(39): 10315–10323, 10321 (“Constrained by CO₂ lifetime and the diffusion time of new technologies (decades), the scenarios considered here (SI Appendix, Fig. S2A) suggest that about half of the 2.6 °C CO₂ warming in the baseline-fast scenario can be mitigated by 2100 and only 0.1–0.3 °C can be mitigated by 2050… The SP [super pollutant] lever targets SLCPs. Reducing SLCP emissions thins the SP blanket within few decades, given the shorter lifetimes of SLCPs (weeks for BC to about 15 years for HFCs). The mitigation potential of the SP lever with a maximum deployment of current technologies … is about 0.6 °C by 2050 and 1.2 °C by 2100 (SI Appendix, Fig. S5B and Table S1).”).

2 United Nations Environment Programme & World Meteorological Organization (2011) Integrated Assessment of Black Carbon and Tropospheric Ozone, 254, 262 (“Evaluating global mean temperature change, it was found that the targeted measures to reduce emissions of methane and BC could greatly reduce warming rates over the next few decades (Figure 6.1; Box 6.1). When all measures are fully implemented, warming during the 2030s relative to the present would be only half as much as in the reference scenario. In contrast, even a fairly aggressive strategy to reduce CO₂ emissions, as for the CO₂-measures scenario, does little to mitigate warming until after the next 20-30 years (Box 6.2).”); “Large impacts of the measures examined here were also seen for the Arctic despite the minimal amount of emissions currently taking place there. This occurs due to the high sensitivity of the Arctic both to pollutants that are transported there from remote sources and to radiative forcing that takes place in areas of the northern hemisphere outside the Arctic. The 16 measures examined here, including the measures on pellet stoves and coal briquettes, reduce warming in the Arctic by 0.7 °C (range 0.2 to 1.3 °C) at 2040. This is a large portion of the 1.1 °C (range 0.7 to 1.7 °C) warming projected under the reference scenario for the Arctic, and hence implementation of the measures would be virtually certain to substantially slow, but not halt, the pace of Arctic climate change.”). See also Shindell D., et al. (2012) Simultaneously Mitigating Near-Term Climate Change and Improving Human Health and Food Security, Science 335(6065): 183–189, 184–185 (“The global mean response to the CH₄ plus BC measures was −0.54 ± 0.05°C in the climate model. …Roughly half the forcing is relatively evenly distributed (from the CH₄ measures). The other half is highly inhomogeneous, especially the strong BC forcing, which is greatest over bright desert and snow or ice surfaces. Those areas often exhibit the largest warming mitigation, making the regional temperature response to aerosols and ozone quite distinct from the more homogeneous response to well-mixed greenhouse gases…. BC albedo and direct forcings are large in the Himalayas, where there is an especially pronounced response in the Karakoram, and in the Arctic, where the measures reduce projected warming over the next three decades by approximately two thirds and where regional temperature response patterns correspond fairly closely to albedo forcing (for example, they are larger over the Canadian archipelago than the interior and larger over Russia than Scandinavia or the North Atlantic.”); and Naik V., et al. (2021) Chapter 6: Short-lived climate forcers, in Climate Change 2021: the Physical Science Basis, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 6-7 (“Across the SSPs,
the collective reduction of CH₄, ozone precursors and HFCs can make a difference of global mean surface air temperature of 0.2 with a very likely range of [0.1–0.4] °C in 2040 and 0.8 with a very likely range of [0.5–1.3] °C at the end of the 21st century (comparing SSP3-7.0 and SSP1-1.9), which is substantial in the context of the Paris Agreement. Sustained methane mitigation, wherever it occurs, stands out as an option that combines near- and long-term gains on surface temperature (high confidence) and leads to air quality benefits by reducing surface ozone levels globally (high confidence). {6.6.3, 6.7.3, 4.4.4}).


4 Xu Y., Ramanathan V., & Victor D. G. (2018) Global warming will happen faster than we think. Comment, NATURE 564(7734): 30–32, 30–31 (“But the latest IPCC special report underplays another alarming fact: global warming is accelerating. Three trends—rising emissions, declining air pollution and natural climate cycles—will combine over the next 20 years to make climate change faster and more furious than anticipated. In our view, there’s a good chance that we could breach the 1.5 °C level by 2030, not by 2040 as projected in the special report (see ‘Accelerated warming’). The climate-modelling community has not grappled enough with the rapid changes that policymakers care most about, preferring to focus on longer-term trends and equilibria.”). Since Xu, Ramanathan, and Victor comment was published, the IPCC has updated its estimate for when 1.5 °C will be exceeded: see Arias P. A., et al. (2021) Technical Summary, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), TS-9 (“Timing of crossing 1.5°C global warming: Slightly different approaches are used in SR1.5 and in this Report. SR1.5 assessed a likely range of 2030 to 2052 for reaching a global warming level of 1.5°C (for a 30-year period), assuming a continued, constant rate of warming. In AR6, combining the larger estimate of global warming to date and the assessed climate response to all considered scenarios, the central estimate of crossing 1.5°C of global warming (for a 20-year period) occurs in the early 2030s, ten years earlier than the midpoint of the likely range assessed in the SR1.5, assuming no major volcanic eruption. (TS.1.3, Cross-Section Box TS.1)”). See also Dvorak M. T., Armour K. C., Frierson D. M. W., Proistosescu C., Baker M. B., & Smith C. J. (2022) Estimating the timing of geophysical commitment to 1.5 and 2.0 °C of global warming, NAT. CLIM. CHANGE 12: 547–552, 547 (“Following abrupt cessation of anthropogenic emissions, decreases in short-lived aerosols would lead to a warming peak within a decade, followed by slow cooling as GHG concentrations decline. This implies a geophysical commitment to temporarily crossing warming levels before reaching them. Here we use an emissions-based climate model (FaIR) to estimate temperature change following cessation of emissions in 2021 and in every year thereafter until 2080 following eight Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs). Assuming a medium-emissions trajectory (SSP2–4.5), we find that we are already committed to peak warming greater than 1.5 °C with 42% probability, increasing to 66% by 2029 (340 GtCO₂ relative to 2021). Probability of peak warming greater than 2.0 °C is currently 2%, increasing to 66% by 2057 (1,550 GtCO₂ relative to 2021). Because climate can return from peak warming as GHG concentrations decline, committed warming of 1.5 °C in 2100 will not occur with at least 66% probability until 2055.”).

5 Madge G. (8 May 2022) Temporary breaching of 1.5°C in next five years?, UK MET OFFICE (“The chance of at least one year exceeding 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels between 2022-2026 is about as likely as not (48%). However, there is only a very small chance (10%) of the five-year mean exceeding this threshold.”); discussing World Meteorological Organization (2022) GLOBAL ANNUAL TO DEcadAL CLIMATE UPDATE. See also Hook L. (9 May 2022) World on course to breach global 1.5°C warming threshold within five years, FINANCIAL TIMES. For previous years, see World Meteorological Organization (2021) WMO GLOBAL ANNUAL TO DEcadAL CLIMATE UPDATE, 5 (“Relative to pre-industrial conditions, the annual mean global near surface temperature is predicted to be between 0.9°C and 1.8°C higher (90% confidence interval). The chance of at least one year exceeding 1.5°C above pre-
industrial levels is 44% and is increasing with time. There is a very small chance (10%) of the five-year mean exceeding this threshold. The Paris Agreement refers to a global temperature increase of 1.5°C, which is normally interpreted as the long-term warming, but temporary exceedances would be expected as global temperatures approach the threshold.”; discussed in Hodgson C. (26 May 2021) *Chance of temporarily reaching 1.5°C in warming is rising*, WMO says, Financial Times. *Compare with* World Meteorological Organization (2020) *United in Science* 2020, 16 (“Figure 2 shows that in the five-year period 2020–2024, the annual mean global near surface temperature is predicted to be between 0.91 °C and 1.59 °C above pre-industrial conditions (taken as the average over the period 1850 to 1900). The chance of at least one year exceeding 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels is 24%, with a very small chance (3%) of the five-year mean exceeding this level. Confidence in forecasts of global mean temperature is high. However, the coronavirus lockdown caused changes in emissions of greenhouse gases and aerosols that were not included in the forecast models. The impact of changes in greenhouse gases is likely small based on early estimates (Le Quéré et al. 2020 and Carbonbrief.org").”


7 Arias P. A., et al. (2021) *Technical Summary*, in Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), TS-59 (“The net effect of changes in clouds in response to global warming is to amplify human-induced warming, that is, the net cloud feedback is positive (high confidence”).) See also Ceppi P. & Nowack P. (2021) *Observational evidence that cloud feedback amplifies global warming*, Proc. Nat’l. Acad. Sci. 118(30): 1–7, 4 (“Global warming drives changes in Earth’s cloud cover, which, in turn, may amplify or dampen climate change. This “cloud feedback” is the single most important cause of uncertainty in Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity (ECS)—the equilibrium global warming following a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide. Using data from Earth observations and climate model simulations, we here develop a statistical learning analysis of how clouds respond to changes in the environment. We show that global cloud feedback is dominated by the sensitivity of clouds to surface temperature and tropospheric stability. Considering changes in just these two factors, we are able to constrain global cloud feedback to 0.43 ± 0.35 W m⁻² K⁻¹ (90% confidence), implying a robustly amplifying effect of clouds on global warming and only a 0.5% chance of ECS below 2 K. … Our global constraint implies that a globally positive cloud feedback is virtually certain, thus strengthening prior theoretical and modeling evidence that clouds will provide a moderate amplifying feedback on global warming through a combination of [terrestrial] LW [longwave] and [solar] SW [shortwave] changes. This positive cloud feedback renders ECS lower than 2 K extremely unlikely, confirming scientific understanding that sustained greenhouse gas emissions will cause substantial future warming and potentially dangerous climate change.”); discussed in Berwyn B. (19 July 2021) *Climate-Driven Changes in Clouds are Likely to Amplify Global Warming*, Inside Climate News (“New research, using machine learning, helps project how the buildup of greenhouse gases will change clouds in ways that further heat the planet.”).

8 Copernicus Climate Services (10 January 2022) *Copernicus: Globally, the seven hottest years on record were the last seven; carbon dioxide and methane concentrations continue to rise* (“Globally, 2021 was the fifth warmest year on record, but only marginally warmer than 2015 and 2018; The annual average temperature was 0.3°C above the temperature of the 1991-2020 reference period, and 1.1-1.2°C above the pre-industrial level of 1850-1900; The last seven years have been the warmest years on record by a clear margin”). See also National Aeronautics and Space Administration (13 January 2022) *2021 Tied for 6th Warmest Year in Continued Trend*, NASA Analysis Shows; National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (13 January 2022) *2021 was world’s 6th-warmest year on record*; National Aeronautics and Space Administration (14 January 2021) *2020 Tied for Warmest Year on Record*, NASA Analysis Shows (“Tracking global temperature trends provides a critical indicator of the impact of human activities – specifically, greenhouse gas emissions – on our planet. Earth’s average temperature has risen more than 2 degrees Fahrenheit (1.2 degrees Celsius) since the late 19th century.”); and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2021) Summary for Policymakers, in Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), SPM-6 (“The likely range of total human-caused global surface temperature increase from 1850–1900 to 2010–2019 [11] is 0.8°C to 1.3°C, with a best estimate of 1.0°C. It is likely that well-mixed GHGs contributed a warming of 1.0°C to 2.0°C, other human drivers (principally aerosols) contributed a cooling of 0.0°C to 0.8°C, natural drivers changed global surface temperature by –0.1°C to 0.1°C, and internal variability changed it by –0.2°C to 0.2°C. It is very likely that well-mixed GHGs were the main driver[12] of tropospheric warming since 1979, and extremely
likely that human-caused stratospheric ozone depletion was the main driver of cooling of the lower stratosphere between 1979 and the mid-1990s.”… Footnote 11: “The period distinction with A.1.2 arises because the attribution studies consider this slightly earlier period. The observed warming to 2010–2019 is 1.06 [0.88 to 1.21] °C.” Footnote 12: “Throughout this SPM, ‘main driver’ means responsible for more than 50% of the change.”).

9 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2022) Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Shukla P. R., et al. (eds.), SPM-31 (“In modelled global low emission pathways, the projected reduction of cooling and warming aerosol emissions over time leads to net warming in the near- to mid-term. In these mitigation pathways, the projected reductions of cooling aerosols are mostly due to reduced fossil fuel combustion that was not equipped with effective air pollution controls.”). See also Naik V., et al. (2021) Chapter 6: Short-lived climate forcers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 6-8 (“Additional CH₄ and BC mitigation would contribute to offsetting the additional warming associated with SO₂ reductions that would accompany decarbonization (high confidence).”); Ramanathan V. & Feng Y. (2008) On avoiding dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system: Formidable challenges ahead, PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 105(38): 14245–14250, 14248 (“Switching from coal to “cleaner” natural gas will reduce CO₂ emission and thus would be effective in minimizing future increases in the committed warming. However, because it also reduces air pollution and thus the ABC [Atmospheric Brown Cloud] masking effect, it may speed up the approach to the committed warming of 2.4°C (1.4–4.3°C).”); and United Nations Environment Programme & World Meteorological Organization (2011) INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF BLACK CARBON AND TROPOSPHERIC OZONE, 254 (“Evaluating global mean temperature change, it was found that the targeted measures to reduce emissions of methane and BC could greatly reduce warming rates over the next few decades (Figure 6.1; Box 6.1). When all measures are fully implemented, warming during the 2030s relative to the present would be only half as much as in the reference scenario. In contrast, even a fairly aggressive strategy to reduce CO₂ emissions, as for the CO₂-measures scenario, does little to mitigate warming until after the next 20–30 years (Box 6.2). In fact, sulphur dioxide (SO₂) is coemitted with CO₂ in some of the most highly emitting activities, coal burning in large-scale combustion such as in power plants, for example, that are obvious targets for reduced usage under a CO₂-emissions mitigation strategy. Hence such strategies can lead to additional near-term warming (Figure 6.1), in a well-known temporary effect (e.g. Raes and Seinfeld, 2009), although most of the nearer term warming is driven by CO₂ emissions in the past. The CO₂-measures scenario clearly leads to long-term benefits however, with a dramatically lower warming rate at 2070 under that scenario than under the scenario with only CH₄ and BC measures (see Figure 6.1 and timescales in Box 6.2). Hence the near-term measures clearly cannot be substituted for measures to reduce emissions of long-lived GHGs. The near-term measures largely target different source sectors for emissions than the CO₂ measures, so that the emissions reductions of the short-lived pollutants are almost identical regardless of whether the CO₂ measures are implemented or not, as shown in Chapter 5. The near-term measures and the CO₂ measures also impact climate change over different timescales owing to the different lifetimes of these substances. In essence, the near-term CH₄ and BC measures are effectively uncoupled from CO₂ measures examined here.”).

10 Molina M., Zaelke D., Sarma K. M., Andersen S. O., Ramanathan V., & Kaniu R. (2009) Reducing abrupt climate change risk using the Montreal Protocol and other regulatory actions to complement cuts in CO₂ emissions, PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 106(49): 20616–20621, 20616 (“Current emissions of anthropogenic greenhouse gases (GHGs) have already committed the planet to an increase in average surface temperature by the end of the century that may be above the critical threshold for tipping elements of the climate system into abrupt change with potentially irreversible and unmanageable consequences. This would mean that the climate system is close to entering if not already within the zone of “dangerous anthropogenic interference” (DAI). Scientific and policy literature refers to the need for “early,” “urgent,” “rapid,” and “fast-action” mitigation to help avoid DAI and abrupt climate changes. We define “fast-action” to include regulatory measures that can begin within 2–3 years, be substantially implemented in 5–10 years, and produce a climate response within decades. We discuss strategies for short-lived non-CO₂ GHGs and particles, where existing agreements can be used to accomplish mitigation objectives. Policy makers can amend the Montreal Protocol to phase down the production and consumption of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) with high global warming potential. Other fast-action strategies can reduce emissions of black carbon particles and precursor gases that lead to ozone formation in the lower atmosphere, and increase biosequestration, including through biochar. These and other fast-action strategies may reduce the risk of abrupt climate change in the next few decades by complementing cuts in CO₂ emissions.”). See also Molina M., Ramanathan V. & Zaelke D. (2020) Best path to net zero: Cut short-lived climate pollutants, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (“And let us be clear: By “speed,” we mean measures—including regulatory ones—that can begin within two-to-three years, be substantially implemented in five-to-10 years, and produce a climate response within the next decade or two.”).
The chance of triggering CTPs is already non-negligible and will grow even with stringent climate mitigation (SSP1-1.9 in Fig. 2, B and C). Nevertheless, achieving the Paris Agreement’s aim to pursue efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C would clearly be safer than keeping global warming below 2°C (90) (Fig. 2). Going from 1.5 to 2°C increases the likelihood of committing to WAIS and GrIS collapse near complete warm-water coral die-off, and abrupt permafrost thaw; further, the best estimate threshold for LABC collapse is crossed. The likelihood of triggering AMOC collapse, Boreal forest shifts, and extra-polar glacier loss becomes non-negligible at >1.5°C and glacier loss becomes likely by ~2°C. A cluster of abrupt shifts occur in ESMs at 1.5 to 2°C (19). Although not tipping elements, ASSI loss could become regular by 2°C, gradual permafrost thaw would likely become widespread beyond 1.5°C, and land carbon sink weakening would become significant by 2°C.”) See also Lent...towards the threshold beyond which is Hothouse Earth (Fig. 2). The humancreated Stabilized Earth pathway leads to a basin of attraction that is not likely to exist in the Earth System’s stability landscape away from its current trajectory toward the threshold beyond which is Hothouse Earth (Fig. 2). The hu...the entire population or a massive relocation of most of the population to safer climates. … If damaging tipping cascades occur and a global tipping point cannot be ruled out, then this is an existential threat to civilization. No amount of economic cost–benefit analysis is going to help us. We need to change our approach to the climate problem. … In our view, the evidence from tipping points alone suggests that we are in a state of planetary emergency: both the risk and urgency of the situation are acute….”); and Steffen W., et al. (2018) Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene. PROC. NAT’L. ACADEM. SCI. 115(33): 8252–8259, 8254 (“This analysis implies that, even if the Paris Accord target of a 1.5 °C to 2.0 °C rise in temperature is met, we cannot exclude the risk that a cascade of feedbacks could push the Earth System irreversibly onto a “Hothouse Earth” pathway. The challenge that humanity faces is to create a “Stabilized Earth” pathway that steers the Earth System away from its current trajectory toward the threshold beyond which is Hothouse Earth (Fig. 2). The humancreated Stabilized Earth pathway leads to a basin of attraction that is not likely to exist in the Earth System’s stability landscape without human stewardship to create and maintain it. Creating such a pathway and basin of attraction requires a fundamental change in the role of humans on the planet. This stewardship role requires deliberate and sustained action to become an integral, adaptive part of Earth System dynamics, creating feedbacks that keep the system on a Stabilized Earth pathway (Alternative Stabilized Earth Pathway).”).

11 Armstrong McKay D. I., Staal A., Abrams J. F., Winkelmann R., Sakschewski B., Loriani S., Fetzer I., Cornell S. E., Rockström J., & Lenton T. M. (2022) Exceeding 1.5°C global warming could trigger multiple climate tipping points. SCIENCE 377(6611): eabn7950, 1–10. 7 (“The chance of triggering CTPs is already non-negligible and will grow even with stringent climate mitigation (SSP1-1.9 in Fig. 2, B and C). Nevertheless, achieving the Paris Agreement’s aim to pursue efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C would clearly be safer than keeping global warming below 2°C (90) (Fig. 2). Going from 1.5 to 2°C increases the likelihood of committing to WAIS and GrIS collapse near complete warm-water coral die-off, and abrupt permafrost thaw; further, the best estimate threshold for LABC collapse is crossed. The likelihood of triggering AMOC collapse, Boreal forest shifts, and extra-polar glacier loss becomes non-negligible at >1.5°C and glacier loss becomes likely by ~2°C. A cluster of abrupt shifts occur in ESMs at 1.5 to 2°C (19). Although not tipping elements, ASSI loss could become regular by 2°C, gradual permafrost thaw would likely become widespread beyond 1.5°C, and land carbon sink weakening would become significant by 2°C.”). See also Lent...towards the threshold beyond which is Hothouse Earth (Fig. 2). The humancreated Stabilized Earth pathway leads to a basin of attraction that is not likely to exist in the Earth System’s stability landscape away from its current trajectory toward the threshold beyond which is Hothouse Earth (Fig. 2). The humancreated Stabilized Earth pathway leads to a basin of attraction that is not likely to exist in the Earth System’s stability landscape without human stewardship to create and maintain it. Creating such a pathway and basin of attraction requires a fundamental change in the role of humans on the planet. This stewardship role requires deliberate and sustained action to become an integral, adaptive part of Earth System dynamics, creating feedbacks that keep the system on a Stabilized Earth pathway (Alternative Stabilized Earth Pathway).”).

12 Xu Y. & Ramanathan V. (2017) Well below 2°C: Mitigation strategies for avoiding dangerous to catastrophic climate changes. PROC. NAT’L. ACADEM. SCI. 114(39): 10319–10323, 10320 (“Box 2. Risk Categorization of Climate Change to Society. … [A] 2 °C warming would double the land area subject to deadly heat and expose 48% of the population. A 4 °C warming by 2100 would subject 47% of the land area and almost 74% of the world population to deadly heat, which could pose existential risks to humans and mammals alike unless massive adaptation measures are implemented, such as providing air conditioning to the entire population or a massive relocation of most of the population to safer climates. … This bottom 3 billion population comprises mostly subsistent farmers, whose livelihood will be severely impacted, if not destroyed, with a one- to five-year megadrought, heat waves, or heavy floods; for those among the bottom 3 billion of the world’s population who are living in coastal areas, a 1- to 2-m rise in sea level (likely with a warming in excess of 3 °C) poses existential threat if they do not relocate or migrate. It has been estimated that several hundred million people would be subject to famine with warming in excess of 4 °C (54). However, there has essentially been no discussion on warming beyond 5 °C. Climate change-induced species extinction is one major concern with warming of such large magnitudes (>5 °C). The current rate of loss of species is ~1,000-fold the historical rate, due largely to habitat destruction. At this rate, about 25% of species are in danger of extinction in the coming decades (56). Global warming of 6 °C or more (accompanied by increase in ocean acidity due to increased CO2) can act as a major force multiplier and expose as much as 90% of species to the dangers of extinction (57). The bodily harms combined with climate change-forced species destruction, biodiversity loss, and threats to water and food security, as summarized recently (58), motivated us to categorize warming beyond 5 °C as unknown??, implying the possibility of existential threats.”). See also Xu C., Kohler T. A., Lenton T. M., Svenning J.-C., & Scheffer M. (2020) Future of the human climate niche. PROC. NAT’L. ACADEM. SCI. 117(21): 11350–11355, 11350 (“Here, we demonstrate that for millennia, human populations have resided in the same narrow part of the climatic envelope available on the globe, characterized by a major mode around ~11 °C to 15 °C mean annual
temperature (MAT). …We show that in a business-as-usual climate change scenario, the geographical position of this temperature niche is projected to shift more over the coming 50 y than it has moved since 6000 BP. …Specifically, 3.5 billion people will be exposed to MAT ≥29.0 °C, a situation found in the present climate only in 0.8% of the global land surface, mostly concentrated in the Sahara, but in 2070 projected to cover 19% of the global land (Fig. 3). …For instance, accounting for population growth projected in the SSP3 scenario, each degree of temperature rise above the current baseline roughly corresponds to one billion humans left outside the temperature niche, absent migration (SI Appendix, Fig. S14.”; Watts N., et al. (2021) The 2020 report of The Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: responding to converging crises. The LANCET 397(10269): 129–170, 129 (“Vulnerable populations were exposed to an additional 475 million heatwave events globally in 2019, which was, in turn, reflected in excess morbidity and mortality (indicator 1.1.2). During the past 20 years, there has been a 53.7% increase in heat-related mortality in people older than 65 years, reaching a total of 296 000 deaths in 2018 (indicator 1.1.3). The high cost in terms of human lives and suffering is associated with effects on economic output, with 302 billion h of potential labour capacity lost in 2019 (indicator 1.1.4). India and Indonesia were among the worst affected countries, seeing losses of potential labour capacity equivalent to 4–6% of their annual gross domestic product (indicator 4.1.3.”); and Atwoli L., et al. (2021) Call for emergency action to limit global temperature increases, restore biodiversity, and protect health. The LANCET 398(10304): 939–941, 939 (“Harms disproportionately affect the most vulnerable, including children, older populations, ethnic minorities, poorer communities, and those with underlying health problems.”).)

13 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2021) Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), SPM-19 (“With every additional increment of global warming, changes in extremes continue to become larger. For example, every additional 0.5°C of global warming causes clearly discernible increases in the intensity and frequency of hot extremes, including heatwaves (very likely), and heavy precipitation (high confidence), as well as agricultural and ecological droughts in some regions (high confidence). Discernible changes in intensity and frequency of meteorological droughts, with more regions showing increases than decreases, are seen in some regions for every additional 0.5°C of global warming (medium confidence). Increases in frequency and intensity of hydrological droughts become larger with increasing global warming in some regions (medium confidence). There will be an increasing occurrence of some extreme events unprecedented in the observational record with additional global warming, even at 1.5°C of global warming. Projected percentage changes in frequency are higher for rarer events (high confidence).”). See also Fischer E. M., Sippel S., & Knutti R. (2021) Increasing probability of record-shattering climate extremes, NAT. CLIM. CHANGE 11: 689–695, 689 (“Here, we show models project not only more intense extremes but also events that break previous records by much larger margins. These record-shattering extremes, nearly impossible in the absence of warming, are likely to occur in the coming decades. We demonstrate that their probability of occurrence depends on warming rate, rather than global warming level, and is thus pathway-dependent. In high-emission scenarios, week-long heat extremes that break records by three or more standard deviations are two to seven times more probable in 2021–2050 and three to 21 times more probable in 2051–2080, compared to the last three decades.”).

14 Goldstein A., Noon M. L., Ledezma J. C., Roehrdanz P. R., Raghaw M., McGreevey M., Stone C., Shrestha S., Golden Kroner R., Hole D., & Turner W. (2021) IRRECOVERABLE CARBON: THE PLACES WE MUST PROTECT TO AVERT CLIMATE CATASTROPHE. Conservation International, 7 (“Irrecoverable carbon’ refers to the vast stores of carbon in nature that are vulnerable to release from human activity and, if lost, could not be restored by 2050 — when the world must reach net-zero emissions to avoid the worst impacts of climate change... There are high concentrations of irrecoverable carbon in the Amazon (31.5 Gt), the Congo Basin (8.1 Gt), and New Guinea (7.3 Gt). Other important irrecoverable carbon reserves are located in the Pacific Northwest of North America, the Valdivian forests of Chile, the mangroves and swamp forests of Guyana, the peatlands of Northern Scotland, Niger Delta’s mangroves, Cambodia’s Tonle Sap Lake, the Scandinavian and Siberian boreal forests, and the eucalyptus forest of Southeast Australia, among others.”). See also Griscom B. W., et al. (2017) Natural climate solutions, PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 114(44): 11645–11650, 11645 (“Better stewardship of land is needed to achieve the Paris Climate Agreement goal of holding warming to below 2 °C; however, confusion persists about the specific set of land stewardship options available and their mitigation potential. To address this, we identify and quantify “natural climate solutions” (NCS): 20 conservation, restoration, and improved land management actions that increase carbon storage and/or avoid greenhouse gas emissions across global forests, wetlands, grasslands, and agricultural lands. We find that the maximum potential of NCS—when constrained by food security, fiber security, and biodiversity conservation—is 23.8 petagrams of CO₂ equivalent (PgCO₂e) y⁻¹ (95% CI 20.3–37.4). This is ≥30% higher than prior estimates, which did not include the full range of options and safeguards considered here. About half of this maximum (11.3 PgCO₂e y⁻¹) represents cost-effective climate mitigation, assuming the social cost of CO₂ pollution is ≥100 USD MgCO₂e⁻¹ by 2030. Natural climate solutions can provide 37% of cost-effective CO₂ mitigation needed through 2030 for a >66%

15 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2022) Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Shukla P. R., et al. (eds.), SPM-22 (“C.1.2 In modelled pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) assuming immediate action, global net CO2 emissions are reduced compared to modelled 2019 emissions by 27% [11–46%] in 2030 and by 52% [36-70%] in 2040; and global CH4 emissions are reduced by 24% [9–53%] in 2030 and by 37% [20–60%] in 2040. In pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot global net CO2 emissions are reduced compared to modelled 2019 emissions by 48% [36–69%] in 2030 and by 80% [61-109%] in 2040; and global CH4 emissions are reduced by 34% [21–57%] in 2030 and 44% [31–63%] in 2040. There are similar reductions of non-CO2 emissions by 2050 in both types of pathways: CH4 is reduced by 45% [25–70%]; N2O is reduced by 20% [5–55%]; and F-Gases are reduced by 85% [20–90%]. [FOOTNOTE 44] Across most modelled pathways, this is the maximum technical potential for anthropogenic CH4 reductions in the underlying models (high confidence). Further emissions reductions, as illustrated by the IMP-SP pathway, may be achieved through changes in activity levels and/or technological innovations beyond those represented in the majority of the pathways (medium confidence). Higher emissions reductions of CH4 could further reduce peak warming. (high confidence) (Figure SPM.5) [3.3]”).

16 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2022) Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Shukla P. R., et al. (eds.), SPM-30–SPM-31 (“Deep GHG emissions reductions by 2030 and 2040, particularly reductions of methane emissions, lower peak warming, reduce the likelihood of overshooting warming limits and lead to less reliance on net negative CO2 emissions that reverse warming in the latter half of the century… Future non-CO2 warming depends on reductions in non-CO2 GHG, aerosol and their precursor, and ozone precursor emissions. In modelled global low emission pathways, the projected reduction of cooling and warming aerosol emissions over time leads to net warming in the near- to mid-term. In these mitigation pathways, the projected reductions of cooling aerosols are mostly due to reduced fossil fuel combustion that was not equipped with effective air pollution controls. Non-CO2 GHG emissions at the time of net zero CO2 are projected to be of similar magnitude in modelled pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) or lower. These non-CO2 GHG emissions are about 8 [5–11] GtCO2-eq per year, with the largest fraction from CH4 (60% [55–80%]), followed by N2O (30% [20–35%]) and F-gases (3% [2–20%]). [FOOTNOTE 52] Due to the short lifetime of CH4 in the atmosphere, projected deep reduction of CH4 emissions up until the time of net zero CO2 in modelled mitigation pathways effectively reduces peak global warming. (high confidence) [3.3, AR6 WG I SPM D1.7]”).

17 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2018) Summary for Policymakers, in GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5 °C, Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), SPM-15, SPM-17 (“In model pathways with no or limited overshoot of 1.5 °C, global net anthropogenic CO2 emissions decline by about 45% from 2010 levels by 2030 (40–60% interquartile range), reaching net zero around 2050 (2045–2055 interquartile range).… Modelled pathways that limit global warming to 1.5 °C with no or limited overshoot involve deep reductions in emissions of methane and black carbon (35% or more of both by 2050 relative to 2010).”); “C.3. All pathways that limit global warming to 1.5 °C with limited or no overshoot project the use of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) on the order of 100–1000 GtCO2 over the 21st century.”).

18 Canadell J. G., et al. (2021) Chapter 5: Global Carbon and other Biogeochemical Cycles and Feedbacks, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 5-78 (“Abrupt change is defined as a change in the system that is substantially faster than the typical rate of the changes in its history (Chapter 1, Section 1.4.5). A related matter is a tipping point: a critical threshold beyond which a system reorganizes, often abruptly and/or irreversibly.”).
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report, and reveals evidence of 37 forced regional abrupt changes in the ocean, sea ice, snow cover, permafrost, and terrestrial biosphere that arise after a certain global temperature increase. Eighteen out of 37 events occur for global warming levels of less than 2°C, a threshold sometimes presented as a safe limit. See also Lenton T. M., Rockström J., Fafnernmo O., Rahmstorf S., Richardson K., Steffen W., and Schellnhuber H. J. (2019) Climate tipping points—too risky to bet against, Comment, Nature 575(7784): 592–595, 593 (“A further key impetus to limit warming to 1.5°C is that other tipping points could be triggered at low levels of global warming. The latest IPCC models projected a cluster of abrupt shifts between 1.5°C and 2°C, several of which involve the ocean. This ice is already shrinking rapidly in the Arctic....”); Arias P. A., et al. (2021) Technical Summary, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), TS-71–TS-72 (“It is likely that under stabilization of global warming at 1.5°C, 2.0°C, or 3.0°C relative to 1850–1900, the AMOC will continue to weaken for several decades by about 15%, 20% and 30% of its strength and then recover to pre-decline values over several centuries (medium confidence). At sustained warming levels between 2°C and 3°C, there is limited evidence that the Greenland and West Antarctic Ice Sheets will be lost almost completely and irreversibly over multiple millennia; both the probability of their complete loss and the rate of mass loss increases with higher surface temperatures (high confidence). At sustained warming levels between 3°C and 5°C, near-complete loss of the Greenland Ice Sheet and complete loss of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet is projected to occur irreversibly over multiple millennia (medium confidence); with substantial parts or all of Wilkes Subglacial Basin in East Antarctica lost over multiple millennia (low confidence). Early-warning signals of accelerated sea-level-rise from Antarctica, could possibly be observed within the next few decades. For other hazards (e.g., ice sheet behaviour, glacier mass loss and global mean sea level change, coastal floods, coastal erosion, air pollution, and ocean acidification) the time and/or scenario dimensions remain critical, and a simple and robust relationship with global warming level cannot be established (high confidence). The response of biogeochemical cycles to anthropogenic perturbations can be abrupt at regional scales and irreversible on decadal to century time scales (high confidence). The probability of crossing uncertain regional thresholds increases with climate change (high confidence). It is very unlikely that gas clathrates (mostly methane) in deeper terrestrial permafrost and subsea clathrates will lead to a detectable departure from the emissions trajectory during this century. Possible abrupt changes and tipping points in biogeochemical cycles lead to additional uncertainty in 21st century atmospheric GHG concentrations, but future anthropogenic emissions remain the dominant uncertainty (high confidence). There is potential for abrupt water cycle changes in some high-emission scenarios, but there is no overall consistency regarding the magnitude and timing of such changes. Positive land surface feedbacks, including vegetation, dust, and snow, can contribute to abrupt changes in aridity, but there is only low confidence that such changes will occur during the 21st century. Continued Amazon deforestation, combined with a warming climate, raises the probability that this ecosystem will cross a tipping point into a dry state during the 21st century (low confidence). (TS3.2.2, 5.4.3, 5.4.5, 5.4.8, 5.4.9, 8.6.2, 8.6.3, Cross-chapter Box 12.11)”; and Lee J. Y., et al. (2021) Chapter 4: Future Global Climate: Scenario-Based Projections and Near-Term Information, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 4-96 (Table 4.10 lists 15 components of the Earth system susceptible to tipping points).

See Hoegh-Guldberg O., et al. (2018) Chapter 3: Impacts of 1.5 °C of Global Warming on Natural and Human Systems, in GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5 °C, Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 262 (“Tipping points refer to critical thresholds in a system that, when exceeded, can lead to a significant change in the state of the system, often with an understanding that the change is irreversible. An understanding of the sensitivities of tipping points in the physical climate system, as well as in ecosystems and human systems, is essential for understanding the risks associated with different degrees of global warming. This subsection reviews tipping points across these three areas within the context of the different sensitivities to 1.5°C versus 2°C of global warming. Sensitivities to less ambitious global temperature goals are also briefly reviewed. Moreover, an analysis is provided of how integrated risks across physical, natural and human systems may accumulate to lead to the exceedance of thresholds for particular systems. The emphasis in this section is on the identification of regional tipping points and their sensitivity to 1.5°C and 2°C of global warming, whereas tipping points in the global climate system, referred to as large-scale singular events, were already discussed in Section 3.5.2. A summary of regional tipping points is provided in Table 3.7.”); and Abram N., et al. (2019) Chapter 1: Framing and Context of the Report, in THE
OCEAN AND CRYOSPHERE IN A CHANGING CLIMATE. Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., et al. (eds.), 1-81 (“While some aspects of the ocean and cryosphere might respond in a linear (i.e., directly proportional) manner to a perturbation by some external forcing, this may change fundamentally when critical thresholds are reached. A very important example for such a threshold is the transition from frozen water to liquid water at around 0 °C that can lead to rapid acceleration of ice-melt or permafrost thaw (e.g., Abram et al., 2013; Trusel et al., 2018). Such thresholds often act as tipping points, as they are associated with rapid and abrupt changes even when the underlying forcing changes gradually (Figure 1.1a, 1.1c). Tipping elements include, for example, the collapse of the ocean’s large-scale overturning circulation in the Atlantic (Section 6.7), or the collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet though a process called marine ice sheet instability (Cross-Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 3; Lenton, et al. 2008). Potential ocean and cryosphere tipping elements form part of the scientific case for efforts to limit climate warming to well below 2°C (IPCC, 2018).”).

21 Here we distinguish between abrupt shifts, as in Drijfhout et al. (2015), and the more restrictive definition of “core climate tipping points” defined by Armstrong McKay et al. (2022) as “when change in part of the climate system becomes (i) selfperpetuating beyond (ii) a warming threshold as a result of asymmetry in the relevant feedbacks, leading to (iii) substantial and widespread Earth system impacts.” See Armstrong McKay D. I., Staal A., Abrams J. F., Winkelmann R., Saksciewski B., Loriain S., Fetzer I., Cornell S. E., Rockström J., & Lenton T. M. (2022) Exceeding 1.5°C global warming could trigger multiple climate tipping points, SCIENCE 377(6611): eabn7950, 1–10, 7 (“Current warming is ~1.1°C above preindustrial and even with rapid emission cuts warming will reach ~1.5°C by the 2030s (23). We cannot rule out that WAIS and GrIS tipping points have already been passed (see above) and several other tipping elements have minimum threshold values within the 1.1 to 1.5°C range. Our best estimate thresholds for GrIS, WAIS, REEF, and abrupt permafrost thaw (PFAT) are ~1.5°C although WAIS and GrIS collapse may still be avoidable if GMST returns below 1.5°C within an uncertain overshoot time (likely decades) (94). … The chance of triggering CTPs is already non-negligible and will grow even with stringent climate mitigation (SSP1-1.9 in Fig. 2, B and C). Nevertheless, achieving the Paris Agreement’s aim to pursue efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C would clearly be safer than keeping global warming below 2°C (90) (Fig. 2). Going from 1.5 to 2°C increases the likelihood of committing to WAIS and GrIS collapse near complete warm-water coral die-off, and abrupt permafrost thaw; further, the best estimate threshold for LABC collapse is crossed. The likelihood of triggering AMOC collapse, Boreal forest shifts, and extra-polar glacier loss becomes non-negligible at >1.5°C and glacier loss becomes likely by ~2°C. A cluster of abrupt shifts occur in ESMs at 1.5 to 2°C (19). Although not tipping elements, ASSI loss could become regular by 2°C, gradual permafrost thaw would likely become widespread beyond 1.5°C, and land carbon sink weakening would become significant by ~2°C.”).

22 Lenton T. M., Rockstrom J., Gaffney O., Rahmstorf S., Richardson K., Steffen W., & Schellnhuber H. J. (2019) Climate tipping points—too risky to bet against, Comment, NATURE 575(7784): 592–595, 594 (“In our view, the clearest emergency would be if we were approaching a global cascade of tipping points that led to a new, less habitable, ‘hothouse’ climate state14. Interactions could happen through ocean and atmospheric circulation or through feedbacks that increase greenhouse-gas levels and global temperature.”). See also Wunderling N., Donges J. F., Kurths J., & Winkelmann R. (2021) Interacting tipping elements increase risk of climate domino effects under global warming, EARTH SYST. DYN. 12(2): 601–619, 614 (“In this study, we show that this risk increases significantly when considering interactions between these climate tipping elements and that these interactions tend to have an overall destabilising effect. Altogether, with the exception of the Greenland Ice Sheet, interactions effectively push the critical threshold temperatures to lower warming levels, thereby reducing the overall stability of the climate system. The domino-like interactions also foster cascading, non-linear responses. Under these circumstances, our model indicates that cascades are predominantly initiated by the polar ice sheets and mediated by the AMOC. Therefore, our results also imply that the negative feedback loop connecting the Greenland Ice Sheet and the AMOC might not be able to stabilise the climate system as a whole.”); Klose A. K., Wunderling N., Winkelmann R., & Donges J. F. (2021) What do we mean, ‘tipping cascade’?, ENVIRO. RES. LETT. 16(12): 125011, 1–12, 1 (“Here we illustrate how different patterns of multiple tipping dynamics emerge from a very simple coupling of two previously studied idealized tipping elements. In particular, we distinguish between a two phase cascade, a domino cascade and a joint cascade. A mitigation of an unfolding two phase cascade may be possible and common early warning indicators are sensitive to upcoming critical transitions to a certain degree. In contrast, a domino cascade may hardly be stopped once initiated and critical slowing down-based indicators fail to indicate tipping of the following element. These different potentials for intervention and anticipation across the distinct patterns of multiple tipping dynamics should be seen as a call to be more precise in future analyses of cascading dynamics arising from tipping element interactions in the Earth system.”); and Rocha J. C., Peterson G., Bodin Ö., & Levin S. (2018) Cascading regime shifts within and across scales, SCIENCE 362(6421): 1379–1383, 1383 (“A key lesson from our study is that regime shifts can be interconnected. Regime shifts should not be studied in isolation under the assumption that they are independent systems. Methods and data collection need to
be further developed to account for the possibility of cascading effects. Our finding that ~45% of regime shift couplings can have structural dependence suggests that current approaches to environmental management and governance underestimate the likelihood of cascading effects.”).

23 Drijfhout S., Bathiany S., Beaulieu C., Brovkin V., Claussen M., Huntingford C., Scheffer M., Sgubin G., & Swingedouw D. (2015) *Catalogue of abrupt shifts in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change climate models*, PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 112(43): E5777–E5786, E5784 (“Permafrost carbon release (51) and methane hydrates release (52) were not expected in CMIP5 simulations, because of missing biogeochemical components in those models capable of simulating such changes.”). See also Bathiany S., Hidding J., & Scheffer M. (2020) *Edge Detection Reveals Abrupt and Extreme Climate Events*, J. CLIM. 33(15): 6399–6421, 6416 (“Despite their societal relevance, our knowledge about the risks of future abrupt climate shifts is far from robust. Several important aspects are highly uncertain: future greenhouse gas emissions (scenario uncertainty), the current climate state (initial condition uncertainty), the questionwhether and how to model specific processes (structural uncertainty), and what values one should choose for parameters appearing in the equations (parametric uncertainty). Such uncertainties can be explored using ensemble simulations. For example, by running many simulations with different combinations of parameter values a perturbed-physics ensemble can address how parameter uncertainty affects the occurrence of extreme events (Clark et al. 2006). This strategy can be particularly beneficial for studying abrupt events as well since abrupt shifts are associated with region-specific processes, whereas models are usually calibrated to produce a realistic global mean climate at the expense of regional realism (Mauritsen et al. 2012; McNeall et al. 2016). The currently available model configurations are therefore neither reliable nor sufficient to assess the risk of abrupt shifts (Drijfhout et al. 2015). It is hence very plausible that yet-undiscovered tipping points can occur in climate models.”); Canadell J. G., et al. (2021) *Chapter 5: Global Carbon and other Biogeochemical Cycles and Feedbacks*, in *CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS*. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 5-78 (“There is low confidence in the estimate of the non-CO₂ biogeochemical feedbacks, due to the large range in the estimates of α for some individual feedbacks (Figure 5.29c), which can be attributed to the diversity in how models account for these feedbacks, limited process-level understanding, and the existence of known feedbacks for which there is not sufficient evidence to assess the feedback strength.”); and *Permafrost Pathways, Course of Action: Mitigation Policy*, Woodwell Climate Research Center (last visited 29 July 2022) (“Depending on how hot we let it get, carbon emissions from Arctic permafrost thaw are expected to be in the range of 30 to more than 150 billion tons of carbon (110 to more than 550 Gt CO₂) this century, with upper estimates on par with the cumulative emissions from the entire United States at its current rate. To put it another way, permafrost thaw emissions could use up between 25 and 40 percent of the remaining carbon budget that would be necessary to cap warming at the internationally agreed-upon 2 degrees Celsius global temperature threshold established in the Paris Agreement.... Despite the enormity of this problem, gaps in permafrost carbon monitoring and modeling are resulting in permafrost being left out of global climate policies, rendering our emissions targets fundamentally inaccurate. World leaders are in a race against time to reduce emissions and prevent Earth's temperature from reaching dangerous levels. The problem is, without including current and projected emissions from permafrost, this race will be impossible to finish... 82% [of] IPCC models do not include carbon emissions from permafrost thaw.”).

24 Molina M., Ramanathan V., & Zaelke D. (2018) *Climate report understates threat*, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (“These cascading feedbacks include the loss of the Arctic’s sea ice, which could disappear entirely in summer in the next 15 years. The ice serves as a shield, reflecting heat back into the atmosphere, but is increasingly being melted into water that absorbs heat instead. Losing the ice would tremendously increase the Arctic’s warming, which is already at least twice the global average rate. This, in turn, would accelerate the collapse of permafrost, releasing its ancient stores of methane, a super climate pollutant 30 times more potent in causing warming than carbon dioxide.”).

25 Kemp L., Xu C., Depledge J., Ebi K. L., Gibbins G., Kohler T. A., Rockström J., Scheffer M., Schellnhuber H. J., Steffen W., & Lenton T. M. (2022) *Climate Endgame: Exploring catastrophic climate change scenarios*, PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 119(34): e2108146119, 1–9, 3 (“Third, climate change could exacerbate vulnerabilities and cause multiple, indirect stresses (such as economic damage, loss of land, and water and food insecurity) that coalesce into system-wide synchronous failures. This is the path of systemic risk. Global crises tend to occur through such reinforcing “synchronous failures” that spread across countries and systems, as with the 2007–2008 global financial crisis (44). It is plausible that a sudden shift in climate could trigger systems failures that unravel societies across the globe. The potential of systemic climate risk is marked: The most vulnerable states and communities will continue to be the hardest hit in a warming world, exacerbating inequities. Fig. 1 shows how projected population density intersects with extreme >29 °C mean annual temperature (MAT) (such temperatures are currently restricted to only
0.8% of Earth’s land surface area). Using the medium-high scenario of emissions and population growth (SSP3-7.0 emissions, and SSP3 population growth), by 2070, around 2 billion people are expected to live in these extremely hot areas. Currently, only 30 million people live in hot places, primarily in the Sahara Desert and Gulf Coast (43). Extreme temperatures combined with high humidity can negatively affect outdoor worker productivity and yields of major cereal crops. These deadly heat conditions could significantly affect populated areas in South and southwest Asia(47).

Fig. 2 takes a political lens on extreme heat, overlapping SSP3-7.0 or SSP5-8.5 projections of >29 °C MAT circa 2070, with the Fragile States Index (a measurement of the instability of states). There is a striking overlap between currently vulnerable states and future areas of extreme warming. If current political fragility does not improve significantly in the coming decades, then a belt of instability with potentially serious ramifications could occur.”). See also Stern N. & Stiglitz J. (2022) *The economics of immense risk, urgent action and radical change: towards new approaches to the economics of climate change*. J. ECON. METHODOLOGY. 29: 1–36, 2 (“Moreover, at the core of the standard IAM methodology is an analysis of intertemporal trade-offs; how much the current generation should sacrifice in order for future generations to be spared the devastation of climate change. Rising to the climate challenges does indeed involve deep normative questions, including how different generations’ welfare is to be compared and the rights of future generations. But the world has been much more focused than the IAMs on a different set of issues, the risks of catastrophic consequences. These potentially catastrophic risks are in large measure assumed away in the IAMs.”).

26 Lenton T. M., Rockström J., Gaffney O., Ramseur S., Richardson K., Steffen W., & Schellnhuber H. J. (2019) *Climate tipping points—too risky to bet against*, Comment, NATURE, 575(7784): 592–595, 594 (“In our view, the clearest emergency would be if we were approaching a global cascade of tipping points that led to a new, less habitable, ‘hothouse’ climate state[44]. Interactions could happen through ocean and atmospheric circulation or through feedbacks that increase greenhouse-gas levels and global temperature. Alternatively, strong cloud feedbacks could cause a global tipping point[45,46]. We argue that cascading effects might be common. Research last year[47] analysed 30 types of regime shift spanning physical climate and ecological systems, from collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet to a switch from rainforest to savanna. This indicated that exceeding tipping points in one system can increase the risk of crossing them in others. Such links were found for 45% of possible interactions[48]. In our view, examples are starting to be observed. … If damaging tipping cascades occur and a global tipping point cannot be ruled out, then this is an existential threat to civilization. No amount of economic cost–benefit analysis is going to help us. We need to change our approach to the climate problem. … In our view, the evidence from tipping points alone suggests that we are in a state of planetary emergency: both the risk and urgency of the situation are acute….”). See also Armstrong McKay D. I., Staal A., Abrams J. F., Winkelmann R., Sakeschewski B., Loriani S., Fetzer I., Cornell S. E., Rockström J., & Lenton T. M. (2022) *Exceeding 1.5°C global warming could trigger multiple climate tipping points*, SCIENCE 377(6611): eabn7950, 1–10, 7 (“Current warming is ~1.1°C above preindustrial and even with rapid emission cuts warming will reach ~1.5°C by the 2030s (23). We cannot rule out that WAIS and GrIS tipping points have already been passed (see above) and other several tipping elements have minimum threshold values within the 1.1 to 1.5°C range. Our best estimate thresholds for GrIS, WAIS, REEF, and abrupt permafrost thaw (PFAT) are ~1.5°C although WAIS and GrIS collapse may still be avoidable if GMST returns below 1.5°C within an uncertain overshoot time (likely decades) (94).”).

27 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2022) *Summary for Policymakers*, in *CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY*, Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., et al. (eds.), SPM-20 (“SPM.B.6 If global warming transiently exceeds 1.5°C in the coming decades or later (overshoot) then, many human and natural systems will face additional severe risks, compared to remaining below 1.5°C (high confidence). Depending on the magnitude and duration of overshoot, some impacts will cause release of additional greenhouse gases (medium confidence) and some will be irreversible, even if global warming is reduced (high confidence). (Figure SPM.3) [2.5, 3.4, 12.3, 16.6, CCB SLR, CCB DEEP, Box SPM.1] SPM.B.6.1 While model-based assessments of the impacts of overshoot pathways are limited, observations and current understanding of processes permit assessment of impacts from overshoot. Additional warming, e.g., above 1.5°C during an overshoot period this century, will result in irreversible impacts on certain ecosystems with low resilience, such as polar, mountain, and coastal ecosystems, impacted by ice-sheet, glacier melt, or by accelerating and higher committed sea level rise (high confidence). Risks to human systems will increase, including those to infrastructure, low-lying coastal settlements, some ecosystem-based adaptation measures, and associated livelihoods (high confidence), cultural and spiritual values (medium confidence). Projected impacts are less severe with shorter duration and lower levels of overshoot (medium confidence). [2.5, 3.4, 12.3, 13.2, 16.5, 16.6, CCB 1.2, CCP5.3, CCP6.1, CCP6.2, CCP2.2, CCB SLR, Box TS4, SROCC 2.3, SROCC 5.4, WG1 SPM B5 and C3] SPM.B.6.2 Risk of severe impacts increase with every additional increment of global warming during overshoot (high confidence). In high-carbon ecosystems (currently storing 3,000 to 4,000 GtC) such impacts are already observed
and are projected to increase with every additional increment of global warming, such as increased wildfires, mass mortality of trees, drying of peatlands, and thawing of permafrost, weakening natural land carbon sinks and increasing releases of greenhouse gases (medium confidence). The resulting contribution to a potential amplification of global warming indicates that a return to a given global warming level or below would be more challenging (medium confidence). (2.4, 2.5, CCP4.2, WG1 SPM B.4.3, SROCC 5.4”).

28 Wunderling N., Winkelmann R., Rockström J., Loriani S., Armstrong-McKay D., Ritchie P., Sakshewska B., & Donges J. (22 April 2022) Global warming overshoots increase risk of triggering climate tipping points and cascades, NATURE (preprint), 1–31, 1, 11–12, 18 (“Climate tipping elements play a crucial role for the stability of the Earth system under human pressures and are potentially at risk of disintegrating within and partially even below the Paris temperature guardrails of 1.5-2.0°C above pre-industrial levels. However, current policies and actions make it very likely to, at least temporarily, transgress the Paris targets. This raises the question whether tipping points can still be avoided under such overshoot scenarios. Here, we investigate the associated risks for tipping under a range of temperature overshoot scenarios using a stylised network model of four interacting climate tipping elements: the Greenland and West Antarctic Ice Sheets, the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation and the Amazon rainforest. Our results reveal that temporary overshoots can increase tipping risks by up to 72% compared to a soft landing without overshoots, even when the long-term equilibrium temperature stabilises within the Paris range.”; “We compute that the risk for tipping events occurring at convergence temperatures within the limits of the Paris climate target ranges between slightly more than half (57.8%) to more than nine-tenths (91.4%) of all simulations (see Fig. 3). For small peak temperatures ($T_{\text{Peak}} = 2.5 \, ^\circ\text{C}$), overshoot tipping only accounts for as little as 9% of all tipping events but for intermediate peak temperature levels ($T_{\text{Peak}} = 4.0 \, ^\circ\text{C}$) this number can increase to as much as 42% (see pie charts in Fig. 3). Specifically, the risk of tipping increases between 10–72% in these scenarios for overshooting before stabilising at the convergence temperature than just approaching the convergence temperature with no overshoot. Note that in the special case, where the peak temperature equals the convergence temperature ($T_{\text{Peak}} = T_{\text{Conv}} = 2.0 \, ^\circ\text{C}$), overshoot tipping events do not occur.”; “Critically, to reduce the risk and prevent the negative impacts of interacting climate tipping elements on human societies and biosphere integrity, it is of utmost importance to ensure that temperature overshoot trajectories are limited in both magnitude and duration, while stabilising global warming at, or better, below the Paris agreement’s targets. Concretely, avoiding a high climate risk zone aiming to limit the risk for tipping events would entail convergence temperatures of today’s levels of global warming or below ($< 1.2 \, ^\circ\text{C}$, better $\leq 1.0 \, ^\circ\text{C}$), while overshoot temperatures should not exceed $3.0 \, ^\circ\text{C}$ and convergence times should not exceed 300 years unless peak temperatures are significantly smaller than $2.5 \, ^\circ\text{C}$. This would reduce the risk for one tipping event to occur to below 33% (see Fig. 2d.”).

29 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (8 June 2021) Despite pandemic shutdowns, carbon dioxide and methane surged in 2020 (“NOAA’s preliminary analysis showed the annual increase in atmospheric methane for 2020 was 14.7 parts per billion (ppb), which is the largest annual increase recorded since systematic measurements began in 1983.”). See also Vaughan A. (7 January 2022) Record levels of greenhouse gas methane are a ‘fire alarm moment’, NEW SCIENTIST (“According to data compiled by the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), average atmospheric concentrations of methane reached a record 1900 parts per billion (ppb) in September 2021, the highest in nearly four decades of records. The figure stood at 1638 ppb in 1983.”); and Pultarova T. (11 January 2022) Satellites reveal record high methane concentrations despite reduction pledges, SPACE. This is a 15% increase from global methane emissions in the 1984–2006 period. See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2022) Increase in atmospheric methane set another record during 2021 (“NOAA’s preliminary analysis showed the annual increase in atmospheric methane during 2021 was 17 parts per billion (ppb), the largest annual increase recorded since systematic measurements began in 1983. The increase during 2020 was 15.3 ppb. Atmospheric methane levels averaged 1,895.7 ppb during 2021, or around 162% greater than pre-industrial levels. From NOAA’s observations, scientists estimate global methane emissions in 2021 are 15% higher than the 1984-2006 period.”).

30 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Trends in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide, Global Monitoring Laboratory (last visited 9 May 2022) (April 2022 monthly CO$_2$ levels averaged 420.23 ppm). See also National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2021) Carbon dioxide peaks near 420 parts per million at Mauna Loa observatory (“Atmospheric carbon dioxide measured at NOAA’s Mauna Loa Atmospheric Baseline Observatory peaked for 2021 in May at a monthly average of 419 parts per million (ppm), the highest level since accurate measurements began 63 years ago… The atmospheric burden of CO$_2$ is now comparable to where it was during the Pliocene Climatic Optimum, between 4.1 and 4.5 million years ago, when CO$_2$ was close to, or above 400 ppm. During that time, sea level was about 78 feet higher than today, the average temperature was 7 degrees Fahrenheit higher than in pre-industrial times, and studies indicate large forests occupied areas of the Arctic that are now tundra.”). Note 420 ppm is a 50% increase over pre-industrial levels of 280 ppm.
31 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Global Monitoring Laboratory (2021) *NOAA Global Monitoring Laboratory – The NOAA Annual Greenhouse Gas Index (AGGI)* (last visited 3 August 2021) ("For example, the atmospheric abundance of CO₂ has increased by an average of 1.85 ppm per year over the past 41 years (1979–2020). This increase in CO₂ is accelerating — while it averaged about 1.6 ppm per year in the 1980s and 1.5 ppm per year in the 1990s, the growth rate increased to 2.4 ppm per year during the last decade (2009–2020). The annual CO₂ increase from 1 Jan 2020 to 1 Jan 2021 was 2.50 ± 0.08 ppm (see [https://gml.noaa.gov/ccgg/trends/global.html](https://gml.noaa.gov/ccgg/trends/global.html), which is slightly higher than the average for the previous decade, and much higher than the two decades before that.").

32 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2021) *Summary for Policymakers*, in *CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS*, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), SPM-10 ("It is virtually certain that hot extremes (including heatwaves) have become more frequent and more intense across most land regions since the 1950s, while cold extremes (including cold waves) have become less frequent and less severe, with high confidence that human-induced climate change is the main driver[14] of these changes. Some recent hot extremes observed over the past decade would have been extremely unlikely to occur without human influence on the climate system. Marine heatwaves have approximately doubled in frequency since the 1980s (high confidence), and human influence has very likely contributed to most of them since at least 2006."). See also Kotz M., Wenz L., & Levermann A. (2021) *Footprint of greenhouse forcing in daily temperature variability*, PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 118(32): 1–8, 1 ("Assessing historical changes to daily temperature variability in comparison with those from state-of-the-art climate models, we show that variability has changed with distinct global patterns over the past 65 years, changes which are attributable to rising concentrations of greenhouse gases. If these rises continue, temperature variability is projected to increase by up to 100% at low latitudes and decrease by 40% at northern high latitudes by the end of the century.").

33 Philip S. Y., et al. (2021) *Rapid attribution analysis of the extraordinary heatwave on the Pacific Coast of the US and Canada*, WORLD WEATHER ATTRIBUTE, 20 ("Results for current vs past climate, i.e. for 1.2°C of global warming vs pre-industrial conditions (1850-1900), indicate an increase in intensity of about 2.0 °C (1.2 °C to 2.8 °C) and a PR of at least 150. Model results for additional future changes if global warming reaches 2°C indicate another increase in intensity of about 1.3 °C (0.8 °C to 1.7 °C) and a PR of at least 3, with a best estimate of 175. This means that an event like the current one, that is currently estimated to occur only once every 1000 years, would occur roughly every 5 to 10 years in that future world with 2°C of global warming.").

34 Philip S. Y., et al. (2021) *Rapid attribution analysis of the extraordinary heatwave on the Pacific Coast of the US and Canada*, WORLD WEATHER ATTRIBUTE, 1 ("Also, this heatwave was about 2°C hotter than it would have been if it had occurred at the beginning of the industrial revolution (when global mean temperatures were 1.2°C cooler than today."). See also Newburger E. (1 July 2021) *Historic heat wave linked to hundreds of deaths in Pacific Northwest and Canada*, CNBC ("Dr. Jennifer Vines, Multnomah County’s health officer, said the preliminary cause of death was hyperthermia, an abnormally high body temperature resulting from an inability of the body to deal with heat. Many of the dead were found alone and without air conditioning…. While it is too early to say with certainty how many of these deaths are heat related, it is believed likely that the significant increase in deaths reported is attributable to the extreme weather B.C. has experienced," Lapointe said in a statement.").

35 Philip S. Y., et al. (2021) *Rapid attribution analysis of the extraordinary heatwave on the Pacific Coast of the US and Canada*, WORLD WEATHER ATTRIBUTE, 1 ("Looking into the future, in a world with 2°C of global warming (0.8°C warmer than today which at current emission levels would be reached as early as the 2040s ), this event would have been another degree hotter. An event like this -- currently estimated to occur only once every 1000 years, would occur roughly every 5 to 10 years in that future world with 2°C of global warming.").

36 First Street Foundation (2022) *The 6th National Risk Assessment: Hazardous Heat*, 4 ("The results indicate that the incidence of extreme heat is growing across the country, both in absolute and relative terms. In absolute terms, the incidence of heat that exceeds the threshold of the National Weather Service’s (NWS) highest category for heat, called “Extreme Danger” (Heat Index above 125°F) is expected to impact about 8 million people this year, increasing to about 107 million people in 2053, an increase of 13 times over 30 years. This increase in “Extreme Danger Days” is concentrated in the middle of the country, in areas where there are no coastal influences to mitigate extreme temperatures."); discussed in Kaufman L. (15 August 2022) *Much of the US Will Be an ‘Extreme Heat Belt’ by the 2050s*, BLOOMBERG.
industrial climate, is no longer useful. When the current climate has
changed so significantly that the pre-industrial world becomes a poor basis of comparison, other tools are needed to
indicate if countries meet their current climate commitments so far agreed in negotiations under the 2015 Paris Agreement. That’s according to the latest data from the Met Office Hadley Centre, commissioned by the Climate Crisis Advisory Group (CCAG). The data (figure 1 below) looks at how rapidly temperatures are changing across Europe and tracks observed mean summer temperatures since 1850 against model predictions. It finds that, according to current predictions[1], an average summer in central Europe by 2100 will be over 4°C hotter than it was in the pre-industrial era.

37 Vautard R., et al. (2020) Human contribution to the record-breaking June and July 2019 heatwaves in Western Europe, ENVIRON. RES. LETT. 15(9): 094077, 1–9, 5 (“For the France average, the heatwave was an event with a return period estimated to be 134 years. As for the June case, except for HadGEM-3A, which has a hot and dry bias, the changes in intensity are systematically underestimated, as they range from 1.1 °C (CNRM-CM6.1) to 1.6 °C (EC-EARTH). By combining information from models and observations, we conclude that the probability of such an event to occur for France has increased by a factor of at least 10 (see the synthesis in figure 3). This factor is very uncertain and could be two orders of magnitude higher. The change in intensity of an equally probable heatwave is between 1.5 degrees and 3 degrees. We found similar numerical results for Lille, with however an estimate of change in intensity higher in the observations, and models predict trend estimates that are consistently lower than observation trends, a fact that needs further investigation beyond the scope of this attribution study. We conclude for these cases that such an event would have had an extremely small probability to occur (less than about once every 1000 years) without climate change in France. Climate change had therefore a major influence to explain such temperatures, making them about 100 times more likely (at least a factor of ten).”).

38 Copernicus Atmosphere Monitoring Service (4 August 2021) Copernicus: Mediterranean region evolves into wildfire hotspot, while fire intensity reaches new records in Turkey (“With Southeast Europe currently experiencing heatwave conditions, the fire danger remains high in the area, especially across much of Turkey and around the Mediterranean. CAMS data show that the daily total Fire Radiative Power (FRP) for Turkey has reached unprecedented values in the entire dataset, which goes back to 2003.”).

39 Rousi E., Kornhuber K., Beobide-Arsuaga G., Luo F., & Coumou D. (2022) Accelerated western European heatwave trends linked to more-persistent double jets over Eurasia, NAT. COMMUN. 13(3851): 1–11, 1 (“Persistent heat extremes can have severe impacts on ecosystems and societies, including excess mortality, wildfires, and harvest failures. Here we identify Europe as a heatwave hotspot, exhibiting upward trends that are three-to-four times faster compared to the rest of the northern midlatitudes over the past 42 years. This accelerated trend is linked to atmospheric dynamical changes via an increase in the frequency and persistence of double jet stream states over Eurasia. We find that double jet occurrences are particularly important for western European heatwaves, explaining up to 35% of temperature variability. The upward trend in the persistence of double jet events explains almost all of the accelerated heatwave trend in western Europe, and about 30% of it over the extended European region. Those findings provide evidence that in addition to thermodynamical drivers, atmospheric dynamical changes have contributed to the increased rate of European heatwaves, with implications for risk management and potential adaptation strategies.”);

40 World Weather Attribution (28 July 2022) Without human-caused climate change temperatures of 40°C in the UK would have been extremely unlikely (“Combining the results based on observational and model analysis, we find that, for both event definitions, human-caused climate change made the event at least 10 times more likely. In the models, the same event would be about 2°C less hot in a 1.2°C cooler world, which is a much smaller change in intensity than observed.”).

41 Climate Crisis Advisory Group (25 August 2022) Record-breaking heatwave will be an average summer by 2035, latest Met Office Hadley Centre data shows, Press Release (“The record-breaking heatwave experienced across Europe this summer will be considered an “average” summer by 2035, even if countries meet their current climate commitments so far agreed in negotiations under the 2015 Paris Agreement. That’s according to the latest data from the Met Office Hadley Centre, commissioned by the Climate Crisis Advisory Group (CCAG). The data (figure 1 below) looks at how rapidly temperatures are changing across Europe and tracks observed mean summer temperatures since 1850 against model predictions. It finds that, according to current predictions[1], an average summer in central Europe by 2100 will be over 4°C hotter than it was in the pre-industrial era.”);
discussed in Mathers M. (25 August 2022) UK’s record-breaking heatwave will be average summer by 2035, Met Office says, INDEPENDENT.

42 Harrington L. J., Ebi K. L., Frame D. J., & Otto F. E. L. (2022) Integrating attribution with adaptation for unprecedented future heatwaves, CLIM. CHANGE 172(2): 1–7, 3 (“Thus, specifically resolving whether a recent heatwave — say, one which occurs once per decade in today’s climate — would have occurred either once in 100 generations or once in 1000 generations in a pre-industrial climate, is no longer useful. When the current climate has changed so significantly that the pre-industrial world becomes a poor basis of comparison, other tools are needed to instead quantify future changes in exposure or the effectiveness of adaptation to changes in extreme weather seen over recent decades.”);
discussed in Sengupta S. (3 May 2022) An extraordinary heat wave exposes the limits of protecting people, THE NEW YORK TIMES (“For more than a month now, across much of the country (and in next door Pakistan), temperatures have soared and stayed there. The capital, Delhi, topped 46 degrees Celsius (114 degrees Fahrenheit)
Climate change likely increased extreme monsoon rainfall, flooding highly vulnerable communities in Pakistan.

Clarke B., Otto F., & Harrington L. (5 September 2022) *Pakistan floods: What role did climate change play ?, The Conversation* (*Clues as to the role of climate change can also come from aspects that contributed to this disaster. There are three main factors. ¶ First, extreme rainfall. A warmer atmosphere holds more moisture. For every degree the atmosphere warms it can hold about 6%-7% more moisture, which often results in more rain falling during the most extreme events (south Asia has warmed around 0.7°C since 1900). Had this event happened in a world where carbon dioxide concentrations were instead at pre-industrial levels, the rains probably would have been less intense. ¶ Second, the monsoon itself, which is highly complex and variable. It forms in south Asia in the summer, when air over land warms faster than air over the sea, which creates a flow of air onto the land. The winds bring great volumes of moisture that precipitate into deluges when they meet higher ground, especially the Himalayas. ¶ Unusual monsoon rains over Pakistan have some predictability. They occur when multiple phenomena coincide, including a La Niña event in the Pacific and large meanders in the high-altitude jet stream, as was the case in both 2010 and this year. ¶ There is emerging evidence that this confluence of factors may occur more regularly as the climate changes. If such trends continue, then flooding in Pakistan and other simultaneous extremes across the northern Hemisphere will happen more often in the future. ¶ Pakistan also experienced extended and brutal heatwaves in May and June this year, which were amplified by climate change. This heat amplified the monsoonal "thermal low"—a low-pressure system created by hot air rising rapidly—which greatly enhanced the flow of moisture-laden air onto southern Pakistan. ¶ Third, Pakistan has more than 7,000 glaciers in its northern mountainous regions. As these glaciers melt, their waters contribute to the flooding. This melting is driven to a large degree by climate change and is especially prominent this year as a result of the heatwave.") *See also* Otto F. E. L., Zachariah M., Saeed F., Siddiqi A., & Shahzad K. (2022) *Climate change likely increased extreme monsoon rainfall, flooding highly vulnerable communities in Pakistan. World Weather Attribution*, 36 (*However, for the 5-day rainfall extreme, the majority of models and observations we have analysed show that intense rainfall has become heavier as Pakistan has warmed. Some of these models suggest climate change could have increased the rainfall intensity up to 50% for the 5-day event definition."); *and* Trenberth K. (15 September 2022) *2022’s supercharged summer of climate extremes: How global warming and La Niña fueled disasters on top of disasters*, The Conversation.
As the Arctic atmosphere warms, it can hold more water vapor, which is an important greenhouse gas. The changing vegetation of the Arctic also affects the brightness of the surface, which then influences warming. As the Arctic atmosphere warms, it can hold more water vapor, which is an important greenhouse gas.

Additionally, methodological advances and new datasets contributed approximately 0.1ºC to the updated estimate of warming in AR6[10].” … Footnote 10: “Since AR5, methodological advances and new datasets have provided a more complete spatial representation of changes in surface temperature, including in the Arctic. These and other improvements have additionally increased the estimate of global surface temperature change by approximately 0.1 ºC, but this increase does not represent additional physical warming since the AR5.”

Changes in the Arctic climate are important because the Arctic acts as a refrigerator for the rest of the world—it helps cool the planet. So changes in the Arctic climate could affect the climate in the rest of the world. Changes in the Arctic have effects that cascade through the food chain… Researchers say that the changes in the Arctic are worrisome, because they could lead to feedback effects that lead to further warming. For instance, when the white sea ice melts in summer, areas of dark open water are exposed which can absorb more heat from the sun. That extra heat then helps melt even more ice. The loss of sea ice is known to be one of the drivers of Arctic amplification. Permafrost may also be involved in feedbacks. As permafrost thaws, plants and animals that were frozen in the ground begin to decay. When they decay, they release carbon dioxide and methane back to the atmosphere that can contribute to further warming. The changing vegetation of the Arctic also affects the brightness of the surface, which then influences warming. As the Arctic atmosphere warms, it can hold more water vapor, which is an important greenhouse gas.”

“Since AR5, methodological advances and new datasets have provided a more complete spatial representation of changes in surface temperature, including in the Arctic. These and other improvements have additionally increased the estimate of global surface temperature change by approximately 0.1 ºC, but this increase does not represent additional physical warming since the AR5.”

Footnotes:

45 Fischer E. M., Sippel S., & Knutti R. (2021) Increasing probability of record-shattering climate extremes, NAT. CLIM. CHANGE 11: 689–685, 689 (“Here, we show models project not only more intense extremes but also events that break previous records by much larger margins. These record-shattering extremes, nearly impossible in the absence of warming, are likely to occur in the coming decades. We demonstrate that their probability of occurrence depends on warming rate, rather than global warming level, and is thus pathway-dependent. In high-emission scenarios, week-long heat extremes that break records by three or more standard deviations are two to seven times more probable in 2021–2050 and three to 21 times more probable in 2051–2080, compared to the last three decades. In 2051–2080, such events are estimated to occur about every 6–37 years somewhere in the northern midlatitudes.”).

46 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration National Centers for Environmental Information (2021) State of the Climate: Global Climate Report for May 2021 (“The seven warmest years since 1880 have all occurred since 2014, while the 10 warmest years have occurred since 2005. The decadal global land and ocean surface average temperature anomaly for 2011–2020 was the warmest decade on record for the globe, with a surface global temperature of +0.82°C (+1.48°F) above the 20th century average. This surpassed the previous decadal record (2001–2010) value of +0.62°C (+1.12°F).”). See also Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2021) Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), SPM-5 (“Each of the last four decades has been successively warmer than any decade that preceded it since 1850. Global surface temperature in the first two decades of the 21st century (2001-2020) was 0.99 [0.84-1.10] °C higher than 1850-1900. Global surface temperature was 1.09 [0.95 to 1.20] °C higher in 2011–2020 than 1850–1900, with larger increases over land (1.59 [1.34 to 1.83] °C) than over the ocean (0.88 [0.68 to 1.01] °C). The estimated increase in global surface temperature since AR5 is principally due to further warming since 2003–2012 (+0.19 [0.16 to 0.22] °C). Additionally, methodological advances and new datasets contributed approximately 0.1°C to the updated estimate of warming in AR6[10].”… Footnote 10: “Since AR5, methodological advances and new datasets have provided a more complete spatial representation of changes in surface temperature, including in the Arctic. These and other improvements have additionally increased the estimate of global surface temperature change by approximately 0.1 ºC, but this increase does not represent additional physical warming since the AR5.”

47 Xu Y., Ramanathan V., & Victor D. G. (2018) Global warming will happen faster than we think, NATURE 564(7734): 30–32, 31 (“In 2017, industrial carbon dioxide emissions are estimated to have reached about 37 gigatonnes. This puts them on track with the highest emissions trajectory the IPCC has modelled so far. This dark news means that the next 25 years are poised to warm at a rate of 0.25–0.32 ºC per decade. That is faster than the 0.2 ºC per decade that we have experienced since the 2000s, and which the IPCC used in its special report.”)
2.92, and longer durations.

MICRO RCP4.5 was 2 (“As per the Budyko–Sellers hypothesis, an initial warming of the Arctic due to factors such as CO2 forcing will lead to decreased ice cover which exposes more of the underlying darker ocean and amplifies the warming. In 1975, this phenomenon was simulated in a 3D climate model by Manabe and Wetherald (9), who showed that under conditions of a doubling of CO2, tropospheric warming in the polar regions was much larger than in the tropics, due in part to the albedo decrease from shrinking snow/ice area.”).

These quantities through this century and from a lower present model means: 2032–2039, more than 20 years before the date of ice area. Using such a model selection, the AR5 emission scenario, i.e. it could have an initial warming of the Arctic due to factors such as CO2 forcing will lead to decreased ice cover which exposes more of the underlying darker ocean and amplifies the warming. In 1975, this phenomenon was simulated in a 3D climate model by Manabe and Wetherald (9), who showed that under conditions of a doubling of CO2, tropospheric warming in the polar regions was much larger than in the tropics, due in part to the albedo decrease from shrinking snow/ice area.”).

This arises both from a more rapid reduction in atmospheric circulation have amplified the warming in this area.46,47 In general, there are no regions within the Arctic Circle where AA is smaller than two, apart from the northern North Atlantic.”); discussed in Budryk Z. (11 August 2022) Arctic warming up to four times as fast as global average, 2(144): 1–10, 3 (“During 1979–2021, major portions of the Arctic Ocean were warming at least four times as fast as the global average (Fig. 1c). The most extreme AA values occur in the sea areas near Novaya Zemlya, which were locally warming up to seven times as fast as the global average. These high warming rates are consistent with recent research44, and evidently, the primary reason for such a high amplification ratio is the reduction of cold-season ice cover, which has been most pronounced in the Barents Sea44,45. Furthermore, it has been found that changes in atmospheric circulation have amplified the warming in this area.46,47 In general, there are no regions within the Arctic Circle where AA is smaller than two, apart from the northern North Atlantic.”); discussed in Budryk Z. (11 August 2022) Arctic warming up to four times as fast as global average, 2(144): 1–10, 3.

These results stand in contrast to the widely-held conventional wisdom — prevalent across scientific and lay publications alike — that the Arctic is "only" warming around twice as fast as the global mean.”); discussed in Voosen P. (14 December 2021) The Arctic is warming four times faster than the rest of the world, SCIENCE.

Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (2021) ARCTIC CLIMATE CHANGE UPDATE 2021: KEY TRENDS AND IMPACTS, Summary for Policymakers, 6 (“The extent of Arctic sea ice in September declined by 43% between 1979 and 2019, and—with the exception of the Bering Sea—sea-ice extent and area are declining throughout the Arctic in all months. Sea-ice cover also continues to be younger and thinner than during the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s.”). See also Druckenmiller M. L., et al. (2021) The Arctic, Bull. Am. Met. Soc. 102(8): S263–S316, S280 (“September is the month when the minimum annual sea ice extent occurs. In 2020, this average monthly ice extent was 3.92 million km² (Fig. 5.8b), the second lowest monthly extent in the 42-year satellite record. On 15 September, the annual minimum Arctic sea ice extent of 3.74 million km² was reached; this was also the second lowest on record. The September monthly extent has been decreasing at an average rate of −82,700 km² per year since 1979 (−13.1% per decade relative to the 1981–2010 average; Fig. 5.8c).”).

Observation-based selection of climate models projects Arctic ice-free summers around 2035, COMMUN. EARTH ENVIRON. 2(144): 1–8, 4, 6 (“In the high-emission scenario, five out of six selection criteria that include ocean heat transport provide a first-ice-free Arctic in September before 2040 (range of multi-model means: 2032–2039), more than 20 years before the date of ice-free Arctic for the multi-model mean without model selection (i.e. 2061)”; “This model selection reveals that sea-ice area and volume reach lower values at the end of this century compared to the multi-model mean without selection. This arises both from a more rapid reduction in these quantities through this century and from a lower present-day sea-ice area. Using such a model selection, the timing of an almost ice-free Arctic in summer is advanced by up to 29 years in the high-emission scenario, i.e. it could occur as early as around 2035.”). See also Peng G., Matthews J. L., Wang M., Vose R., & Sun L. (2020) What Do Global Climate Models Tell Us about Future Arctic Sea Ice Coverage Changes?, CLIMATE 8(15): 1–24, 17 (“Excluding the values later than 2100, the averaged projected [first ice-free Arctic summer (FIASY)] value for RCP4.5 was 2054 with a spread of 74 years; for RCP8.5, the averaged FIASY was 2042 with a spread of 42 years. ...which put the mean FIASY at 2037. The RCP8.5 projections tended to push FIASY earlier, except for those of the MICRO-ESM and MICRO-ESM-CHEM models. Those two models also tended to project earlier Arctic ice-free dates and longer durations.”); and Overland J. E. & Wang M. (2013) When will the summer Arctic be nearly sea ice free?,
aging 0.21 × 10^3 xplains the large decrease in ice thickness during or tundra as Pistone –, re circulation in the Nordic Seas. The Atlantic Water volume transport to the Nordic 3, of the same magnitude as the sea ice negative season or the following warm season was related to in connected to the declining sea ice in both the warm and cold seasons (Figures 11and A15). Less sea ice in the cold A was already thin on 4 August before the storm (Figures 1i and 2b).”).

The enhanced melt is widespread in the ICAPS, but is strongest in the Canada Basin, almost doubled during the cyclone, aver...)

The Atlantic Water volume transport to the Nordic Seas and Arctic Ocean is consequently strengthened. This enhances the warming trend of the Arctic Atlantic Water layer, potentially contributing to the Arctic “Atlantification.” In these processes, the Nordic Seas play the role of a switchyard, while the reduction of sea ice export flux caused by increased air-sea heat flux over the Arctic Ocean is the switchgear. Increasing ocean heat can reduce sea ice thickness, and currently this occurs mainly in certain regions including the western Eurasian Basin near the Fram Strait and the northern Kara Sea (Carmack et al., 2015; Dmitrenko et al., 2014; Ivanov et al., 2012; Onarheim et al., 2014; Polyakov et al., 2010).

A warm jet in a cold ocean. NAT. COMMUN. 12(2418): 1–12, 1 (“Unprecedented quantities of heat are entering the Pacific sector of the Arctic Ocean through Bering Strait, particularly during summer months. Though some heat is lost to the atmosphere during autumn cooling, a significant fraction of the incoming warm, salty water subducts (dives beneath) below a cooler fresher layer of near-surface water, subsequently extending hundreds of kilometers into the Beaufort Gyre. Upward turbulent mixing of these sub-surface pockets of heat is likely accelerating sea ice melt in the region. This Pacific-origin water brings both heat and unique biogeochemical properties, contributing to a changing Arctic ecosystem.”).

The impact of an intense summer cyclone on 2012 Arctic sea ice retreat. GEOPHYS. RES. LETT. 40(4): 720–726, 722 (“The rapid reduction in ice volume during the storm is due to enhanced ice melt (Figures 3a–3d). The simulated total ice melt is 0.12 ×10^3 km^3 d^-1 before the cyclone, but almost doubled during the cyclone, averaging 0.21 ×10^3 km^3 d^-1 (or 0.17 ×10^3 km^3 d^-1 in the ICAPS) during 6–8 August (Figure 2c and Table 1). The enhanced melt is widespread in the ICAPS, but is strongest in the Canada Basin, where ice melt is as high as 0.12 m d^-1 (Figures 3b and 3c). This explains the large decrease in ice thickness during the storm in these areas (Figures 1j–11), up to 0.5 m by 10 August (Figure 1l). The simulated ice in most of these areas was already thin on 4 August before the storm (Figures 1i and 2b).”).

Plain Language Summary of Pistone K., et al.

Radiative Heating of an Ice-Free Arctic Ocean. GEOPHYS. RES. LETT. 46(13): 7474–7480, 7477 (“This heating of 0.71 W/m^2 is approximately equivalent to the direct radiative effect of emitting one trillion tons of CO_2 into the atmosphere (see calculation in Appendix A). As of 2016, an estimated 2.4 trillion tons of CO_2 have been emitted since the preindustrial period due to both fossil fuel combustion (1.54 trillion tons) and land use changes (0.82 trillion tons), with an additional 40 billion tons of CO_2 per year emitted from these sources during 2007–2016 (Le Quéré et al., 2018). Thus, the additional warming due to the complete loss of Arctic sea ice would be equivalent to 25 years of global CO_2 emissions at the current rate.”). See also Institute for Governance & Sustainable Development (2019) Plain Language Summary of Pistone K., et al.

A Farewell to Ice: A Report from the Arctic. Oxford University Press, 107–108 (“Warm air over an ice-free Arctic also causes the snowline to retreat. This of the same magnitude as the sea ice negative anomaly during the same period, and the change in albedo is roughly the same between snow-covered land and snow-free tundra as it is between sea ice and open water. Nobody has yet published the calculations for tundra as Pistone and her colleagues did for sea ice, but the similarity of the magnitudes means that snowline retreat and sea ice retreat are each adding about the same amount to global warming.”).

Intensification of the Atlantic Water Supply to the Arctic Ocean Through Fram Strait Induced by Arctic Sea Ice Decline. GEOPHYS. RES. LETT. 47(3): e2019GL086682, 1–10, 1 (“The reduction in sea ice export through Fram Strait induced by Arctic sea ice decline increases the salinity in the Greenland Sea, which lowers the sea surface height and strengthens the cyclonic gyre circulation in the Nordic Seas. The Atlantic Water volume transport to the Nordic Seas and Arctic Ocean is consequently strengthened. This enhances the warming trend of the Arctic Atlantic Water layer, potentially contributing to the Arctic “Atlantification.” In these processes, the Nordic Seas play the role of a switchyard, while the reduction of sea ice export flux caused by increased air-sea heat flux over the Arctic Ocean is the switchgear. Increasing ocean heat can reduce sea ice thickness, and currently this occurs mainly in certain regions including the western Eurasian Basin near the Fram Strait and the northern Kara Sea (Carmack et al., 2015; Dmitrenko et al., 2014; Ivanov et al., 2012; Onarheim et al., 2014; Polyakov et al., 2010).”).

A warm jet in a cold ocean. NAT. COMMUN. 12(2418): 1–12, 1 (“Unprecedented quantities of heat are entering the Pacific sector of the Arctic Ocean through Bering Strait, particularly during summer months. Though some heat is lost to the atmosphere during autumn cooling, a significant fraction of the incoming warm, salty water subducts (dives beneath) below a cooler fresher layer of near-surface water, subsequently extending hundreds of kilometers into the Beaufort Gyre. Upward turbulent mixing of these sub-surface pockets of heat is likely accelerating sea ice melt in the region. This Pacific-origin water brings both heat and unique biogeochemical properties, contributing to a changing Arctic ecosystem.”).
Sector of the Arctic. FRONT. EARTH SCI. 9(738497): 1–17, 15 (“The advective tendency of SIC due to the 10-m wind is one of the most consistent predictors of both local and regional ice loss for the large sample of cyclones in the ECB region. We find the strongest relationship between advection and sea ice loss for low concentration sea ice in August. This supports previous studies arguing that the reduced mechanical strength of lower concentration sea ice makes it more susceptible to wind-induced drift and deformation (Hakkinen et al., 2008; Rampal et al., 2009; Spreen et al., 2011).”); and Finocchio P. M., Doyle J. D., & Stern D. P. (2022) Accelerated Sea-Ice Loss from Late-Summer Cyclones in the New Arctic. J. CLIM. 1(aop): 1–39, 1 (“We compare the 1-7 day changes in sea-ice area and thickness following days in each month with and without cyclones from two decades: 1991–2000 and 2009–2018. Only in August do cyclones locally accelerate seasonal sea-ice loss on average, and the ability of August cyclones to accelerate ice loss has become more pronounced in the recent decade. The recent increase in ice loss following August cyclones is most evident in the Amerasian Arctic (140°E–120°W), where reanalyses indicate that the average upper-ocean temperature has increased by 0.2-0.8°C and the average ice thickness has decreased by almost 1 m between the two decades. Such changes promote cyclone-induced ocean mixing and sea-ice divergence that locally increase the likelihood for rapid ice loss near cyclones. In contrast, June cyclones in both decades locally slow down seasonal sea-ice loss. Moreover, the 7-day sea-ice loss in June has increased from the early to the recent decade by 67% more in the absence of cyclones than in the presence of cyclones. The largest increases in June ice loss occur in the Eurasian Arctic (0-140°E), where substantial reductions in average surface albedo in the recent decade have allowed more of the abundant insolation in the absence of cyclones to be absorbed at the sea surface.”). Research is also underway that analyzes 2022 trends for accelerated ice loss in the Arctic due to late summer cyclones. See Hand E. (23 August 2022) Arctic stormchasers brave giant cyclones to understand how they chew up sea ice, SCIENCE.

59 Rantanen M., Karpechko A. Y., Lipponen A., Nordling K., Hyvärinen O., Ruosteenko K., Vihma T. & Laaksonen A. (2022) The Arctic has warmed nearly four times faster than the globe since 1979, COMMUN. EARTH ENVIRO. 3(168): 1–10, 3 (“During 1979–2021, major portions of the Arctic Ocean were warming at least four times as fast as the global average (Fig. 1c). The most extreme AA values occur in the sea areas near Novaya Zemlya, which were locally warming up to seven times as fast as the global average. These high warming rates are consistent with recent research and, evidently, the primary reason for such a high amplification ratio is the reduction of cold-season ice cover, which has most pronounced in the Barents Sea. Furthermore, it has been found that changes in atmospheric circulation have amplified the warming in this area. In general, there are no regions within the Arctic Circle where AA is smaller than two, apart from the northern North Atlantic.”); discussed in Budryk Z. (11 August 2022) Arctic warming up to four times as fast as global average: study, THE HILL; and Fountain H. (11 August 2022) Arctic Warming Is Happening Faster Than Described, Analysis Shows, THE NEW YORK TIMES. See also Jacobs P., Lenssen N. J. L., Schmidt G. A., & Rohde R. A. (2021) The Arctic Is Now Warming Four Times As Fast As The Rest of the Globe, Presentation at the American Geophysical Union Fall Meeting. A13E-02 (“We demonstrate the Arctic is likely warming over 4 times faster than the rest of the world, some 3-4 times the global average, with higher rates found both for more recent intervals as well as more accurate latitudinal boundaries. These results stand in contrast to the widely-held conventional wisdom — prevalent across scientific and lay publications alike — that the Arctic is "only" warming around twice as fast as the global mean.”); discussed in Voosen P. (14 December 2021) The Arctic is warming four times faster than the rest of the world, SCIENCE; and Chylek P., Folland C., Klett J. D., Wang M., Hengartner N., Lesins G., & Dubey M. K. (2022) Annual Mean Arctic Amplification 1970–2020: Observed and Simulated by CMIP6 Climate Models, GEOPHYS. RES. LETT. 49(13): e2022GL099371, 1–8, 1 (“While the annual mean Arctic Amplification (AA) index varied between two and three during the 1970–2000 period, it reached values exceeding four during the first two decades of the 21st century. The AA did not change in a continuous fashion but rather in two sharp increases around 1986 and 1999. During those steps the mean global surface air temperature trend remained almost constant, while the Arctic trend increased. Although the “best” CMIP6 models reproduce the increasing trend of the AA in 1980s they do not capture the sharply increasing trend of the AA after 1999 including its rapid step-like increase. We propose that the first sharp AA increase around 1986 is due to external forcing, while the second step close to 1999 is due to internal climate variability, which models cannot reproduce in the observed time… Annual mean Arctic Amplification (AA) within the period 1970–2020 changed in steep steps around 1986 and 1999. It reached values over 4.0…”); discussed in Los Alamos National Laboratory (5 July 2022) Arctic temperatures are increasing four times faster than global warming, PHYS.ORG.

60 Cai Z., You Q., Wu F., Chen H., Chen D., & Cohen J. (2021) Arctic Warming Revealed by Multiple CMIP6 Models: Evaluation of Historical Simulations and Quantification of Future Projection Uncertainties, J. CLIM. 34(12): 4871–4892, 4878 (“The Arctic’s warming rate from 1986 to 2100 is much higher than that of the Northern Hemisphere and the global mean under the three different scenarios (You et al. 2021). Figure 8 shows the spatial patterns of annual mean near-surface temperature change in the Arctic according to the MME for the three periods relative to 1986–2005 under the three scenarios. Projections for the regionally averaged mean near-surface temperature increases in the
Arctic under SSP1-2.6, SSP2-4.5, and SSP5-8.5 scenarios are +2.5°, +2.6°, and +2.8°C respectively in the near term (2021–40), +3.3°, +4.0°, and +5.1°C in the midterm (2014–60), and +3.5°, +5.8°, and +10.4°C in the long-term (2081–2100) relative to the reference period based on the CMIP6 MMEM.

61 Ciavarella A., et al. (2021) Prolonged Siberian heat of 2020 almost impossible without human influence, CLIM. CHANGE 166(9): 1–18, 1 (“Over the first half of 2020, Siberia experienced the warmest period from January to June since records began and on the 20th of June the weather station at Verkhoyansk reported 38 °C, the highest daily maximum temperature recorded north of the Arctic Circle... We show that human-induced climate change has dramatically increased the probability of occurrence and magnitude of extremes in both of these (with lower confidence for the probability for Verkhoyansk) and that without human influence the temperatures widely experienced in Siberia in the first half of 2020 would have been practically impossible.”). See also DeGeorge K. (24 June 2021) Siberia is seeing record heat — again, ARCTIC TODAY (“On Monday, satellites with the European Union’s Copernicus Earth observation program detected exceptionally high ground temperatures across much of the region, with a high reaching an astounding 48 degrees Celsius (118 degrees Fahrenheit) near Verkhoyansk, in the Sakha Republic, while other sites recorded highs of 43 degrees C (109.4 degrees F) and 37 degrees C (98.6 degrees F). It’s important to note that those are ground temperatures, not air temperatures. For example, that latter figure was recorded in Saksylakh, also in the Sakha Republic, where air temperatures taken at the same time were a slightly cooler 31.9 degrees C (89.4 degrees F). That still set a record for Saksylakh, though, as the hottest pre-solstice temperature recorded there since measurements began in 1936. The news comes a month after the Arctic Council’s Arctic Monitoring and Assessment working group issued a report confirming that the region is now warming three times faster than the global average, rather than twice as fast. And it comes almost exactly a year after the first 100-degree (Fahrenheit) temperature was recorded north of the Arctic Circle — also in Verkhoyansk.”).

62 Schweiger A. J., Steele M., Zhang J., Moore G. W. K., & Laiedre K. L. (2021) Accelerated sea ice loss in the Wandel Sea points to a change in the Arctic’s Last Ice Area, COMMUN. EARTH ENVIRON. 2(122): 1–11, 2, 6 (“The Polarstern’s route was guided by satellite images showing extensive areas of open water and sea ice concentration (SIC) as low as 70% at 87N (Figs. 1a, S1b). We define our WS study area by 81.5°N–85°N, 10°W–50°W, the same area where we saw signs of change in February 2018. Daily 2020 WS SIC drops below the 5th percentile of the 1979–2020 time series on July 25 and stays there almost until the end of August (Fig. 1b). August 14, 2020 constitutes a record low 52% SIC minimum (Fig. 1c). Several earlier years (e.g., 1985: 57%, 1990: 67%, and 1991: 62%) also show significant low SIC minima, although none as low as 2020.”); 1 (“During spring 2020, ice accumulated in the WS (Fig. 4a, b) in response to anomalous advection (mostly in February; Fig. 4c, d). As a result, ice thickness was near its 1979–2020 mean value by June 1 according to PIOMAS; Fig. 2c), and actually thicker than in recent years (2011–2019) as confirmed by the combined CryoSat-2/SMOS satellite product... While primarily driven by unusual weather, climate change in the form of thinning sea ice contributed significantly to the record low August 2020 SIC in the WS. Several advection events, some relatively early in the melt season, transported sea ice out of the region and allowed the accumulation of heat from the absorption of solar radiation in the ocean. This heat was mixed upward and contributed to rapid melt during high wind events, notably between August 9 and 16; Ocean-forced melting in this area that is traditionally covered by thick, compact ice is a key finding of this study.”); “These ensemble experiments underline the importance of both spring sea ice and summer atmospheric forcing to August SIC. In summary, we find that: Spring ice conditions were mostly responsible for the summer SIC anomaly through the end of July, while the atmosphere was mainly responsible for driving SIC to a record low during August. Partitioning the impact of 2020 spring initial sea ice conditions vs. summer atmospheric forcing on the sea ice anomaly at the time of the WS sea ice minimum on August 14 (see “Methods”) attributes ~20% to the initial conditions while ~80% is the due to the atmospheric forcing.”).

63 Labe Z., Magnusdottir G., & Stern H. (2018) Variability of Arctic Sea Ice Thickness Using PIOMAS and the CESM Large Ensemble, J. CLIM. 31(8): 3233–3247, 3245 (Figure 10. “While twenty-first-century sea ice thins substantially in all seasons, a large sea ice cover continues to reform during the cold season. A region of perennially thick ice north of Greenland also remains...An area of perennially thick sea ice remains north of Greenland during all months of the year, but it significantly thins (especially in September) by the mid-twenty-first century. Average September SIT in all regions eventually falls below 0.5 m during the 21st century.”).

64 Schweiger A. J., Steele M., Zhang J., Moore G. W. K., & Laiedre K. L. (2021) Accelerated sea ice loss in the Wandel Sea points to a change in the Arctic's Last Ice Area, COMMUN. EARTH ENVIRON. 2(122): 1–11, 2 (“The LIA is considered to be a last refuge for ice-associated Arctic marine mammals, such as polar bears (Ursus maritimus), ice-dependent seals such as ringed seals (Pusa hispida) and bearded seals (Ergignathus barbatus), and walrus (Odobenus rosmarus) throughout the 21st century.”).
Isaksen K., et al. (2022) Exceptional warming over the Barents sea, Sci. Rep. 12(9371): 1–18, 11 (“The accelerated warming up to the latest decade is in agreement with the most recent assessments of instrumental observations in the Arctic.28 Przybylak and Wyszyński analyzed trends from 1951 to 2015 and showed that the strongest temperature increase in the Arctic in winter was observed over Svalbard, but no stations in north-eastern areas were then available. By including newly available SAT observations from northern and eastern Svalbard and from FJL, we were able to additionally study the regional SAT developments in the NBS. Our main findings are summarised in Fig. 7 and show that the warming in western Svalbard is large, but even larger in northern and eastern Svalbard and in FJL. From 1981 to 2020, we found an annual warming rate varying between 1.0 and 1.6 °C per decade, whereas, over the two periods 1991–2020 and 2001–2020, the annual warming rates ranged from 1.1 to 2.7 °C per decade. These rates are stronger than hitherto known in this region. The increasing temperature rates for the Northern Barents Sea region are exceptional on the Arctic and global scale and correspond to 2 to 2.5 times the Arctic warming averages and 5 to 7 times the global warming averages (Fig. 7).”); discussed in Carrington D. (15 June 2022) New data reveals extraordinary global heating in the Arctic, The Guardian.

Isaksen K., et al. (2022) Exceptional warming over the Barents sea, Sci. Rep. 12(9371): 1–18, 3 (“Record-high warming was observed over the two periods 1991–2020 and 2001–2020, with annual values ranging from ~1.1 °C per decade in Ny-Ålesund to 2.7 °C per decade at Karl XII-oya (Table 1 and Fig. 3c). The annual warming was dominated by higher autumn and winter warming but enhanced warming occurred in all seasons (Table 1). In autumn (SON) we noticed an accelerated warming for 1991–2020 and 2001–2020, with up to 4.0 °C per decade for the latter period at Karl XII-oya.”); discussed in Carrington D. (15 June 2022) New data reveals extraordinary global heating in the Arctic, The Guardian.

Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (2021) ARCTIC CLIMATE CHANGE UPDATE 2021: KEY TRENDS AND IMPACTS, SUMMARY FOR POLICY-MAKERS, 6 (“The extent of Arctic sea ice in September declined by 43% between 1979 and 2019, and—with the exception of the Bering Sea—sea-ice extent and area are declining throughout the Arctic in all months. Sea-ice cover also continues to be younger and thinner than during the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s.”). See also Druckenmiller M. L., et al. (2021) The Arctic, BULL. AM. MET. SOC. 102(8): S263–S316, S280 (“September is the month when the minimum annual sea ice extent occurs. In 2020, this average monthly ice extent was 3.92 million km² (Fig. 5.8b), the second lowest monthly extent in the 42-year satellite record. On 15 September, the annual minimum Arctic sea ice extent of 3.74 million km² was reached; this was also the second lowest on record. The September monthly extent has been decreasing at an average rate of ~82,700 km² per year since 1979 (~13.1% per decade relative to the 1981–2010 average; Fig. 5.8c).”).

Docquier D. & Koenigk T. (2021) Observation-based selection of climate models projects Arctic ice-free summers around 2035, COMMUN. EARTH ENVIRON. 2(144): 1–8, 4, 6 (“In the high-emission scenario, five out of six selection criteria that include ocean heat transport provide a first ice-free Arctic in September before 2040 (range of multi-model mean: 2032–2039), more than 20 years before the date of ice-free Arctic for the multi-model mean without model selection (i.e. 2061)”; “This model selection reveals that sea-ice area and volume reach lower values at the end of this century compared to the multi-model mean without selection. This arises both from a more rapid reduction in these quantities throughout this century and from a lower present-day sea-ice area. Using such a model selection, the timing of an almost ice-free Arctic in summer is advanced by up to 29 years in the high-emission scenario, i.e. it could occur as early as around 2035.”). See also Peng G., Matthews J. L., Wang M., Vose R., & Sun L. (2020) What Do Global Climate Models Tell Us about Future Arctic Sea Ice Coverage Changes?, CLIMATE 8(15): 1–24, 17 (“Excluding the values later than 2100, the averaged projected [first ice-free Arctic summer year (FIASY)] value for RCP4.5 was 2054 with a spread of 74 years; for RCP8.5, the averaged FIASY was 2042 with a spread of 42 years. ...which put the mean FIASY at 2037. The RCP8.5 projections tended to push FIASY earlier, except for those of the MICRO-ESM and MICRO-ESM-CHEM models. Those two models also tended to project earlier Arctic ice-free dates and longer durations.”); and Overland J. E. & Wang M. (2013) When will the summer Arctic be nearly sea ice free?, GEOPHYS. RES. LETT. 40(10): 2097–2101, 2097 (“Three recent approaches to predictions in the scientific literature are as follows: (1) extrapolation of sea ice volume data, (2) assuming several more rapid loss events such as 2007 and 2012, and (3) climate model projections. Time horizons for a nearly sea ice-free summer for these three approaches are roughly 2020 or earlier, 2030 ± 10 years, and 2040 or later. Loss estimates from models are based on a subset of the most rapid ensemble members. … Observations and citations support the conclusion that most global climate model results in the CMIP5 archive are too conservative in their sea ice projections. Recent data and expert opinion should be considered in addition to model results to advance the very likely timing for future sea ice loss to the first half of the 21st century, with a possibility of major loss within a decade or two.”).
Arctic sea ice extent during the period of 1981 to 2010, mainly caused by PICA reduction that declined at an annual rate of \(-1.105 \times 105\) km\(^2\) per year. The AICA SIE in September had a minimum extent of 4.32892 \times 106 km\(^2\) in 2020 compared to the much larger SIE of 7.63860 \times 106 km\(^2\) in 1982, resulting in a 43% decline over the past four decades.”).

72 U.S. Census Bureau, State Area Measurements and Internal Point Coordinates (last visited 19 July 2022).

73 Wang X., Liu Y., Key J. R., & Dworak R. (2022) A New Perspective on Four Decades of Changes in Arctic Sea Ice from Satellite Observations, REMOTE SENS. 14(8): 1846, 1–22, 13 (“The AICA SIT in March decreased to 1.80 m in 2020 from 3.85 m in 1982, resulting in a 53% decrease at a rate of \(-0.058\) m per year when Arctic sea ice reaches its seasonal maximum extent in the Arctic Ocean. In September, when the Arctic sea ice is at its minimum extent, AICA SIT declined to 0.71 m in 2020 from 1.36 m in 1982, resulting in a 48% decrease at a rate of \(-0.016\) m per year. On an annual average, AICA SIT decreased by 1.22 m, which is 52% of the 2.35 m in 1982, resulting in a 1.13 m in 2020. Both PICA and SICA SIT declined to 1.32 m and 0.96 m in 2020 from 2.55 m and 1.86 m in 1982, respectively. All of the Arctic SIT trends in all months are statistically significant, however the SICA SIT trend in September is slightly positive, with a confidence level of 0.496 due to the very small sample size of seasonal ice in September (Table 3).”).

74 Wang X., Liu Y., Key J. R., & Dworak R. (2022) A New Perspective on Four Decades of Changes in Arctic Sea Ice from Satellite Observations, REMOTE SENS. 14(8): 1846, 1–22, 18 (“Over 1982–2020, AICA SIV decreased to 20,679.0 km\(^3\) in 2020 from 51,216.6 km\(^3\) in 1982, resulting in a 60% decrease at a rate of \(-859.2\) km\(^3\) per year in March. In September, AICA SIV declined to 2462.0 km\(^3\) in 2020 from 8931.2 km\(^3\) in 1982, resulting in a 72% decrease at a rate of \(-\)170.2 km\(^3\) per year. Based on an annual average, AICA SIV decreased by 17,284.8 km\(^3\), which is 63% of the 27,590.4 km\(^3\) in 1982, resulting in 10,305.5 km\(^3\) SIV in 2020. PICA SIV and SICA SIV declined to 5766.0 km\(^3\) and 4522.8 km\(^3\) in 2020 from 20,313.0 km\(^3\) and 7271.0 km\(^3\) in 1982, respectively. In addition, the ratios of PICA SIV and SICA SIV to AICA SIV were declining in March, when Arctic sea ice reaches its maximum volume over 1982–2020 (Figure 14). It is around 2019 when the SICA SIV proportion started surpassing the PICA SIV proportion in March.”).

75 National Snow and Ice Data Center (21 September 2020) Arctic sea ice decline stalls out at second lowest minimum (“On September 15, Arctic sea ice likely reached its annual minimum extent of 3.74 million square kilometers (1.44 million square miles). The minimum ice extent is the second lowest in the 42-year-old satellite record, reinforcing the long-term downward trend in Arctic ice extent. Sea ice extent will now begin its seasonal increase through autumn and winter. Please note that this is a preliminary announcement. Changing winds or late-season melt could still reduce the Arctic ice extent, as happened in 2005 and 2010. NSIDC scientists will release a full analysis of the Arctic melt season, and discuss the Antarctic winter sea ice growth, in early October. The 14 lowest extents in the satellite era have all occurred in the last 14 years.”). See also Richter-Menge J., Druckenmiller M. L. & Thoman R. L. (2020) 15 Years of Arctic Observation: A Retrospective, in ARCTIC REPORT CARD 2020, Thoman R. L., Richter-Menge J., & Druckenmiller M. L. (eds.), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 8 (“As it turns out, the first publication in 2006 coincided with a cusp of transformation in the sea ice cover, which is literally and figuratively central to the Arctic system. The 2007 September minimum sea ice extent stunned scientists and grabbed world-wide media attention.”).
attention with a new record minimum that was 23% below the previous record low set in 2005. Just five years later, in 2012, the 2007 record was overtaken by a September minimum sea ice extent that was 18% below 2007. The 2012 record low still stands as of 2020. However, in the 14 years since ARC2006 the late summer sea ice minimum extent has never returned to pre-2007 values.

70 National Snow and Ice Data Center (22 September 2022) Arctic sea ice minimum tied for tenth lowest (“On September 18, Arctic sea ice likely reached its annual minimum extent of 4.67 million square kilometers (1.80 million square miles). The 2022 minimum is tied for tenth lowest in the nearly 44-year satellite record, with 2018 and 2017. The last 16 years, from 2007 to 2022, are the lowest 16 sea ice extents in the satellite record.”). See also National Snow and Ice Data Center (22 September 2021) Arctic Sea Ice at Highest Minimum Since 2014 (“On September 16, Arctic sea ice likely reached its annual minimum extent of 4.72 million square kilometers (1.82 million square miles). The 2021 minimum is the twelfth lowest in the nearly 43-year satellite record. The last 15 years are the lowest 15 sea ice extents in the satellite record. The amount of multi-year ice (ice that has survived at least one summer melt season), is one of the lowest levels in the ice age record, which began in 1984.”).

77 Perovich D., et al. (2020) Sea Ice, in Arctic Report Card 2020, Thoman R. L., Richter-Menge J., & Druckenmiller M. L. (eds.), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 29–30, 48 (“The oldest ice (>4 years old), which once dominated within the Arctic Ocean, now makes up just a small fraction of the Arctic Ocean ice pack in March, when the sea ice cover is at its maximum extent (Fig. 3). In 1985, 33% of the ice pack was very old ice (>4 years), but by March 2019 old ice only constituted 1.2% of the ice pack within the Arctic Ocean. The total extent of the oldest ice declined from 2.52 million km² in March 1985 to 0.09 million km² in March 2019. … First-year ice now dominates the sea ice cover, comprising ~70% of the March 2019 ice pack, compared to approximately 35–50% in the 1980s. Given that older ice tends to be thicker, the sea ice cover has transformed from a strong, thick ice mass in the 1980s to a younger, more fragile, and thinner ice mass in recent years. First-year ice is therefore more vulnerable to melting out in summer, thereby increasing the likelihood of lower minimum ice extents.”); “The oldest ice (> 4 years old) was once a major component of the Arctic sea ice cover, but now makes up just a small fraction of the March Arctic Ocean ice pack (Fig. 3). In 1985, 33% of the ice pack was very old ice (>4 years), but by March 2020 old ice only constituted 4.4% of the ice pack within the Arctic Ocean. The total extent of the oldest ice declined from 2.70 million km² in March 1985 to 0.34 million km² in March 2020. The March 2020 extent of > 4 year old ice increased from the record-low year in 2019 when it was only 1.2% (0.09 million km²) of the ice cover. This increase was due to 3–4 year old ice surviving a year and aging into > 4 year old ice. The 3–4 year old cover dropped from 6.4% in 2019 to 3.7% in 2020. Overall the percentage of ice 3 years and older was effectively unchanged. Note that these percentages are relative to ice in the Arctic Ocean region (Fig. 3, bottom inset); areas in the peripheral seas outside of this region have little or no older ice and thus do not show any change over time.”). See also Druckenmiller M. L., et al. (2021) The Arctic, BULL. AM. MET. SOC. 102(8): S263–S316, S282 (“The dominant ice type is now first-year ice (0–1 years old), which comprised about 70% of the March 2020 Arctic Ocean ice cover. The median ice age dropped from 2–3 years old in the mid-1980s to less than 1 year old by 2020. The total extent of the oldest ice (>4 years old) declined from 2.50 million km² in March 1985 to 0.34 million km² in March 2020.”); World Meteorological Organization (2020) UNITED IN SCIENCE 2020, 9 (“Arctic (as well as sub-Arctic) sea ice has seen a long-term decline in all months during the satellite era (1979–present), with the largest relative losses in late summer, around the time of the annual minimum in September, with regional variations. The long-term trend over the 1979–2019 period indicates that Arctic summer sea-ice extent has declined at a rate of approximately 13% per decade (Figure 4). In every year from 2016 to 2020, the Arctic average summer minimum and average winter maximum sea-ice extent were below the 1981–2010 long term average. In July 2020, the Arctic sea-ice extent was the lowest on record for July. There is very high confidence that Arctic sea-ice extent continues to decline in all months of the year and that since 1979, the areal proportion of thick ice, at least 5 years old, has declined by approximately 90%.”); and National Snow & Ice Data Center (2 September 2020) Tapping the brakes, Arctic Sea Ice News & Analysis (“As of September 1, Arctic sea ice extent stood at 4.26 million square kilometers (1.64 million square miles), the second lowest extent for that date in the satellite passive microwave record that started in 1979.”). Analysis by Zack Labe showed that sea ice for the high Arctic (above 80°N) was the lowest extent on record: see Zack Labe (@ZLabe), Twitter, 11 September 2020, 6:19pm (“Sea ice extent in the middle of the #ArcticOcean is currently the lowest on record (e.g., high Arctic ~80°N+ latitude). This is a pretty impressive statistic.”).

78 Osborne E., Richter-Menge J., & Jeffries M. (eds.) (2018) Executive Summary, in Arctic Report Card 2018, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2 ("The disappearance of the older and thicker classes of sea ice are leaving an ice pack that is more vulnerable to melting in the summer, and liable to move unpredictably. When scientists began measuring Arctic ice thickness in 1985, 16% of the ice pack was very old (i.e., multiyear) ice. In 2018, old ice constituted less than 1% of the ice pack, meaning that very old Arctic ice has declined by 95% in the last 33 years.").
See also Bi H., Liang Y., Wang Y., Liang X., Zhang Z., Du T., Yu Q., Huang J., Kong M., & Huang H. (2020) *Arctic multyear sea ice variability observed from satellites: a review*, J. OCEAN. LIMNOI. 38(4): 962–984, 963 (“As the MY [multyear] ice in the Arctic Ocean is declining at a significant rate, approximately -9%--15%/decade in the past three decades (Comiso, 2012; Polyakov et al., 2012; Kwok, 2018), the MY ice area has declined from about two-thirds of the Arctic basin area to less than one third (Galley et al., 2016). Along with the significant decline in the MY coverage and extent, there is also a clear transitioning trend in MY composition toward the thinner and younger components (Rigor and Wallace, 2004; Maslanik et al., 2007, 2011; Tschudi et al., 2016).”).

Wadhams P. (2017) *A FAREWELL TO ICE: A REPORT FROM THE ARCTIC*, Oxford University Press: Oxford, United Kingdom, 107–108 (“Warm air over an ice-free Arctic also causes the snowline to retreat. … This of the same magnitude as the sea ice negative anomaly during the same period, and the change in albedo is roughly the same between snow-covered land and snow-free tundra as it is between sea ice and open water. Nobody has yet published the calculations for tundra as Pistone and her colleagues did for sea ice, but the similarity of the magnitudes means that snowline retreat and sea ice retreat are each adding about the same amount to global warming.”).


Slater T., Lawrence I., Otosaka I. Shepherd A., Gourmelen N., Jacob L., Tepes P., Gilbert L., & Nienow P. (2021) *Earth’s ice imbalance*, THE CRYOSPHERE 15: 233–246, 233 (“The rate of [global] ice loss has risen by 57 % since the 1990s – from 0.8 to 1.2 trillion tonnes per year – owing to increased losses from mountain glaciers, Antarctica, Greenland and from Antarctic ice shelves…. Even though Earth’s cryosphere has absorbed only a small fraction of the global energy imbalance [3.2 ± 0.3 %], it has lost a staggering 28 trillion tonnes of ice between 1994 and 2017…. [T]here can be little doubt that the vast majority of Earth’s ice loss is a direct consequence of climate warming.”).

(25 January 2021) *Our world is losing ice at record rate*, EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY (“A paper, published today in The Cryosphere, describes how a team of researchers led by the University of Leeds in the UK used information from ESA’s ERS, Envisat and CryoSat satellites as well as the Copernicus Sentinel-1 and Sentinel-2 missions to find that the rate at which Earth has lost ice has increased markedly within the past three decades, from 0.8 trillion tonnes per year in the 1990s to 1.3 trillion tonnes per year by 2017. To put this into perspective, one trillion tonnes of ice can be thought of as a cube of ice measuring 10x10x10 km, which would be taller than Mount Everest.”).

Slater T., Lawrence I., Otosaka I. Shepherd A., Gourmelen N., Jacob L., Tepes P., Gilbert L., & Nienow P. (2021) *Earth’s ice imbalance*, THE CRYOSPHERE 15: 233–246, 233 (“The rate of [global] ice loss has risen by 57 % since the 1990s – from 0.8 to 1.2 trillion tonnes per year – owing to increased losses from mountain glaciers, Antarctica, Greenland and from Antarctic ice shelves…. Even though Earth’s cryosphere has absorbed only a small fraction of the global energy imbalance [3.2 ± 0.3 %], it has lost a staggering 28 trillion tonnes of ice between 1994 and 2017…. [T]here can be little doubt that the vast majority of Earth's ice loss is a direct consequence of climate warming.”).

Mallett R. D. C., Stroeve J. C., Tsamados M., Landy J. C., Willatt R., Nandan V., & Liston G. E. (2021) *Faster decline and higher variability in the sea ice thickness of the marginal Arctic seas when accounting for dynamic snow cover*, THE CRYOSPHERE 15(5): 2429–2450, 2429, 2441 (“When the sea ice thickness in the period 2002–2018 is calculated using new snow data with more realistic variability and trends, we find mean sea ice thickness in four of the seven marginal seas to be declining between 60%–100% faster than when calculated with the conventional climatology.”.”; “We first assess regions where SIT was already in statistically significant decline when calculated with mW99. This is the case for all months in the Laptev and Kara seas and 4 of 7 months in the Chukchi and Barents sea. The rate of decline in these regions grew significantly when calculated with SnowModel-LG data (Fig. 10; green panels). Relative to the decline rate calculated with mW99, this represents average increases of 62% in the Laptev sea, 81% in the Kara Sea and 102% in the Barents Sea. The largest increase in an already statistically significant decline was in the Chukchi Sea in April, where the decline rate increased by a factor of 2.1. When analysed as an aggregated area and with mW99, the total marginal seas area exhibits a statistically significant negative trend in November,
December, January and April. The East Siberian Sea is the only region to have a month of decline when calculated with mW99 but not with SnowModel-LG.”).

85 Wang Q., Wekerle C., Wang X., Danilov S., Koldunov N., Sein D., Sidorenko D., von Appen W.-J., & Jung T. (2020) Intensification of the Atlantic Water Supply to the Arctic Ocean Through Fram Strait Induced by Arctic Sea Ice Decline, GEOPHYS. RES. LETT. 47(3): e2019GL086682, 1–10, 1 (“The reduction in sea ice export through Fram Strait induced by Arctic sea ice decline increases the salinity in the Greenland Sea, which lowers the sea surface height and strengthens the cyclonic gyre circulation in the Nordic Seas. The Atlantic Water volume transport to the Nordic Seas and Arctic Ocean is consequently strengthened. This enhances the warming trend of the Arctic Atlantic Water layer, potentially contributing to the Arctic “Atlantification.” … In these processes, the Nordic Seas play the role of a switchyard, while the reduction of sea ice export flux caused by increased air-sea heat flux over the Arctic Ocean is the switchgear. Increasing ocean heat can reduce sea ice thickness, and currently this occurs mainly in certain regions including the western Eurasian Basin near the Fram Strait and the northern Kara Sea (Carmack et al., 2015; Dmitrenko et al., 2014; Ivanov et al., 2012; Onarheim et al., 2014; Polyakov et al., 2010).”).

86 MacKinnon J. A., et al. (2021) A warm jet in a cold ocean, NAT. COMMUN. 12(2418): 1–12, 1 (“Unprecedented quantities of heat are entering the Pacific sector of the Arctic Ocean through Bering Strait, particularly during summer months. Though some heat is lost to the atmosphere during autumn cooling, a significant fraction of the incoming warm, salty ocean water subducts (dives beneath) below a cooler fresher layer of near-surface water, subsequently extending hundreds of kilometers into the Beaufort Gyre. Upward turbulent mixing of these sub-surface pockets of heat is likely accelerating sea ice melt in the region. This Pacific-origin water brings both heat and unique biogeochemical properties, contributing to a changing Arctic ecosystem.”).

87 Barton B. I., Lenn Y.-D., & Lique C. (2018) Observed Atlantification of the Barents Sea Causes the Polar Front to Limit the Expansion of Winter Sea Ice, J. PHYS. OCEANOGR. 48(8): 1849–1866, 1866 (“Our results provide new evidence that, in addition to the natural multidecadal variability, the Barents Sea is currently undergoing Atlantification, with the corresponding temperature and salinity increases catalyzed by the observed PF constraint on the sea ice edge. The loss of winter sea ice south of the front represents a loss of freshwater input to BSW, a water mass that makes up 50%–80% of AW. As the stationary PF, rather than the mobile sea ice edge, has become the limiting factor controlling the northern boundary of the surface area available for AW cooling in winter, the buffering effect to BSW temperature from the variations of sea ice conditions has decreased. Observations show a change in BSW properties over the same time period resulting in denser BSW, which could in turn result in a deeper settling depth of BSW once exported to the Arctic basin through St. Anna Trough (Dmitrenko et al. 2015), with potential far-reaching impacts for the dense water outflow through Fram Strait (Lique et al. 2010; Moat et al. 2014) or the density of the Denmark Strait overflow (Karcher et al. 2011), both of which are important for the deeper branch of the AMOC.”).

88 Shu Q., Wang Q., Song Z., & Qiao F. (2021) The poleward enhanced Arctic Ocean cooling machine in a warming climate, NAT. COMMUN. 12(2966): 1–9, 6 (“Most of the CMIP6 models consistently show a poleward advance of the Arctic Ocean cooling machine and Arctic Atlantification (Supplementary Figs. 7–14). The significant model spreads in the simulated linear trends of sea ice concentration, sea surface heat flux, MLD, and sea surface stress (Supplementary Fig. 15) imply possible uncertainties in the predicted timing and strength of the changes in the cooling machine and Arctic Atlantification represented by the MMM. In particular, the underestimated trends in sea ice decline, ocean surface heat flux, and MLD in the CMIP6 MMM compared to observations and reanalysis as shown in Fig. 2 imply that the future development of the poleward expansion of the cooling machine and the strengthening of Arctic Atlantification are very possibly underestimated in the CMIP6 models on average.”).

89 Isaksen K., et al. (2022) Exceptional warming over the Barents sea, SCi. REP. 12(9371): 1–18, 1 (“Both the SAT analysis from instrumental records and widely used reanalyses products, including ERA5, point to a maximum warming area in the Barents region (Fig. 1). This Arctic warming hotspot is not constrained to the warming atmosphere; the Northern Barents Sea (NBS) region also hosts the most pronounced loss of Arctic winter sea ice and has since the early 2000s experienced a sharp increase in both temperature and salinity in the entire water column. The decline in the Barents sea ice cover, increased ocean temperature and salinity are closely related to the higher temperatures in the Atlantic Water and increased ocean heat transport entering the region from the west. In addition, the increase in salinity is larger towards the upper layers, leading to a weakened ocean stratification and thereby an increased upward heat flux. These oceanographic processes strongly contribute to the amplified warming in the region and enable larger heat flux interaction between the ocean and the air. If the rise in ocean temperature and
salinity continues, the originally cold and stratified Arctic shelf region may be transformed into an Atlantic-dominated climate regime with a warmer and more well-mixed water column strongly preventing sea ice formation\textsuperscript{52}.

\textsuperscript{90} Thomson J. & Rogers W. E. (2014) \textit{Swell and sea in the emerging Arctic Ocean}, \textit{Geophys. Res. Lett.}, 41(9): 3136–3140, 3136 (“Ocean surface waves (sea and swell) are generated by winds blowing over a distance (fetch) for a duration of time. In the Arctic Ocean, fetch varies seasonally from essentially zero in winter to hundreds of kilometers in recent summers. Using in situ observations of waves in the central Beaufort Sea, combined with a numerical wave model and satellite sea ice observations, we show that wave energy scales with fetch throughout the seasonal ice cycle. Furthermore, we show that the increased open water of 2012 allowed waves to develop beyond pure wind seas and evolve into swells. The swells remain tied to the available fetch, however, because fetch is a proxy for the basin size in which the wave evolution occurs. Thus, both sea and swell depend on the open water fetch in the Arctic, because the swell is regionally driven. This suggests that further reductions in seasonal ice cover in the future will result in larger waves, which in turn provide a mechanism to break up sea ice and accelerate ice retreat.”).

\textsuperscript{91} Finocchio P. M. & Doyle J. D. (2022) \textit{Summer Cyclones and Their Association With Short-Term Sea Ice Variability in the Pacific Sector of the Arctic}, \textit{Front. Earth Sci.}, 9(738497): 1–17, 15 (“The advective tendency of SIC due to the 10-m wind is one of the most consistent predictors of both local and regional ice loss for the large sample of cyclones in the ECPB region. We find the strongest relationship between advection and sea ice loss for low concentration sea ice in August. This supports previous studies arguing that the reduced mechanical strength of lower concentration sea ice makes it more susceptible to wind-induced drift and deformation (Hakkinen et al., 2008; Rampal et al., 2009; Spreen et al., 2011). ”). See also Finocchio P. M., Doyle J. D., & Stern D. P. (2022) \textit{Accelerated Sea-Ice Loss from Late-Summer Cyclones in the New Arctic}, \textit{J. Clim.}, 1:39, 1 (“We compare the 1-7 day changes in sea-ice area and thickness following days in each month with and without cyclones from two decades: 1991-2000 and 2009-2018. Only in August do cyclones locally accelerate seasonal sea-ice loss on average, and the ability of August cyclones to accelerate ice loss has become more pronounced in the recent decade. The recent increase in ice loss following August cyclones is most evident in the Amerasian Arctic (140°E-120°W), where reanalyses indicate that the average upper-ocean temperature has increased by 0.2-0.8°C and the average ice thickness has decreased by almost 1 m between the two decades. Such changes promote cyclone-induced ocean mixing and sea-ice divergence that locally increase the likelihood for rapid ice loss near cyclones. In contrast, June cyclones in both decades locally slow down seasonal sea-ice loss. Moreover, the 7-day sea-ice loss in June has increased from the early to the recent decade by 67% more in the absence of cyclones than in the presence of cyclones. The largest increases in June ice loss occur in the Eurasian Arctic (0-140°E), where substantial reductions in average surface albedo in the recent decade have allowed more of the abundant insolation in the absence of cyclones to be absorbed at the sea surface.”). Research is also underway that analyzes 2022 trends for accelerated ice loss in the Arctic due to late summer cyclones. See Hand E. (23 August 2022) \textit{Arctic stormchasers brave giant cyclones to understand how they chew up sea ice}, \textit{Science}.

\textsuperscript{92} Mallett R. D. C., Stroeve J. C., Cornish S. B., Crawford A. D., Lukovich J. V., Serreze M. C., Barrett A. P., Meier W. N., Heorton H. D. B. S., & Tsamados M. (2021) \textit{Record winter winds in 2020/21 drove exceptional Arctic sea ice transport}, \textit{Commun. Earth Environ.}, 2(149): 1–6, 2 (“The response of the sea ice to the wind forcing was such that four times as much MYI area was transported into the Beaufort Sea as was transported out, but the total ice area transported out was double that transported in (Fig. 2a, b). This transport acted to flush the Beaufort Sea of its first-year ice cover and fill it with MYI. Eight per cent of the Arctic’s MYI cover was transported into the Beaufort Sea in winter 2020/2021 (Fig. 2e), contributing to a record fraction of the MYI cover residing in the Beaufort Sea (23.5%) in the last full week of February (Fig. 2f). This fraction has been historically increasing over the data period (1983–2020), however, this high concentration is well above the linear trend (by 2.06 standard deviations; Figs. S9 and S10). Because around two-thirds of the Beaufort Sea has been ice-free on the first of September over the last decade (Fig.2h), this unprecedented concentration of Arctic MYI in the Beaufort Sea puts it at a larger risk of melting.”). See also Gulev S. K., et al. (2021) \textit{Chapter 2: Changing State of the Climate System}, in \textit{Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis}, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 2-65 (“A reduction of survival rates of sea ice exported from the Siberian shelves by 15% per decade has interrupted the transpolar drift and affected the long-range transport of sea ice (Krumpen et al., 2019). The thinner and on average younger ice has less resistance to dynamic forcing, resulting in a more dynamic ice cover (Hakkinen et al., 2008; Spreen et al., 2011; Vihma et al., 2012; Kwok et al., 2013).”).

\textsuperscript{93} DeGeorge K. (2021) \textit{Record-breaking winter winds have blown old Arctic sea ice into the melt zone}, \textit{ArcticToday} (“In the Arctic, the breakdown of the polar vortex produced an exceptional pattern of surface winds that swirled clockwise about the center of the Arctic Ocean like water around a plughole. These swirling winds spun the floating icepack like a spinning top. In doing so, they drove the Arctic’s perennial ice from a relatively safe and cold position
north of Greenland into an area where ice increasingly can’t survive the summer: the Beaufort Sea. Over the winter, the Beaufort Sea filled with perennial ice such that in the last week of February 2021, it contained a record fraction (23.5 percent) of the Arctic Ocean’s total perennial ice cover.

Valkonen E., Cassano J., & Cassano E. (2021) *Arctic Cyclones and their Interactions With the Declining Sea Ice: A Recent Climatology*, J. Geophys. Res. Atmos. 126(12): 1–35, 35 (“One of the most intriguing results in our analysis of track counts was the strong positive trend in cyclone numbers from ~2,000 onward in the cold season (Figure 3) and its connection to the decreasing SIC. Increased number of cyclones has also been observed in many other studies (Rudeva & Simmonds, 2015; Sepp & Jaagus, 2011; Zahn et al., 2018), but the positive trends found in Sepp and Jaagus (2011) and Zahn et al. (2018) were not spatially coherent, and some studies have also found negative or nonsignificant cyclone trends (e.g., Simmonds & Keay, 2009). The connection between cyclones and the changing sea ice surface has also remained unclear. The results presented here show a more coherent cold season increase in the cyclone counts than previous studies have. We also showed that the increased cyclone counts in the cold season were indeed connected to the declining sea ice in both the warm and cold seasons (Figures 11 and A15). Less sea ice in the cold season or the following warm season was related to increased cyclone counts in the cold season. This was apparent in both the correlation tables and trend matrix figures (Tables 1 and A1, and Figures 3, 11, and A15). The negative correlation between the warm season SIC and cold season cyclones could be supported by the findings of Koyama et al. (2017), which connected low summer sea ice years with more favored conditions for cyclogenesis the following fall/winter. However, they did not find an increase in the number of cyclones associated with the declining sea ice, which our results clearly showed.”). See also Day J. J. & Hodges K. I. (2018) *Growing Land-Sea Temperature Contrast and the Intensification of Arctic Cyclones*, Geophys. Res. Lett. 45: 3673–3681, 3680 (“In summary, we observed: 1. that 2m land temperatures near the Arctic coastline are warming at approximately twice the rate of sea surface temperatures in adjacent regions; 2. that significantly increased Arctic cyclone frequency and intensity, particularly in the Eastern part of the Arctic Ocean, are characteristic of years with high Arctic coastal temperature gradients, compared to low years; and 3. that the sign of this response is consistent with climate model projections, but the magnitude of change in cyclone numbers is higher, suggesting that CMIP models underestimate the sensitivity of the summer storm track to increasing land-sea contrast in the Arctic. Further, because climate change is increasing land-sea contrasts in the Arctic, it seems highly likely that the circulation patterns typical of years with strong AFZ will become more common as the climate warms. Indeed, strengthening of the mean temperature gradients in the AFZ is a robust feature of future climate projections as is an increase in the strength of the Arctic Front Jet (Mann et al., 2017; Nishii et al., 2014). This study shows that this linkage between surface temperature gradients and atmospheric circulation is important for Arctic cyclones, adding weight to previous studies.”).

Zhang J., Lindsay R., Schweiger A., & Steele M. (2013) *The impact of an intense summer cyclone on 2012 Arctic sea ice retreat*, Geophys. Res. Lett. 40(4): 720–726, 722 (“The rapid reduction in ice volume during the storm is due to enhanced ice melt (Figures 3a–3d). The simulated total ice melt is 0.12 ×10³ km³ d⁻¹ before the cyclone, but almost doubled during the cyclone, averaging 0.21 × 10³ km³ d⁻¹ (or 0.17 × 10³ km³ d⁻¹ in the ICAPS) during 6–8 August (Figure 2c and Table 1). The enhanced melt is widespread in the ICAPS, but is strongest in the Canada Basin, where ice melt is as high as 0.12 m d⁻¹ (Figures 3b and 3c). This explains the large decrease in ice thickness during the storm in these areas (Figures 1j–1l), up to 0.5 m by 10 August (Figure 1l). The simulated ice in most of these areas was already thin on 4 August before the storm (Figures 1i and 2b).”). See also Valkonen E., Cassano J., & Cassano E. (2021) *Arctic Cyclones and their Interactions With the Declining Sea Ice: A Recent Climatology*, J. Geophys. Res. Atmos. 126(12): 1–35, 20 (“We also showed that the increased cyclone counts in the cold season were indeed connected to the declining sea ice in both the warm and cold seasons (Figures 11 and A15). Less sea ice in the cold season or the following warm season was related to increased cyclone counts in the cold season.”); and Finocchio P. M., Doyle J. D., & Stern D. P. (2022) *Accelerated Sea-Ice Loss from Late-Summer Cyclones in the New Arctic*, J. Clim.: 1–39, 1 (“We compare the 1-7 day changes in sea-ice area and thickness following days in each month with and without cyclones from two decades: 1991-2000 and 2009-2018. Only in August do cyclones locally accelerate seasonal sea-ice loss on average, and the ability of August cyclones to accelerate ice loss has become more pronounced in the recent decade. The recent increase in ice loss following August cyclones is most evident in the Amerasian Arctic (140°E-120°W), where reanalyses indicate that the average upper-ocean temperature has increased by 0.2-0.8°C and the average ice thickness has decreased by almost 1 m between the two decades. Such changes promote cyclone-induced ocean mixing and sea-ice divergence that locally increase the likelihood for rapid ice loss near cyclones. In contrast, June cyclones in both decades locally slow down seasonal sea-ice loss. Moreover, the 7-day sea-ice loss in June has increased from the early to the recent decade by 67% more in the absence of cyclones than in the presence of cyclones. The largest increases in June ice loss occur in the Eurasian Arctic (0-140°E), where substantial reductions in average surface albedo in the recent decade have allowed more of the abundant insolation in the absence of cyclones to be absorbed at the sea surface.”).
Sea-ice-free Arctic during the Last Interglacial supports fast future loss, Nat. Clim. Change 10: 928–932, 931 (“Our study has demonstrated that the high-ECS HadGEM3 model yields a much-improved representation of Arctic summers during the warmer LIG climate compared with previous mid-garbage model simulations. We analyzed simulated surface air temperatures and proxy reconstructions of LIG summer temperatures and showed a 95% agreement between the model and observations. Arctic surface temperatures and sea ice are strongly related. This requires an ice-free Arctic summer Arctic, our LIG CMIP6 simulation provides (direct) observational support that the summer Arctic could have been ice free during the LIG. This offers a unique solution to the long-standing puzzle of what occurred to drive the temperatures to rise during LIG Arctic summers. The ability of the HadGEM3 model to realistically simulate the warm LIG Arctic climate provides independent support for predictions of ice-free conditions by summer 2035. This should be of huge concern to Arctic communities and climate scientists.”). The LIG sea-ice decrease commences in June (when the LIG sea-ice extent is outside of the PI range of variability, Fig. 1a) and culminates in a complete loss of ice by the end of the melt season in August and September (Fig. 1a,f).”;

“The predicted year of disappearance of September sea ice under high-emissions scenarios is 2086 for HadCM3 (CMIP3/5), 2048 for HadGEM2-ES (CMIP5) and 2035 for HadGEM3 (CMIP6) (Fig. 4). More broadly, multimodel CMIP3–6 mean predictions (and ranges) for a summer sea-ice-free Arctic are as follows: CMIP3, 2062 (2040–2086); CMIP5, 2048 (2020–2081); and CMIP6, 2046 (2029–2066) (Fig. 4 and Supplementary Table 3). We note that the latest year of sea-ice disappearance for CMIP6 models is 2066 and that 50% of the models predict sea-ice-free conditions between ~2030 and 2040. From this we can see that HadGEM3 is not a particular outlier, in terms of its ECS or projected ice-free year.”; and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2021) Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), Figure SPM.8-b.

Artic open-water periods are projected to lengthen dramatically by 2100, Commun. Earth Envir. 2(109): 1–10,4 (“The rate of increase in open-water period is comparable for all three emissions scenarios until the 2040s (Fig. 2), when the rate of change declines in SSP126 (blue), persists in SSP245 (orange), and accelerates in SSP585 (red). The most southerly regions (Sea of Okhotsk, Bering Sea, Gulf of St. Lawrence, and Labrador Sea) become ice-free year-round by the end of the century in SSP585, and some models also show the Greenland and Barents seas reach 365 days of open water for all grid cells by 2100.”).
Arctic, GEOPHYS. RES. LETT. 48: 1–10, 1 (“The Arctic sea ice cover is currently retreating and will continue its retreat in a warming world. However, the loss of sea ice is neither regionally nor seasonally uniform. Here we present the first regional and seasonal assessment of future Arctic sea ice loss in CMIP6 models under low (SSP126) and high (SSP585) emission scenarios, thus spanning the range of future change. We find that Arctic sea ice loss – at present predominantly limited to the summer season – will under SSP585 take place in all regions and all months. The summer sea ice is lost in all the shelf seas regardless of emission scenario, whereas ice-free conditions in winter before the end of this century only occur in the Barents Sea. The seasonal transition to ice-free conditions is found to spread through the Atlantic and Pacific regions, with change starting in the Barents Sea and Chukchi Sea, respectively.”); and Tor Eldevik (@TorEldevik), Twitter, 7 December 2020, 6:43AM (Co-author on the study sharing graphics and information about the ice-free conditions in the shelf seas).

99 Bonan D. B., Schneider T., Eisenman I., & Wills R. C. J. (2021) Constraining the Date of a Seasonally Ice-Free Arctic Using a Simple Model, GEOPHYS. RES. LETT. 48(18): 1–12, 1 (“Under a high-emissions scenario, an ice-free Arctic will likely (>66% probability) occur between 2036 and 2056 in September and between 2050 and 2068 from July to October. Under a medium-emissions scenario, the “likely” date occurs between 2040 and 2062 in September and much later in the 21st century from July to October.”).

100 Pistone K., Eisenman I., & Ramanathan V. (2019) Radiative Heating of an Ice-Free Arctic Ocean, GEOPHYS. RES. LETT. 46(13): 7474–7480, 7477 (“This heating of 0.71 W/m² is approximately equivalent to the direct radiative effect of emitting one trillion tons of CO₂ into the atmosphere (see calculation in Appendix A). As of 2016, an estimated 2.4 trillion tons of CO₂ have been emitted since the preindustrial period due to both fossil fuel combustion (1.54 trillion tons) and land use changes (0.82 trillion tons), with an additional 40 billion tons of CO₂ per year emitted from these sources during 2007–2016 (Le Quéré et al., 2018). Thus, the additional warming due to the complete loss of Arctic sea ice would be equivalent to 25 years of global CO₂ emissions at the current rate.”). See also Institute for Governance & Sustainable Development (2019) Plain Language Summary of Pistone K., et al.

101 Pistone K., Eisenman I., & Ramanathan V. (2019) Radiative Heating of an Ice-Free Arctic Ocean, GEOPHYS. RES. LETT. 46(13): 7474–7480, 7479 (“The estimate of one trillion tons of CO₂ emissions that remain in the atmosphere is equivalent to 7.77 Gt (Le Quéré et al., 2018), this increase of 56.7 Gt weighs 441 Gt. The mean air temperature of the Arctic Ocean relative to the 1979 baseline. Averaged over the globe, this implies a global radiative heating of 0.71 W/m² of radiative forcing is 1.0 trillion tons (i.e., 441 Gt/0.44).”).

102 Pistone K., Eisenman I., & Ramanathan V. (2019) Radiative Heating of an Ice-Free Arctic Ocean, GEOPHYS. RES. LETT. 46(13): 7474–7480, 7476 (“Hence, we focus on the baseline estimate scenario in which cloud conditions remain unchanged from the present. We find that the complete disappearance of Arctic sea ice throughout the sunlit part of the year in this scenario would cause the average planetary albedo of the Arctic Ocean (poleward of 60°N) to decrease by 11.5% in absolute terms. This would add an additional 21 W/m² of annual-mean solar heating over the Arctic Ocean relative to the 1979 baseline. Averaged over the globe, this implies a global radiative heating of 0.71 W/m² (Figure 2).”). See also Wunderling N., Willeit M., Donges J. F., & Winklemann R. (2020) Global warming due to loss of large ice masses and Arctic summer sea ice, NAT. COMMUN. 11(5177): 1–8, 6 (“On shorter time scales, the decay of the Arctic summer sea ice would exert an additional warming of 0.19 °C (0.16–0.21 °C) at a uniform background warming of 1.5 °C (=400 ppm) above pre-industrial. On longer time scales, which can typically not be considered in CMIP projections, the loss of Greenland and West Antarctica, mountain glaciers and the Arctic summer sea ice together can cause additional GMT warming of 0.43°C (0.39–0.46 °C). This effect is robust for a whole range of CO₂ emission scenarios up to 700 ppm and corresponds to 29% extra warming relative to a 1.5 °C scenario.”). If the Greenland Ice Sheet, West Antarctic Ice Sheet, and mountain glaciers were also completely ice-free, the planet could see an additional 0.43 °C of warming, with 55% of that coming from the loss of albedo.

103 Forster P., et al. (2021) Chapter 7: The Earth’s Energy Budget, Climate Feedbacks, and Climate Sensitivity, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 7-49 (Table 7.8 gives Effective Radiative Forcings (ERF) for CO₂ of 2.16 (1.90 to 2.41)). See also NOAA Earth System Research Laboratory, The NOAA Annual Greenhouse Gas Index (AGGI) (Spring 2021 update) (National Oceanic and
In 2011, 51 percent of black carbon emissions from open biomass burning were from wildfires, 43 percent from prescribed burning, with the remainder from agricultural field burning.

Carbon Cycle 106 (2012) U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (2015) U.S. NATIONAL BLACK CARBON AND METHANE EMISSIONS: A REPORT TO THE ARCTIC COUNCIL, 2, 9 (Figure 1 shows BC emissions north of the 40° parallel in 2011 amounting to 0.51 million metric tons, with 39% from open biomass burning, and 51% of that number [19.89% or ~0.10 MMT] due to wildfires; “In 2011, 51 percent of black carbon emissions from open biomass burning were from wildfires, 43 percent from prescribed burning, with the remainder from agricultural field burning.”). See also Kim J.-S., Kug J.-S., Jeong S.-J., Park H., & Schaeppmann-Strub G. (2020) Extensive fires in southeastern Siberian permafrost linked to preceding Arctic Oscillation, Sci. Adv. 6(2): eaax3308, 1–7. 2. 4 (“Strictly speaking, the fire activity–related high-pressure pattern extends further into southeastern Siberia than the typical AO pattern. This suggests that the AO provides preferable conditions for strong fire activity (i.e., high-temperature anomalies), but the positive pressure anomaly extending westward from the North Pacific to southeastern Siberia explains more southeastern Siberian fire activity variability.”); “In contrast, we found a significant negative relationship between March to April snow cover and total annual fire activity, as positive temperature anomalies related to a positive AO in February and March drive early snowmelt in March and April with a time lag of 1 to 2 months (Fig. 3, B and C, and fig. S6) (18, 19). This is consistent with results from a snow water equivalent dataset (fig. S7). Accumulated positive temperature anomalies in late winter lead to earlier melting in snow cover’s seasonal evolution. Once snow cover is reduced, a positive snow-albedo feedback accelerates surface warming and snowmelt (fig. S8). Thus, significant negative snowmelt is observed in March and April as a result (Fig. 3, B and C). Earlier snowmelt leads to faster exposure of the ground surface and litter, which, in turn, allows favorable conditions for fire spreading because this region consists mostly of larch (Larix gmelinii) forests with a high amount of litter that can act as fire fuel (22).… This analysis shows a generally negative relation between burned area and P/PET, meaning that more arid regions have stronger fire activity.”); and Environmental Protection Agency (2012) Report to Congress on Black Carbon, EPA-45/R-12-001.

Holzworth R. H., Brundell J. B., McCarthy M. P., Jacobson A. R., Rodger C. J., & Anderson T. S. (2021) Lightning in the Arctic, Geophys. Res. Lett. 48(7): e2020GL091366, 1–6, 1 (“The ratio of strokes occurring above a given latitude, compared to total global strokes, increases with time, indicating that the Arctic is becoming more influenced by lightning. We compare the increasing fraction of strokes with the NOAA global temperature anomaly, and find that the fraction of strokes above 65°N to total global strokes increases linearly with the temperature anomaly and grew by a factor of 3 as the anomaly increased from 0.65°C to 0.95°C.”); discussed in DeGeorge K. (5 January 2022) The high Arctic saw a huge spike in lightning last year, ARCTIC TODAY (“In 2021 there were 7,238 lightning events...”)
north of 80 degrees North latitude, the company said. That’s almost twice as many as in the preceding nine years combined. Even further north — north of 85 degrees — the company recorded a record high 634 events. (Areas of the Arctic further south, where lightning is a little more common, didn’t see such dramatic increases.).”

108 Chen Y., Romps D. M., Seeley J. T., Veraverbeke S., Riley W. J., Mekonnen Z. A., & Randerson J. T. (2021) Future increases in Arctic lightning and fire risk for permafrost carbon, NAT. CLIM. CHANG. 11(5): 404–410, 407–408 (“Lightning-driven increases in fire may trigger a positive fire–vegetation–soil feedback that promotes shrub expansion, northward displacement of the treeline and changes in tree species composition. A dynamic vegetation feedback may develop over a longer timescale than the atmospheric processes that regulate lightning flash rate and fire ignition. … Together, the vegetation dynamics and changes in fire weather may contribute to a higher ratio of burned area to lightning flash rate north of the treeline than what is currently observed (Extended Data Fig. 8a). After we add this amplifying effect from a vegetation feedback into our simple fire model (by assuming that the ratio of burned area to lightning flash rate in the Arctic tundra will change to the present–day value in boreal forests 480 km south of the treeline, referred to as the ‘dynamic vegetation’ approach), the model predicts a 570 ± 480% enhancement in burned area and carbon release by the end of this century in Arctic tundra. Increases in burned area within Arctic tundra, in turn, may increase the vulnerability of the permafrost carbon reservoir in at least two ways (Fig. 4b). First, more frequent fires have the potential to damage or remove the surface insulating layer of organic matter in areas that have moderate or high fire severity. The loss of this layer through wildfire combustion will expose the underlying permafrost to substantial warming and degradation and lead to thermokarst development in ice-rich permafrost. Second, with the expansion of shrubs and northern forests in fire–disturbed areas, surface albedo will probably decline in spring and summer, and the extra energy absorbed by the land surface may further amplify regional climate warming. Extra warming and productivity from a fire-driven northward expansion of forests could thus accelerate permafrost thaw and decomposition in areas not currently affected by fire.”). See also Witze A. (10 September 2020) The Arctic is burning like never before — and that’s bad news for climate change, NATURE NEWS (”Wildfires blazed along the Arctic Circle this summer, incinerating tundra, blanketing Siberian cities in smoke and capping the second extraordinary fire season in a row. By the time the fire season waned at the end of last month, the blazes had emitted a record 244 megatonnes of carbon dioxide — that’s 35% more than last year, which also set records. One culprit, scientists say, could be peatlands that are burning as the top of the world melts.”).

109 Scholten R. C., Jandt R., Miller E. A., Rogers B. M., & Veraverbeke S. (2021) Overwintering fires in boreal forests, NATURE 593(7859): 399–404, 404 (We estimated that large overwintering fires in Alaska and the Northwest Territories emitted 3.5 (standard deviation, 1.1) Tg of carbon between 2002 and 2018, 64% of which occurred during the 2015 Northwest Territories and 2010 Alaska fire seasons. The contribution of smouldering combustion is generally underestimated in carbon emission estimates from boreal fires. Thus, our estimate is likely to be conservative, because overwintering fires exhibit a substantial smouldering phase and may burn deeper than our emissions model currently predicts. In addition, smouldering fires emit relatively more methane and less carbon dioxide in comparison to flaming fires, yet methane has a much larger global warming potential.”).

110 Comer B., Olmer N., Mao X., Roy B., & Rutherford D. (2017) Prevalence of heavy fuel oil and black carbon in Arctic shipping, 2015 to 2025, International Council on Clean Transportation, 3, 4 (“Studies have analyzed the amount of HFO used and carried in the Arctic. Between 2011 and 2013, Det Norske Veritas completed a series of reports for the AC’s Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) working group to help it understand the use and carriage of HFO in the Arctic (Det Norske Veritas [DNV], 2011, 2013). In these studies, DNV found that only 20% of vessels sailing in the IMO Arctic from August to November 2010, and 28% from January to December 2012, operated on HFO. However, roughly 78%, or 400,000 tonnes, of the bunker fuel mass on board vessels in the IMO Arctic was HFO. DNV found that fishing vessels dominated the Arctic fleet in terms number of ships, operating hours, and fuel consumption in the Arctic; however, they assumed that most of these vessels operated on lighter and cleaner distillate fuels, rather than HFO, a reasonable assumption according to the results presented here. Bulk carriers, passenger vessels, and oil tankers had the most HFO fuel on board by mass because of their larger bunker tank capacity. A recent International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT) working paper (Comer, Olmer, & Mao, 2016) found that whereas less than half of ships operating in the IMO Arctic used HFO in 2015, the mass of fuel onboard all ships in the IMO Arctic was dominated by HFO (76% HFO; 23% distillate; less than 1% LNG, nuclear, and gas boil off), because ships operating on HFO tend to be larger ships with large bunker fuel tanks. That paper reported that ships in the IMO Arctic in 2015 had more than 830,000 t of HFO onboard, more than twice the amount estimated by DNV for the year 2012. A portion of this substantial increase in fuel carriage is attributable to greater carriage of HFO; however, the bulk of this difference is likely as a result of having more complete ship position and ship characteristics data in the 2016 ICCT study than in the 2013 DNV study. Comer et al. (2016) found that the carriage of HFO as bunker fuel in the IMO Arctic in 2015 was dominated by bulk carriers (247,800 t), container
vessels (112,900 t), oil tankers (110,600 t), general cargo vessels (76,600 t), and fishing vessels (76,200 t); “Several studies have estimated BC emissions in the Arctic, although the geographical definitions of the Arctic are inconsistent across studies. Corbett et al. (2010) estimated that ships operating in the AMSA area emitted 0.88 kilotonnes (kt) of BC in 2004, growing to 1.20 kt in 2020, 1.50 kt in 2030, and 2.70 kt in 2050 under a BAU scenario. Similarly, Peters et al. (2011) estimated that ships operating within the AMAP boundary emitted 1.15 kt of BC emissions in 2004, growing to 2.16 kt in 2030 and 2.96 kt in 2050. Both studies assumed a BC emission factor (EF) of 0.35 g/kg fuel. Two more recent studies—DNV (2013) and Winther et al. (2014)—better match the geospatial extents of the Arctic found in this report. DNV (2013) estimated that ships operating within the IMO Arctic emitted 0.052 kt of BC in 2012, assuming a BC EF of 0.18 g/kg fuel. Winther et al. (2014) estimated ships operating at or above 58.95°N emitted 1.585 kt of BC in 2012, assuming a BC EF of 0.35 g/kg fuel.”). See also Anselmi E. (6 April 2020) A new report shows that more ships are visiting the Arctic, ARCTICTODAY; and McVeigh K. (10 April 2022) ‘Black carbon’ threat to Arctic as sea routes open up with global heating, THE GUARDIAN.

11 O’Rourke R., Leggett J. A., Comay L. B., Ramseur J. L., Frittelli J., Sheikh P. A., Keating-Bitonti C., & Tracy B. S. (updated 24 March 2022) CHANGES IN THE ARCTIC: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, Congressional Research Service R41153, 19 (“While there continues to be significant international cooperation on Arctic issues, the emergence of great power competition (also called strategic competition) between the United States, Russia, and China, combined with the increase in human activities in the Arctic resulting from the diminishment of Arctic ice, has introduced elements of competition and tension into the Arctic’s geopolitical environment, and the Arctic is viewed by some observers as an arena for geopolitical competition among the three countries.”). See also Gricius G. (18 March 2021) Geopolitical Implications of New Arctic Shipping Lanes, THE ARCTIC INSTITUTE; and Spohr K. & Hamilton D. S. (eds.) (2020) THE ARCTIC AND WORLD ORDER, Foreign Policy Institute & Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs, Johns Hopkins University SAIS: Washington, DC.

112 Canadell J. G., et al. (2021) Chapter 5: Global Carbon and other Biogeochemical Cycles and Feedbacks, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 5-66 (“This new assessment, based on studies included in or published since SROCC (Schafer et al., 2014; Koven et al., 2015c; Schneider von Deimling et al., 2015; Schuur et al., 2015; MacDougall and Knutti, 2016a; Gasser et al., 2018; Yokohata et al., 2020), estimates that the permafrost CO₂ feedback per degree of global warming (Figure 5.29) is 18 (3.1–41, 5th–95th percentile range) Pg C °C⁻¹. The assessment is based on a wide range of scenarios evaluated at 2100, and an assessed estimate of the permafrost CH₄-climate feedback at 2.8 (0.7–7.3 5th–95th percentile range) Pg Ceq °C⁻¹ (Figure 5.29). This feedback affects the remaining carbon budgets for climate stabilisation and is included in their assessment (Section 5.5.2).”). See also Lawrence D. M., Slater A. G., Tomas R. A., Holland M. M., & Deser C. (2008) Accelerated Arctic land warming and permafrost degradation during rapid sea ice loss, GEOPHYS. RES. LETT. 35(L11506): 1–6, 5 (“We find that rapid sea ice loss forces a strong acceleration of Arctic land warming in CCSM3 (3.5-fold increase, peaking in autumn) which can trigger rapid degradation of currently warm permafrost and may increase the vulnerability of colder permafrost for subsequent degradation under continued warming. Our results also suggest that talik formation may be a harbinger of rapid subsequent terrestrial change. This sea ice loss – land warming relationship may be immediately relevant given the record low sea ice extent in 2007.”); and Vaks A., Mason A., Breitenbach S., Kononov A., Osinzey A., Rosensaft M., Borshevskiy A., Gutareva O., & Henderson G. (2020) Palaeoclimate evidence of vulnerable permafrost of times of low sea ice, NATURE 577(7789): 221–225, 221 (“The robustness of permafrost when sea ice is present, as well as the increased permafrost vulnerability when sea ice is absent, can be explained by changes in both heat and moisture transport. Reduced sea ice may contribute to warming of Arctic air, which can lead to warming far inland. Open Arctic waters also increase the source of moisture and increase autumn snowfall over Siberia, insulating the ground from low winter temperatures. These processes explain the relationship between an ice-free Arctic and permafrost thawing before 0.4 Ma. If these processes continue during modern climate change, future loss of summer Arctic sea ice will accelerate the thawing of Siberian permafrost.”). For more on impacts of melting permafrost to climate and water supply, see Taillant J. D. (2021) Chapter 5. A Thawing Earth, in MELTDOWN: THE EARTH WITHOUT GLACIERS, Oxford University Press: Oxford, United Kingdom; and Taillant J. D. (2015) Chapter 4. Invisible Glaciers, in GLACIERS: THE POLITICS OF ICE, Oxford University Press: Oxford, United Kingdom.

113 Schaefer K., Lantuit H., Romanovsky V. E., Schuur E. A. G., & Witt R. (2014) The Impact of the Permafrost Carbon Feedback on Global Climate, ENVIRON. RES. LETT. 9(085003): 1–9, 2 (“If temperatures rise and permafrost thaws, the organic material will also thaw and begin to decay, releasing carbon dioxide (CO₂) and methane (CH₄) into the atmosphere and amplifying the warming due to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions … The PCF is irreversible on human time scales because in a warming climate, the burial mechanisms described above slow down or stop, so
there is no way to convert CO₂ into organic matter and freeze it back into the permafrost.”). See also Schaefer K., Zhang T., Bruhwiler L., & Barrett A. P. (2011) *Amount and timing of permafrost carbon release in response to climate warming*. TELLUS B 63(2): 165–180, 166 (“The permafrost carbon feedback (PCF) is an amplification of surface warming due to the release into the atmosphere of carbon currently frozen in permafrost (Fig. 1). As atmospheric CO₂ and methane concentrations increase, surface air temperatures will increase, causing permafrost degradation and thawing some portion of the permafrost carbon. Once permafrost carbon thaws, microbial decay will resume, increasing respiration fluxes to the atmosphere and atmospheric concentrations of CO₂ and methane. This will in turn amplify the rate of atmospheric warming and accelerate permafrost degradation, resulting in a positive PCF feedback loop on climate (Zimov et al., 2006b).”); and Chen Y., Liu A., & Moore J.C. (2020) *Mitigation of Arctic permafrost carbon loss through stratospheric aerosol geoengineering*. NAT. COMMUN. 11(2430): 1–35, 2, 3 (“Between 2020 and 2069, Plnc-Panther simulations of soil C change, driven by outputs of 7 ESMs for the RCP4.5 projection, varied from 19.4 Pg C gain to 52.7 Pg C loss (mean 25.6 Pg C loss), while under G4 the ensemble mean was 11.9 Pg C loss (range: 29.2 Pg C gain to 44.9 Pg C loss). Projected C losses are roughly linearly proportional to changes in soil temperature, and each 1 °C warming in the Arctic permafrost would result in ~13.7 Pg C loss; the intercept indicates that the Arctic permafrost, if maintained in current state, would remain a weak carbon sink. MIROC-ESM and MIROC-ESM-CHEM, with simulations of warming above 3 °C, produce severe soil C losses, while GISS-E2-R with minor soil temperature change produces net soil C gains under both scenarios before 2070.”; “PlncPanTher simulations of the anoxic respiration rates over the period 2006–2010 are 1.2–1.7 Pg C year−1, and so the estimated range of CH₄ emissions is 28–39 Tg year−1, which is very close to the 15–40 Tg CH₄ year−1 estimates of current permafrost wetland CH₄ emissions.”).

114 Wilkersen J., Dobosk R., Sayres D. S., Healy C., Dumas E., Baker B., & Anderson J. G. (2019) *Permafrost nitrous oxide emissions observed on a landscape scale using the airborne eddy-covariance method*. ATMOS. CHEM. PHYS. 19(7): 4257–4268, 4257 (“The microbial by-product nitrous oxide (N₂O), a potent greenhouse gas and ozone depleting substance, has conventionally been assumed to have minimal emissions in permafrost regions. This assumption has been questioned by recent in situ studies which have demonstrated that some geologic features in permafrost may, in fact, have elevated emissions comparable to those of tropical soils. However, these recent studies, along with every known in situ study focused on permafrost N₂O fluxes, have used chambers to examine small areas (< 50 m²). In late August 2013, we used the airborne eddy-covariance technique to make in situ N₂O flux measurements over the North Slope of Alaska from a low-flying aircraft spanning a much larger area: around 310 km². We observed large variability of N₂O fluxes with many areas exhibiting negligible emissions. Still, the daily mean averaged over our flight campaign was 3.8 (2.2–4.7) mg N₂O m⁻² d⁻¹ with the 90 % confidence interval shown in parentheses. If these measurements are representative of the whole month, then the permafrost areas we observed emitted a total of around 0.04–0.09 g m⁻² for August, which is comparable to what is typically assumed to be the upper limit of yearly emissions for these regions.”).

115 Biskaborn B. K., et al. (2019) *Permafrost is warming at a global scale*. NAT. COMMUN. 10(264): 1–11, 1 (“During the reference decade between 2007 and 2016, ground temperature near the depth of zero annual amplitude in the continuous permafrost zone increased by 0.39 ± 0.15 °C. Over the same period, discontinuous permafrost warmed by 0.20 ± 0.10 °C. Permafrost in mountains warmed by 0.19 ± 0.05 °C and in Antarctica by 0.37 ± 0.10 °C. Globally, permafrost temperature increased by 0.29 ± 0.12 °C.”). See also Smith S. L., O’Neill H. B., Isaksen K., Noetzli J., & Romanovsky V. E. (2022) *The changing thermal state of permafrost*. NAT. REV. EARTH ENVIRON. 3: 10–23, 10 (“In warmer permafrost (temperatures close to 0 °C), rates of warming are typically less than 0.3 °C per decade, as observed in sub-Arctic regions. In colder permafrost (temperatures less than −2 °C), by contrast, warming of up to about 1 °C per decade is apparent, as in the high-latitude Arctic. Increased active-layer thicknesses have also been observed since the 1990s in some regions, including a change of 0.4 m in the Russian Arctic.”).

116 Miner K. R., Turetsky M. R., Malina E., Bartsch A., Tamminen J., McGuire A. D., Fix A., Sweeney C., Elder C. D., & Miller C. E. (2022) *Permafrost carbon emissions in a changing Arctic*. NAT. REV. EARTH ENVIRON. 3: 55–67, 55 (“Permafrost underlies ~25% of the Northern Hemisphere land surface and stores an estimated ~1,700Pg (1,700Gt) of carbon in frozen ground, the active layer and talik1,2. Rapid anthropogenic warming and resultant thaw threaten to mobilize permafrost carbon stores3,4, potentially increasing atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO₂) and methane (CH₄), and converting the Arctic from a carbon sink to a carbon source.”). See also Schuur E. A. G., et al. (2015) *Climate Change and the Permafrost Carbon Feedback*. NATURE 520: 171–179, 171 (“The first studies that brought widespread attention to permafrost carbon estimated that almost 1,700 billion tons of organic carbon were stored in terrestrial soils in the northern permafrost zone. The recognition of this vast pool stored in Arctic and sub-Arctic regions was in part due to substantial carbon stored at depth (1 m) in permafrost, below the traditional zone of

117 Gulev S. K., et al. (2021) Chapter 2: Changing State of the Climate System, in Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 2-72 (“Recent (2018–2019) permafrost temperatures in the upper 20–30 m layer (at depths where seasonal variation is minimal) were the highest ever directly observed at most sites (Romanovsky et al., 2020), with temperatures in colder permafrost of northern North America being more than 1°C higher than they were in 1978. Increases in temperature of colder Arctic permafrost are larger (average 0.4°C–0.6°C per decade) than for warmer (temperature > −2°C) permafrost (average 0.17°C per decade) of sub-Arctic regions (Figures 2.25, 9.22).”).

118 Canadell J. G., et al. (2021) Chapter 5: Global Carbon and other Biogeochemical Cycles and Feedbacks, in Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 5-66 (“This new assessment, based on studies included in or published since SROCC (Schaef er et al., 2014; Koven et al., 2015c; Schneider von Deimling et al., 2015; Schuur et al., 2016; MacDougall and Knutti, 2016a; Gasser et al., 2018; Yokohata et al., 2020), estimates that the permafrost CO₂ feedback per degree of global warming (Figure 5.29) is 18 (3.1–41, 5th–95th percentile range) Pg C°C⁻¹. The assessment is based on a wide range of scenarios evaluated at 2100, and an assessed estimate of the permafrost CH₄-climate feedback at 2.8 (0.7–7.3 5th–95th percentile range) Pg Ceq °C⁻¹ (Figure 5.29). This feedback affects the remaining carbon budgets for climate stabilisation and is included in their assessment (Section 5.5.2)… Beyond 2100, models suggest that the magnitude of the permafrost carbon feedback strengthens considerably over the period 2100–2300 under a high-emissions scenario (Schneider von Deimling et al., 2015; McGuire et al., 2018). Schneider von Deimling et al. (2015) estimated that thawing permafrost could release 20–40 Pg C of CO₂ in the period from 2100 to 2300 under a RCP2.6 scenario, and 115–172 Pg C of CO₂ under a RCP8.5 scenario. The multi-model ensemble in (McGuire et al., 2018) project a much wider range of permafrost soil carbon losses of 81–642 Pg C (mean 314 Pg C) for an RCP8.5 scenario from 2100 to 2300, and of a gain of 14 Pg C to a loss of 54 Pg C (mean loss of 17 Pg C) for an RCP4.5 scenario over the same period… Methane release from permafrost thaw (including abrupt thaw) under high-warming RCP8.5 scenario has been estimated at 836–2614 Tg CH₄ over the 21st century and 2800–7400 Tg CH₄ from 2100–2300 (Schneider von Deimling et al., 2015), and at 5300 Tg CH₄ over the 21st century and 16000 Tg CH₄ from 2100–2300 (Turetsky et al., 2020). For RCP4.5, these numbers are 538–2356 Tg CH₄ until 2100 and 2000–6100 Tg CH₄ from 2100–2300 (Schneider von Deimling et al., 2015), and 4100 Tg CH₄ until 2100 and 10000 Tg CH₄ from 2100–2300 (Turetsky et al., 2020).”)

119 Chadburn S. E., Burke E. J., Cox P. M., Friedlingstein P., Hugelius G., & Westermann S. (2017) An observation-based constraint on permafrost loss as a function of global warming, Nat. Clim. Change 7: 340–344, 340 (“The estimated permafrost area is 15.5 million km² using this technique (12.0–18.2 million km² using minimum/maximum curves), which compares well to 15.0 million km² from observations (12.6–18.4 million km²).”). See also Obu J., et al. (2019) Northern Hemisphere permafrost map based on TTOP modelling for 2000–2016 at 1 km² scale, Earth-Sci. Rev. 193: 299–316, 305 (“The best estimate of the permafrost area in the Northern Hemisphere is 13.9 × 10⁶ km² (14.6% of the exposed land area), representing the total area with where MAGT < 0 °C (Fig. 3). The borehole temperature comparison can be used to incorporate uncertainty into this estimate, giving a minimum permafrost extent of 10.1 × 10⁶ km² (10.5% of exposed land area; the area within MAGT < −2 °C) and a maximum extent of 19.6 × 10⁶ km² (20.6% of exposed land area; the area within MAGT < +2 °C). The extent of the permafrost region (i.e. all permafrost zones) inferred from permafrost occurrence probabilities is 20.8 × 10⁶ km² (21.8% of exposed land area). The continuous permafrost zone occupies about half of this area, underlying 10.7 × 10⁶ km² (11.2% of exposed land area), while the discontinuous (3.1 × 10⁶ km²; 3.3% of exposed land area), sporadic (3.5 × 10⁶ km²; 3.6% of exposed land area), and isolated patches zones (3.5 × 10⁶ km²; 3.6% of exposed land area) almost equally divide the remainder.”); and Obu J. (2021) How Much of the Earth’s Surface is Underlain by Permafrost?, J. Geophys. Res. Earth Surf. 126(5): e2021JF006123, 1–5, 5 (“Globally, permafrost underlies between 14 and 15.7 × 10⁶ km² of the exposed land area (Gruber, 2012; Obu, Westermann, Bartsch, et al. (2019)), which equates to approximately 11% of the exposed land surface with around 2% uncertainty. No subglacial, relic, or subsea permafrost is included in the above estimates. Circum-Arctic subsea permafrost extent was estimated to be 2.5 × 10⁶ km² (Overduin et al., 2019). Thus, the permafrost area including Circum-Arctic subsea permafrost can be estimated to be around 17 × 10⁶ km².”).

baseline (corresponding to the IPA map, Fig. 1b), and under a 2 °C stabilization we would lose 6.6 (+2.0, -2.2) million km², over 40% of the present-day permafrost area. Therefore, stabilizing at 1.5 °C rather than 2 °C could potentially prevent approximately 2 million km² of permafrost from thawing."). See also Burke E.J., Zhang Y., & Krinner G. (2020) Evaluating permafrost physics in the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project 6 (CMIP6) models and their sensitivity to climate change, The Cryosphere 14(9): 3155–3174, 3173 (“The CMIP6 models project a loss of permafrost under future climate change of between 1.7 and 2.7×10⁶ km²°C⁻¹. A more impact-relevant statistic is the decrease in average mean frozen volume (3.0 to 5.3×10³ km³°C⁻¹) or around 10 %–40 %°C⁻¹.”); and Wang X., et al. (2022) Contrasting characteristics, changes, and linkages of permafrost between the Arctic and the Third Pole, EARTH SCI. REV. 230(104042): 1–21, 9 (“The future reduction in near-surface permafrost (permafrost in the topmost ground layers, < 10–15 m depth, Hjort et al., 2022) area exhibits different magnitudes in the two regions. In the Arctic, the near-surface permafrost area is projected to gradually decline, from 22% (28%) in 2041–2060 to 29% (49%) in 2061–2080 under the RCP 4.5 (RCP 8.5) scenarios relative to the baseline (Table 3). This means that almost one-half of the near-surface permafrost would be lost by the end of the 21st century under the high emission scenario. In western Siberia, permafrost is projected by the CMIP6 models to disappear under SSP5–8.5 because of the MAAT 0 °C isocline moving toward the north (Alexandrov et al., 2021). On the TP, near-surface permafrost exhibits more rapid thaw than in the Arctic, especially under RCP 8.5: 58% in 2041–2060 and 84% in 2061–2080 (Table 3), indicating that near-surface permafrost on the TP is more susceptible to rising air temperatures than the Arctic near-surface permafrost. The near-surface permafrost area on the TP is projected to decrease to 0.54×10⁶ km² in 2099 under a future air temperature increase of 2.9 °C (warming magnitude under RCP 4.5) using an “altitude model” (Li and Cheng, 1999), which is close to the projection under RCP 4.5 (Table 3.”).


122 Turetsky M. R., Abbott B. W., Jones M. C., Anthony K. W., Olefeldt D., Schuur E. A. G., Grosse G., Kuhry P., Hugelius G., Koven C., Lawrence D. M., Gibson C., Sannel A. B. K., & McGuire A. D. (2020) Carbon release through abrupt permafrost thaw, NAT. GEOSCI. 13: 138–143, 138–139 (“The permafrost zone is expected to be a substantial carbon source to the atmosphere, yet large-scale models currently only simulate gradual changes in seasonally thawed soil. Abrupt thaw will probably occur in <20% of the permafrost zone but could affect half of permafrost carbon through collapsing ground, rapid erosion and landslides. Here, we synthesize the best available information and develop inventory models to simulate abrupt thaw impacts on permafrost carbon balance. Emissions across 2.5 million km² of abrupt thaw could provide a similar climate feedback as gradual thaw emissions from the entire 18 million km² permafrost region under the warming projection of Representative Concentration Pathway 8.5. While models forecast that gradual thaw may lead to net ecosystem carbon uptake under projections of Representative Concentration Pathway 4.5, abrupt thaw emissions are likely to offset this potential carbon sink. Active hillslope erosional features will occupy 3% of abrupt thaw terrain by 2300 but emit one-third of abrupt thaw carbon losses. Lakes and wetlands are methane hot spots but their carbon release is partially offset by slowly regrowing vegetation. After considering abrupt thaw stabilization, lake drainage and soil carbon uptake by vegetation regrowth, we conclude that models considering only gradual permafrost thaw are substantially underestimating carbon emissions from thawing permafrost..... Our simulations suggest net cumulative abrupt thaw carbon emissions on the order of 80±19PgC by 2300 (Fig. 2a). For context, a recent modelling study found that gradual vertical thaw could result in permafrost carbon losses of 208PgC by 2300 under RCP8.5 (multimodel mean), although model projections ranged from a net carbon gain of 167PgC to a net loss of 641PgC (ref. 2). Thus, our results suggest that abrupt thaw carbon losses are equivalent to approximately 40% of the mean net emissions attributed to gradual thaw. Most of this carbon release stems from newly formed features that cover <5% of the permafrost region”).

123 Compare 43 GtCO₂e in 2100 with 220 GtCO₂ from Gasser et al. (2018) for 20% additional emissions. See Sayedi S. S., et al. (2020) Subsea permafrost carbon stocks and climate change sensitivity estimated by expert assessment, ENVIRON. RES. LETT. 15(12): 124075, 1–13, 1 (“We performed a structured expert assessment with 25 permafrost researchers to combine quantitative estimates of the stocks and sensitivity of organic carbon in the subsea permafrost...
domain (i.e. unglaciated portions of the continental shelves exposed during the last glacial period). Experts estimated that the subsea permafrost domain contains ~560 gigatons carbon (GtC; 170–740, 90% confidence interval) in OM and 45 GtC (10–110) in CH4. Current fluxes of CH4 and carbon dioxide (CO2) to the water column were estimated at 18 (2–34) and 38 (13–110) megatons C yr⁻¹, respectively. Under Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) RCP8.5, the subsea permafrost domain could release 43 Gt CO2-equivalent (CO2e) by 2100 (14–110) and 190 Gt CO2e by 2300 (45–590), with ~30% fewer emissions under RCP2.6.” discussed in (15 February 2021) Submarine Permafrost Has Been Overlooked as a Major Source of Greenhouse Gases, Scientists Warn, YALE ENVIRONMENT 360.

124 Natali S. M., Holdren J. P., Rogers B. M., Treharne R., Duffy P. B., Pomerance R., & MacDonald E. (2021) Permafrost carbon feedbacks threaten global climate goals, PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 118(21): e2100163118, 1–3, 1 (“These nonlinear processes are particularly relevant when considering the pathway to 2 °C—that is, whether mitigation keeps global average temperature increase below 2 °C (“avoidance”) or causes an “overshoot” in temperature before stabilizing. Permafrost emissions from gradual thaw alone are highly dependent on both the extent and duration of the temperature overshoot (12). For example, for a 1.5 °C or 2 °C target, an overshoot of 0.5 °C leads to a twofold increase in permafrost emissions, and an overshoot of 1.5 °C leads to a fourfold increase.”). See also Gasser T., Kechiar M., Ciais P., Burke E. J., Kleinen T., Zhu D., Huang Y., Ekici A., & Obersteiner M. (2018) Path-dependent reductions in CO2 emission budgets caused by permafrost carbon release, NAT. GEOSCI. 11(11): 830–835, 833 (“In the case of an overshoot amplitude of 0.5 °C, emissions from permafrost thaw reduce the net emission budgets by 130 (30–300) GtCO2 for the 1.5 °C long-term target (that is for a peak temperature of 2 °C, a case that corresponds to the Paris Climate Agreement), and by 190 (50–400)GtCO2 for the 2 °C target (Fig. 2a). For an overshoot amplitude of 1 °C, permafrost-induced reductions reach 210 (50–430)GtCO2 for the 1.5 °C target, and 270 (70–530)GtCO2 for 2 °C target. (Budgets for other targets and other levels of overshoot are provided in Fig. 2 and Supplementary Table 1.”).

125 Froitzheim N., Majka J., & Zastrozhnov D. (2021) Methane release from carbonate rock formations in the Siberian permafrost area during and after the 2020 heat wave, PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 118(32): 1–3, 1 (“In the Taymyr Peninsula and surroundings in North Siberia, the area of the worldwide largest positive surface temperature anomaly for 2020, atmospheric methane concentrations have increased considerably during and after the 2020 heat wave. Two elongated areas of increased atmospheric methane concentration that appeared during summer coincide with two stripes of Paleozoic carbonates exposed at the southern and northern borders of the Yenisey-Khatanga Basin, a hydrocarbon-bearing sedimentary basin between the Siberian Craton to the south and the Taymyr Fold Belt to the north. Over the carbonates, soils are thin to nonexistent and wetlands are scarce. The maxima are thus unlikely to be caused by microbial methane from soils or wetlands. We suggest that gas hydrates in fractures and pockets of the carbonate rocks in the permafrost zone became unstable due to warming from the surface. This process may add unknown quantities of methane to the atmosphere in the near future.”), discussed in Carrington D. (2 August 2021) Climate crisis: Siberian heatwave led to new methane emissions, study says, THE GUARDIAN (“The Siberian heatwave of 2020 led to new methane emissions from the permafrost, according to research. Emissions of the potent greenhouse gas are currently small, the scientists said, but further research is urgently needed. Analysis of satellite data indicated that fossil methane gas leaked from rock formations known to be large hydrocarbon reservoirs after the heatwave, which peaked at 6°C above normal temperatures. Previous observations of leaks have been from permafrost soil or under shallow seas.”), and Mufson S. (3 August 2021) Scientists expected thawing wetlands in Siberia’s permafrost. What they found is ‘much more dangerous’, WASHINGTON POST.

126 Permafrost Pathways, Course of Action: Mitigation Policy (last visited 9 May 2022) (“Depending on how hot we let it get, carbon emissions from Arctic permafrost thaw are expected to be in the range of 30 to more than 150 billion tons of carbon (110 to more than 550 Gt CO2) this century, with upper estimates on par with the cumulative emissions from the entire United States at its current rate. To put it another way, permafrost thaw emissions could use up between 25 and 40 percent of the remaining carbon budget that would be necessary to cap warming at the internationally agreed-upon 2 degrees Celsius global temperature threshold established in the Paris Agreement…. Despite the enormity of this problem, gaps in permafrost carbon monitoring and modeling are resulting in permafrost being left out of global climate policies, rendering our emissions targets fundamentally inaccurate. World leaders are in a race against time to reduce emissions and prevent Earth’s temperature from reaching dangerous levels. The problem is, without including current and projected emissions from permafrost, this race will be impossible to finish…. 82% [of] IPCC models do not include carbon emissions from permafrost thaw.”).

infrastructure, namely through warming, active layer thickening and thaw-related hazards such as thermokarst and mass wasting. These impacts, often linked to anthropogenic warming, are exacerbated through increased human activity. Observed infrastructure damage is substantial, with up to 80% of buildings in some Russian cities and ~30% of some road surfaces in the Qinghai–Tibet Plateau reporting damage. Under anthropogenic warming, infrastructure damage is projected to continue, with 30–50% of critical circumpolar infrastructure thought to be at high risk by 2050. Accordingly, permafrost degradation-related infrastructure costs could rise to tens of billions of US dollars by the second half of the century.”). See also Hjort J., Karijalainen O., Aalto J., Westermann S., Romanovsky V. E., Nelson F. E., Ertzemüller B., & Luoto M. (2018) Degrading permafrost puts Arctic infrastructure at risk by mid-century, Nat. Commun. 9(5147): 1–9, 1 (“Here we identify at unprecedentedly high spatial resolution infrastructure hazard areas in the Northern Hemisphere’s permafrost regions under projected climatic changes and quantify fundamental engineering structures at risk by 2050. We show that nearly four million people and 70% of current infrastructure in the permafrost domain are in areas with high potential for thaw of near-surface permafrost. Our results demonstrate that one-third of pan-Arctic infrastructure and 45% of the hydrocarbon extraction fields in the Russian Arctic are in regions where thaw-related ground instability can cause severe damage to the built environment. Alarmingly, these figures are not reduced substantially even if the climate change targets of the Paris Agreement are reached.”).

DeGeorge K. (29 June 2021) The looming Arctic collapse: More than 40% of north Russian buildings are starting to crumble, ARCTIC TODAY (“Aleksandr Kozlov, Russia’s Minister of Natural Resources, told a minister’s council in May that more than 40% of the northern region’s buildings are starting to deform. Nearly 30% of oil and gas installations are inoperable. By 2050, Russian researchers estimate that the melting permafrost will inflict damages worth about $69 billion, about a quarter of the current Russian federal budget.”).


Whiteman G., Hope C., & Wadhams P. (2013) Vast costs of Arctic change, Nature 499(7459): 401–403, 401 (“We calculate that the costs of a melting Arctic will be huge, because the region is pivotal to the functioning of Earth systems such as oceans and the climate. The release of methane from thawing permafrost beneath the East Siberian Sea, off northern Russia, alone comes with an average global price tag of $60 trillion in the absence of mitigating action — a figure comparable to the size of the world economy in 2012 (about $70 trillion). The total cost of Arctic change will be much higher... The methane pulse will bring forward by 15–35 years the average date at which the global mean temperature rise exceeds 2°C above pre-industrial levels — to 2035 for the business-as-usual scenario and to 2040 for the low-emissions case (see ‘Arctic methane’). This will lead to an extra $60 trillion (net present value) of mean climate-change impacts for the scenario with no mitigation, or 15% of the mean total predicted cost of climate-change impacts (about $400 trillion). In the low-emissions case, the mean net present value of global climate-change impacts is $82 trillion without the methane release; with the pulse, an extra $37 trillion, or 45% is added.... These costs remain the same irrespective of whether the methane emission is delayed by up to 20 years, kicking in at 2035 rather than 2015, or stretched out over two or three decades, rather than one. A pulse of 25 Gt of methane has half the impact of a 50 Gt pulse. The economic consequences will be distributed around the globe, but the modelling shows that about 80% of them will occur in the poorer economies of Africa, Asia and South America. ... The full impacts of a warming Arctic, including, for example, ocean acidification and altered ocean and atmospheric circulation, will be much greater than our cost estimate for methane release alone. To find out the actual cost, better models are needed to incorporate feedbacks that are not included in our models.”).

Watts J. (27 October 2020) Arctic methane deposits ‘starting to release’, scientists say, THE GUARDIAN (“‘At this moment, there is unlikely to be any major impact on global warming, but the point is that this process has now been triggered. This East Siberian slope methane hydrate system has been perturbed and the process will be ongoing,’ said the Swedish scientist Örjan Gustafsson, of Stockholm University, in a satellite call from the vessel.”). Discussing the International Siberian Shelf Study (ISSS) 2020 Arctic Ocean Expedition.

Steinbach J., Holmstrand H., Shcherbakova K., Kosmach D., Brüchert V., Shakhova N., Salyuk A., Sapart C. J., Chernyk D., Noormets R., Semiletov I., & Gustafsson O. (2021) Source apportionment of methane escaping the subsea permafrost system in the outer Eurasian Arctic Shelf, Proc. Nat’l. Acad. Sci. 118(10): 1–9, 7 (“Taken together, the triple-isotope data presented here, in combination with other system data and indications from earlier studies, suggest that deep thermogenic reservoirs are key sources of the elevated methane concentrations in the outer Laptev Sea. This finding is essential in several ways: The occurrence of elevated levels of radiocarbon-depleted methane in the water column may be an indication of thawing subsea permafrost in the study area (see also ref. 8).
The triple-isotope fingerprinting suggests, however, that methane may not primarily originate directly from the subsea permafrost; the continuous leakage of an old geological reservoir to the water column suggests the existence of perforations in the subsea permafrost, serving as conduits of deeper methane to gas-charged shallow sediments. Second, the finding that methane is released from a large pool of preformed methane, as opposed to methane from slow decomposition of thawing subsea permafrost organic matter, suggests that these releases may be more eruptive in nature, which provides a larger potential for abrupt future releases.”). See also Wild B., et al. (2022) Organic matter composition and greenhouse gas production of thawing subsea permafrost in the Laptev Sea, Nat. Commun. 13(1): 5057, 7 (“The lower rates of CH₄ production by subsea permafrost decomposition estimated here, and the likely oxidation of part of this CH₄ do not point to a dominant contribution of organic matter decomposition in thawed subsea permafrost to the high emissions observed in the area. We emphasize, however, the high variability of observed CH₄ production rates, and the limitations of upscaling from incubations to natural environments. Taken together, the high CH₄ emissions ubiquitously observed in the field likely stem from other sources such as preformed CH₄ in gas pockets in the subsea permafrost, collapsing CH₄ hydrates, or venting of a deep thermogenic CH₄ pool.”)

133 Dyonisius M. N., et al. (2020) Old carbon reservoirs were not important in the deglacial methane budget, Science 367(6480): 907–910, 908–909 (“Resulting CH₄ emissions from old permafrost carbon range from 0 to 53 Tg CH₄ per year (table S10) (20) throughout the last deglaciation and may have contributed up to 27% of the total CH₄ emissions to the atmosphere (95% CI upper limit) at the end of the OD-B transition (14.42 ka BP). However, we consider this calculation speculative (see section 4.3 of the materials and methods) (20)…. The last deglaciation serves only as a partial analog to current anthropogenic warming, with the most important differences being the much colder baseline temperature, lower sea level, and the presence of large ice sheets covering a large part of what are currently permafrost regions in the NH…. Because the relatively large global warming of the last deglaciation (which included periods of large and rapid regional warming in the high latitudes) did not trigger CH₄ emissions from old carbon reservoirs, such CH₄ emissions in response to anthropogenic warming also appear to be unlikely.”). See also Canadell J. G., et al. (2021) Chapter 5: Global Carbon and other Biogeochemical Cycles and Feedbacks, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 5-80 (“The present-day methane release from shelf clathrates is ≈10 TgCH₄ yr-1 (Kretschmer et al., 2015; Saunois et al., 2020). Despite polar amplification (Chapter 7), substantial releases from the permafrost-embedded subsea clathrates is very unlikely (Minshull et al., 2016; Malakhova and Eliseev, 2017, 2020). This is consistent with an overall small release of methane from the shelf clathrates during the last glacial despite large reorganisations in climate state (Bock et al., 2017; Petrenko et al., 2017; Dyonisius et al., 2020). The long timescales associated with clathrate destabilisation makes it unlikely that CH₄ release from the ocean to the atmosphere will deviate markedly from the present-day value through the 21st century (Hunter et al., 2013, corresponding to no more than additional 20 ppb of atmospheric methane (i.e. <0.2 ppb yr-1 52).”)

134 Armstrong McKay D. I., Staal A., Abrams J. F., Winkelmann R., Sakschewski B., Loriani S., Fetzer I., Cornell S. E., Rockström J., & Lenton T. M. (2022) Exceeding 1.5°C global warming could trigger multiple climate tipping points, Science 377(6611): eabn7950, 1–10, 7 (“Current warming is ~1.1°C above preindustrial and even with rapid emission cuts warming will reach ~1.5°C by the 2030s (23). We cannot rule out that WAIS and GrIS tipping points have already been passed (see above) and several other tipping elements have minimum threshold values within the 1.1 to 1.5°C range. Our best estimate thresholds for GrIS, WAIS, REEF, and abrupt permafrost thaw (PFAT) are ~1.5°C although WAIS and GrIS collapse may still be avoidable if GMST returns below 1.5°C within an uncertain overshoot time (likely decades) (94.”). See also Wunderling N., Winkelmann R., Rockström J., Loriani S., Armstrong-McKay D., Ritchie P., Sakschewski B., & Donges J. (22 April 2022) Global warming overshoots increase risk of triggering climate tipping points and cascades, Nature (preprint), 1–31, 2 (“Climate tipping elements play a crucial role for the stability of the Earth system under human pressures and are potentially at risk of disintegrating within and partially even below the Paris temperature guardrails of 1.5-2.0°C above pre-industrial levels. However, current policies and actions make it very likely to, at least temporarily, transgress the Paris targets. This raises the question whether tipping points can still be avoided under such overshoot scenarios. Here, we investigate the associated risks for tipping under a range of temperature overshoot scenarios using a stylised network model of four interacting climate tipping elements: the Greenland and West Antarctic Ice Sheets, the Atlantic Meridional Overtowering Circulation and the Amazon rainforest. Our results reveal that temporary overshoots can increase tipping risks by up to 72% compared to a soft landing without overshoots, even when the long-term equilibrium temperature stabilises within the Paris range.”)

Antarctica, Nature 593(7857): 83–89, 88 (“We find that without future warming beyond 2020, Antarctica continues to contribute to 21st-century sea-level rise at a rate roughly comparable to today’s, producing 5 cm of GMSL (Global Mean Sea Level) rise by 2100 and 1.34 m by 2500 (Fig. 3, Table 1). Simulations initially following the +3 °C pathway, but with subsequent CDR (carbon dioxide reduction/negative emissions) delayed until after 2060, show a sharp jump in the pace of 21st-century sea-level rise (Fig. 3b). Every decade that CDR mitigation is delayed has a substantial long-term consequence on sea level, despite the fast decline in CO₂ and return to cooler temperatures (Fig. 3c). Once initiated, marine-based ice loss is found to be unstoppable on these timescales in all mitigation scenarios (Fig. 3). The commitment to sustained ice loss is caused mainly by the onset of marine ice instabilities triggered by the loss of ice shelves that cannot recover in a warmer ocean with long thermal memory (Fig. 3c).”).

See also Pattyn F., et al. (2018) The Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets under 1.5 °C global warming, Nat. Clim. Change 8(12): 1053–1061, 1053 (“On millennial timescales, both ice sheets have tipping points at or slightly above the 1.5–2.0 °C threshold; for Greenland, this may lead to irreversible mass loss due to the surface mass balance–elevation feedback, whereas for Antarctica, this could result in a collapse of major drainage basins due to ice-shelf weakening.”).

136 Ripple W. J., Wolf C., Newsome T. M., Gregg J. W., Lenton T. M., Palomo I., Eikelboom J. A. J., Law B. E., Huq S., Duffy P. B., & Rockström J. (2021) World Scientists’ Warning of a Climate Emergency 2021, BioSci. 71(9): 1–5, 3 (“Greenland and Antarctica recently showed new year-to-date alltime record low levels of ice mass (figure 2f, 2g). In 2020, the minimum summer Arctic sea ice was at its second smallest extent on record, and glacier thickness also set a new all-time low (figure 2e, 2h). Glaciers are melting much faster than previously believed; they are losing 31% more snow and ice per year than they did just 15 years ago (Hugonnet et al. 2021).”).

137 King M. D., Howat I. M., Candela S. G., Noh M. J., Jeong S., Noël B. P. Y., van den Broeke M. R., Wouters B., & Negrete A. (2020) Dynamic ice loss from the Greenland Ice Sheet driven by sustained glacier retreat, Comm. Earth & Env’t.: 1–7, 1 (“The Greenland Ice Sheet is losing mass at accelerated rates in the 21st century, making it the largest single contributor to rising sea levels. Faster flow of outlet glaciers has substantially contributed to this loss, with the cause of speedup, and potential for future change, uncertain.”).

138 Box J. E., Hubbard A., Bahr D. B., Colgan W. T., Fettweis X., Mankoff K. D., Wehrlé A., Noël B., van den Broeke M. R., Wouters B., Bjørk A. A., & Fausto R. S. (2022) Greenland ice sheet climate disequilibrium and committed sea-level rise, Nat. Clim. Change: 1–11, 2.5 (“Application of the average 2000–2019, hereafter ‘recent’, climatology to Greenland’s entire glacierized area of 1,783,090 km² gives an AAR/AAR0 (α) disequilibrium with the current ice configuration corresponding with a 3.3 ± 0.8% committed area and volume loss. Taken in perpetuity, this imbalance with recent climate results in 59 ± 15 × 10^3 km^2 of committed retreat of Greenland’s ice area, equivalent to 110 ± 27 × 10^3 km^3 of the ice sheet volume or 274 ± 68 mm of global eustatic SLR.”; “Given the breadth and potency of those processes, we contend that known physical mechanisms can deliver most of the committed ice volume loss from Greenland’s disequilibrium with its recent climate within this century. Nevertheless, we underscore that a SLR of at least 274 ± 68 mm is already committed, regardless of future climate warming scenarios.”); discussed in Mooney C. (29 August 2022) Greenland ice sheet set to raise sea levels by nearly a foot, study finds, The Washington Post; and Funes Y. (29 August 2022) The Greenland Ice Sheet’s Terrifying Future, Atmos.

139 Fox-Kemper B., et al. (2021) Chapter 9: Ocean, Cryosphere and Sea Level Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 9-122, 9-116 (“the main uncertainty related to high-end sea-level rise is “when” rather than “if” it arises: the upper limit of 1.02 m of likely sea-level range by 2100 for the SSP 5-8.5 scenario will be exceeded in any future warming scenario on time scales of centuries to millennia (high confidence), but it is uncertain how quickly the long-term committed sea level will be reached (Section 9.6.3.5). Hence, global-mean sea level might rise well above the likely range before 2100, which is reflected by assessments of ice-sheet contributions based on structured expert judgment (Bamber et al., 2019) leading to a 95th percentile of projected future sea-level rise as high as 2.3 m in 2100 (Section 9.6.3.3)… High-end sea-level rise can therefore occur if one or two processes related to ice-sheet collapse in Antarctica result in an additional sea-level rise at the maximum of their plausible ranges (Sections 9.4.2.5, 9.6.3.3; Table 9.7) or if several of the processes described in this box result in individual contributions to additional sea-level rise at moderate levels. In both cases, global-mean sea-level rise by 2100 would be substantially higher than the assessed likely range, as indicated by the projections including low confidence processes reaching in 2100 as high as 1.6 m at the 83rd percentile and 2.3 m at the 95th percentile (Section 9.6.3.3).”); “While ice-sheet processes in whose projection there is low confidence have little influence up to 2100 on projections under SSP1-1.9 and SSP1-2.6 (Table 9.9), this is not the case under higher emissions scenarios, where they could lead to GMSL rise well above the likely range. In particular, under SSP5-8.5, low confidence processes could lead to a total GMSL rise of 0.6-1.6 m over this time period (17th-83rd percentile
range of p-box including SEJ- and MICI-based projections), with 5th-95th percentile projections extending to 0.5-2.3 m (low confidence)."

140 Boers N. & Rypdal M. (2021) Critical slowing down suggests that the western Greenland Ice Sheet is close to a tipping point. PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 118(21): 1–7, 1 (“A crucial nonlinear mechanism for the existence of this tipping point is the positive melt-elevation feedback: Melting reduces ice sheet height, exposing the ice sheet surface to warmer temperatures, which further accelerates melting. We reveal early-warning signals for a forthcoming critical transition from ice-core-derived height reconstructions and infer that the western Greenland Ice Sheet has been losing stability in response to rising temperatures. We show that the melt-elevation feedback is likely to be responsible for the observed destabilization. Our results suggest substantially enhanced melting in the near future.”).

141 Robinson A., Calov R., & Ganopolski A. (2012) Multistability and critical thresholds of the Greenland ice sheet. NAT. CLIM. CHANGE 2(6): 429–432, 429 (“Recent studies have focused on the short-term contribution of the Greenland ice sheet to sea-level rise, yet little is known about its long-term stability. The present best estimate of the threshold in global temperature rise leading to complete melting of the ice sheet is 3.1 °C (1.9–5.1 °C, 95% confidence interval) above the preindustrial climate, determined as the temperature for which the modelled surface mass balance of the present-day ice sheet turns negative. Here, using a fully coupled model, we show that this criterion systematically overestimates the temperature threshold and that the Greenland ice sheet is more sensitive to long-term climate change than previously thought. We estimate that the warming threshold leading to a monostable, essentially ice-free state is in the range of 0.8–3.2 °C, with a best estimate of 1.6 °C. By testing the ice sheet’s ability to regrow after partial mass loss, we find that at least one intermediate equilibrium state is possible, though for sufficiently high initial temperature anomalies, total loss of the ice sheet becomes irreversible. Crossing the threshold alone does not imply rapid melting (for temperatures near the threshold, complete melting takes tens of millennia). However, the timescale of melt depends strongly on the magnitude and duration of the temperature overshoot above this critical threshold.”). See also Overland J., Dunlea E., Box J. E., Corell R., Forsius M., Kattsov V., Olsen M. S., Pawlak J., Reiersen L.-O., & Wang M. (2019) The urgency of Arctic change. POLAR SCI. 21: 6–13, 9 (“The summer air temperature “viability threshold” that triggers irreversible wastage of the Greenland ice sheet was previously estimated to be for an annual global temperature increase of 2–5 °C (Gregory and Huybrechts, 2006; Huybrechts et al., 2011). An updated estimate based on a higher resolution simulation that explicitly incorporates albedo and elevation feedbacks suggests a lower loss threshold: 0.8–3.2°C (95% confidence range) (Robinson et al., 2012) with 1.6 °C above pre-industrial conditions as a best estimate. It is likely that the Greenland ice sheet enters a phase of irreversible loss under the RCP 4.5 scenario.”); Schleussner C.-F., Lissner T. K., Fischer E. M., Wohland J., Perrette M., Golly A., Rogelj J., Childers K., Schewe J., Frieler K., Menge M., Hare W., & Schaeffer M. (2016) Differential Climate Impacts for Policy-Relevant Limits to Global Warming: the Case of 1.5°C and 2°C. EARTH SYST. DYNAM. 7(2): 327–351, 342 (“In addition to that, Levermann et al. (2013) report a steep increase in long-term SLR between 1.5°C and 2°C as a result of an increasing risk of crossing a destabilizing threshold for the Greenland ice sheet (Robinson et al., 2012). The disintegration process that would lead to 5–7m global SLR, however, is projected to happen on the timescale of several millennia.”); and Kopp R. E., Shwon R. L., Wagner G., & Yuan J. (2016) Tipping elements and climate-economic shocks: Pathways toward integrated assessment. EARTH’S FUTURE 4(8): 346–372, 354–355 (“For the Greenland Ice Sheet, for example, feedbacks between ice sheet topography and atmospheric dynamics and between ice area and albedo give rise to multiple stable states [Ridley et al., 2009; Robinson et al., 2012; Levermann et al., 2013]. Robinson et al. [2012]’s coupled ice-sheet/regional climate model indicated that, at a temperature of 1°C above pre-Industrial temperatures, the stable states are at 100%, 60%, and 20% of present ice volume. At 1.6°C, however, their model produced only one stable configuration, at ~15% of the Greenland ice sheet’s present volume; thus, 1.6°C warming would represent a commitment to ~6 m of sea-level rise from the Greenland Ice Sheet. The rate of ice sheet mass loss is, however, limited by the flux at the ice sheet margins [e.g., Pfeffer et al., 2008], leading to a disconnect between committed and realized change that could persist for millennia, particularly for levels of warming near the threshold [Applegate et al., 2015].”). If warming is limited to 2 °C, Greenland could contribute 5 cm of sea-level rise by 2050 and 13 cm by 2100, but if emissions are unabated and warming rises to 5 °C, Greenland could contribute 6 cm of sea-level rise by 2050 and 23 cm by 2100: see Bamber J. L., Oppenheimer M., Kopp R. E., Aspinall W. P., & Cooke R. M. (2019) Ice sheet contributions to future sea-level rise from structured expert judgment. PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 116(23): 11195–11200, 11197 (Table 1).

142 Trusel L. D., Das S. B., Osman M. B., Evans M. J., Smith B. E., Fettweis X., McConnell J. R., Noël B. P. Y., & van den Brooekke M. R. (2018) Nonlinear rise in Greenland runoff in response to post-industrial Arctic warming. NATURE 564: 104–108, 104 (“Our results show a pronounced 250% to 575% increase in melt intensity over the last 20 years, relative to a pre-industrial baseline period (eighteenth century) for cores NU and CWG, respectively (Fig. 2). Furthermore, the most recent decade contained in the cores (2004–2013) experienced a more sustained and greater
magnitude of melt than any other 10-year period in the ice-core records. For GrIS cores, 2012 melt is unambiguously the strongest melt season on record. Both NU and CWG annual ice-core-derived melt records significantly ($P < 0.01$) correlate with one another over their 339 years of overlap, and both also with summer air temperatures from the Ilulissat region (Extended Data Table 2; Methods), relationships that improve after applying a 5-year moving average, probably reflecting the noise inherent to melt records owing to variability in meltwater percolation and refreezing. These empirically derived results revealing coherence between independent melt and temperature records emphasize broad-scale GrIS melt forcing, and suggest that summer warming (see Fig. 2) is an important component of the observed regional melt intensification.

King M. D., Howat I. M., Candela S. G., Noh M. J., Jeong S., Noël B. P. Y., van den Broeke M. R., Wouters B., & Negrete A. (2020) Dynamic ice loss from the Greenland Ice Sheet driven by sustained glacier retreat. COMM. EARTH & ENV’T.: 1–7, 1 (“The Greenland Ice Sheet is losing mass at accelerated rates in the 21st century, making it the largest single contributor to rising sea levels. Faster flow of outlet glaciers has substantially contributed to this loss, with the cause of speedup, and potential for future change, uncertain. Here we combine more than three decades of remotely sensed observational products of outlet glacier velocity, elevation, and front position changes over the full ice sheet. We compare decadal variability in discharge and calving front position and find that increased glacier discharge was due almost entirely to the retreat of glacier fronts, rather than inland ice sheet processes, with a remarkably consistent speedup of 4–5% per km of retreat across the ice sheet. We show that widespread retreat between 2000 and 2005 resulted in a step-increase in discharge and a switch to a new dynamic state of sustained mass loss that would persist even under a decline in surface melt.”). When compared to the projections of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, the associated sea-level rise from the recent ice sheet melting of both Greenland and Antarctica is most like the upper range projections. See Slater T., Hogg A. E., & Mottram R. (2020) Ice-sheet losses track high-end sea-level rise projections. Comment. NAT. CLIM. CHANGE 10: 879–881, 881 (“In AR5, the ice-sheet contribution by 2100 is forecast from process-based models simulating changes in ice flow and surface mass balance (SMB) in response to climate warming. Driven by the century-scale increase in temperature forced by representative concentration pathways (RCPs), global mean SLR estimates range from 280–980 mm by 2100 (Fig. 1). Of this, the ice-sheet contribution constitutes 4–420 mm (ref. 3). The spread of these scenarios is uncertain, scenario-dependent and increases rapidly after 2030 (Fig. 1). During 2007–2017, satellite observations show total ice-sheet losses increased the global sea level by 12.3 ± 2.3 mm and track closest to the AR5 upper range (13.7–14.1 mm for all emissions pathways) (Fig. 1). Despite a reduction in ice-sheet losses during 2013–2017 — when atmospheric circulation above Greenland promoted cooler summer conditions and heavy winter snowfall — the observed average SLR rate (1.23 ± 0.24 mm per year) is 45% above central predictions (0.85 ± 0.07 mm per year) and closest to the upper range (1.39 ± 0.14 mm per year) (Fig. 2.”). In mid-September 2020, consistent warming over northeast Greenland contributed to a large chunk of a glacier breaking away from the Arctic’s largest remaining ice shelf. See Amos J. (14 September 2020) Climate change: Warmth shatters section of Greenland ice shelf. BBC News (“A big chunk of ice has broken away from the Arctic’s largest remaining ice shelf - 79N, or Nioghalvfjerdsfjorden - in northeast Greenland. The ejected section covers about 110 square km; satellite imagery shows it to have shattered into many small pieces. The loss is further evidence say scientists of the rapid climate changes taking place in Greenland. … At its leading edge, the 79N glacier splits in two, with a minor offshoot turning directly north. It’s this offshoot, or tributary, called Spalte Glacier, that has now disintegrated. The ice feature was already heavily fractured in 2019; this summer’s warmth has been its final undoing. Spalte Glacier has become a flotilla of icebergs.”). Ramirez R. (30 July 2021) The amount of Greenland ice that melted on Tuesday could cover Florida in 2 inches of water, CNN (“Greenland is experiencing its most significant melting event of the year as temperatures in the Arctic surge. The amount of ice that melted on Tuesday alone would be enough to cover the entire state of Florida in two inches of water.”).
imply rapid melting (for temperatures near the threshold, complete melting takes tens of millennia). However, the timescale of melt depends strongly on the magnitude and duration of the temperature overshoot above this critical threshold.”).

146 National Snow & Ice Data Center (18 August 2021) *Rain at the summit of Greenland, GREENLAND ICE SHEET TODAY* (“On August 14, 2021, rain was observed at the highest point on the Greenland Ice Sheet for several hours, and air temperatures remained above freezing for about nine hours. This was the third time in less than a decade, and the latest date in the year on record, that the National Science Foundation’s Summit Station had above-freezing temperatures and wet snow. There is no previous report of rainfall at this location (72.58°N 38.46°W), which reaches 3,216 meters (10,551 feet) in elevation.”).

147 Box J. E., Hubbard A., Bahr D. B., Colgan W. T., Fettweis X., Mankoff K. D., Wehrlé A., Noël B., van den Broeke M. R., Wouters B., Bjork A. A., & Fausto R. S. (2022) *Greenland ice sheet climate disequilibrium and committed sea-level rise*, NAT. CLIM. CHANGE: 1–11, 1 (“Ice loss from the Greenland ice sheet is one of the largest sources of contemporary sea-level rise (SLR). While process-based models place timescales on Greenland’s deglaciation, their confidence is obscured by model shortcomings including imprecise atmospheric and oceanic couplings. Here, we present a complementary approach resolving ice sheet disequilibrium with climate constrained by satellite-derived bare-ice extent, tidewater sector ice flow discharge and surface mass balance data. We find that Greenland ice imbalance with the recent (2000–2019) climate commits at least 274 ± 68 mm [10.8 ± 2.7 in] SLR from 59 ± 15 × 103 km² ice retreat, equivalent to 3.3 ± 0.9% volume loss, regardless of twenty-first-century climate pathways. This is a result of increasing mass turnover from precipitation, ice flow discharge and meltwater run-off. The high-melt year of 2012 applied in perpetuity yields an ice loss commitment of 782 ± 135 mm [30.8 ± 5.3 in] SLR, serving as an ominous prognosis for Greenland’s trajectory through a twenty-first century of warming.”); discussed in Mooney C. (29 August 2022) *Greenland ice sheet set to raise sea levels by nearly a foot, study finds*, THE WASHINGTON POST; and Funes Y. (29 August 2022) *The Greenland Ice Sheet’s Terrifying Future*, ATMOS.

148 Boers N. (2021) *Observation-based early-warning signals for a collapse of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation*, NAT. CLIM. CHANGE 11(8): 680–688, 687 (“The results presented here hence show that the recently discovered AMOC decline during the last decades is not just a fluctuation related to low-frequency climate variability or a linear response to increasing temperatures. Rather, the presented findings suggest that this decline may be associated with an almost complete loss of stability of the AMOC over the course of the last century, and that the AMOC could be close to a critical transition to its weak circulation mode.”).

149 Douville H., et al. (2021) *Chapter 8: Water Cycle Changes*, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 8-111 (“These patterns of past hydroclimatic change are relevant for future projections because it is very likely that AMOC will weaken by 2100 in response to increased greenhouse gas emissions (Weaver et al., 2012; Drijfhout et al., 2015; Bakker et al., 2016; Reintges et al., 2017) (See also Section 9.2.3.1). Furthermore, there is medium confidence that the decline in AMOC will not involve an abrupt collapse before 2100 (Section 9.2.3.1).”). *See also Arias P. A., et al. (2021)* *Technical Summary*, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), TS-39 (“While there is medium confidence that the projected decline in the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) (TS.2.4) will not involve an abrupt collapse before 2100, such a collapse might be triggered by an unexpected meltwater influx from the Greenland Ice Sheet. If an AMOC collapse were to occur, it would very likely cause abrupt shifts in the weather patterns and water cycle, such as a southward shift in the tropical rain belt, and could result in weakening of the African and Asian monsoons and strengthening of Southern Hemisphere monsoons. (4.7.2, 8.6.1, 9.2.3, Box TS.9, Box TS.13)”; and Fox-Kemper B., et al. (2021) *Chapter 9: Ocean, Cryosphere and Sea Level Change*, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 9-33 (“Both the AR5 (Collins et al., 2013) and the SROCC (Collins et al., 2019) assessed that an abrupt collapse of the AMOC before 2100 was very unlikely, but the SROCC added that by 2300 an AMOC collapse was as likely as not for high-emission scenarios. The SROCC also assessed that model-bias may considerably affect the sensitivity of the modelled AMOC to freshwater forcing. Tuning towards stability and model biases (Valdes, 2011; Liu et al., 2017; Mecking et al., 2017; Weijer et al., 2019) provides CMIP models a tendency toward unrealistic stability (medium confidence). By correcting for existing salinity biases, Liu et al. (2017) demonstrated that AMOC behaviour may change dramatically on centennial to millennial timescales and that the probability of a collapsed state increases. None of the CMIP6 models features an abrupt AMOC collapse in the 21st century, but they neglect meltwater release from the Greenland ice sheet and a recent process study reveals
that a collapse of the AMOC can be induced even by small-amplitude changes in freshwater forcing (Lohmann and Ditlevsen, 2021). As a result, we change the assessment of an abrupt collapse before 2100 to medium confidence that it will not occur.”.

150  Douville H., et al. (2021) Chapter 8: Water Cycle Changes, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 8-112 (“As with the paleoclimatic events, AMOC collapse results in a southward shift in the ITCZ that is most pronounced in the tropical Atlantic. This could cause drying in the Sahel region (Defrance et al., 2017) as well as Mesoamerica and northern Amazonia (Parsons et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2018c). AMOC collapse also causes the Asian monsoon systems to weaken (Liu et al., 2017b) (Figure 8.27b) countering the strengthening expected in response to elevated greenhouse gases (see Section 8.4.2). Europe is projected to experience moderate drying in response to AMOC collapse (Jackson et al., 2015”); discussed in Velasquez-Manoff M. & White J. (3 March 2021) In the Atlantic Ocean, Subtle Shifts Hint at Dramatic Dangers, The NEW YORK TIMES (The consequences could include faster sea level rise along parts of the Eastern United States and parts of Europe, stronger hurricanes barreling into the Southeastern United States, and perhaps most ominously, reduced rainfall across the Sahel, a semi-arid swath of land running the width of Africa that is already a geopolitical tinderbox.”).

151  Sweet W. V., et al. (2022) GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SEA LEVEL RISE SCENARIOS FOR THE UNITED STATES: UPDATED MEAN PROJECTIONS AND EXTREME WATER LEVEL PROBABILITIES ALONG U.S. COASTLINES, NOAA Technical Report NOS 01, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 40 (“By 2050, moderate HTF frequencies nationally are projected to increase by more than a factor of 10, with about a factor of 5 increase in major HTF frequencies. In short, assuming continuation of current trends and summarized at the national level, a flood regime shift is projected by 2050, with moderate HTF occurring a bit more frequently than minor HTF events occur today and major HTF events occurring about as frequently as moderate HTF frequencies occur today”).

152  Orihuela-Pinto B., England M. H., & Taschetto A. S. (2022) Interbasin and interhemispheric impacts of a collapsed Atlantic Overturning Circulation, NAT. CLIM. Chang. 12(6): 558–565, 558 (“We find that an AMOC collapse drives a complex rearrangement of the global atmospheric circulation that affects all latitudes, from the tropics to the polar circulation of both hemispheres. We find that changes in the tropical Pacific involve a robust intensification of the Walker circulation, a weakening of the subtropical highs in the Southern Hemisphere and an intensification of the Amundsen Sea Low over west Antarctica.”).

153  Scambos T. & Weeman K. (13 December 2021) The Threat from Thwaites: The Retreat of Antarctica’s Riskiest Glacier, COOPERATIVE INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH IN ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES (“The glacier is the size of Florida or Britain and currently contributes four percent of annual global sea level rise. If it does collapse, global sea levels would rise by several feet—putting millions of people living in coastal cities in danger zones for extreme flooding. ‘Thwaites is the widest glacier in the world,’ said Ted Scambos, a senior research scientist at the Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences (CIRES). ‘It’s doubled its outflow speed within the last 30 years, and the glacier in its entirety holds enough water to raise sea level by over two feet. And it could lead to even more sea level rise according to the strengthening expected in response to elevated greenhouse gases”.”). See also Rignot E., Mouginot J., Scheuchl B., van den Broeke M., van Wessem M. J., & Morlighem M. (2019) Four decades of Antarctic Ice Sheet mass balance from 1979–2017, PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 116(4): 1095–1103, 1096 (Table 1 gives 65 cm sea-level equivalent (SLE) for Thwaites glacier).

154  Morlighem M., et al. (2020) Deep glacial troughs and stabilizing ridges unveiled beneath the margins of the Antarctic ice sheet, NAT. GEOSCI. 13: 132–137, 134 (“We do not find major bumps in bed topography upstream of the current grounding line that could stop the grounding line retreat, except for two prominent ridges ~35 and 50 km upstream (red lines, Fig. 2a). Ice sheet numerical models indicate that once the glacier retreats past the second ridge, the retreat of Thwaites Glacier would become unstoppable [18, 19, 20].”). See also Gilbert E. (3 January 2022) What Antarctica’s ‘Doomsday’ Glacier Could Mean For The World, SCIENCE ALERT.

Thwaites Glacier ice front, to document the ocean-floor imprint of past retreat from a sea-bed promontory. We show patterns of back-stepping sedimentary ridges formed daily by a mechanism of tidal lifting and settling at the grounding line at a time when Thwaites Glacier was more advanced than it is today. Over a duration of 5.5 months, Thwaites grounding zone retreated at a rate of >2.1 km per year—twice the rate observed by satellite at the fastest retreating part of the grounding zone between 2011 and 2019. Our results suggest that sustained pulses of rapid retreat have occurred at Thwaites Glacier in the past two centuries. Similar rapid retreat pulses are likely to occur in the near future when the grounding zone migrates back off stabilizing high points on the sea floor.”; discussed in University of South Florida (5 September 2022) Faster in the Past: New seafloor images of West Antarctic Ice Sheet upend understanding of Thwaites Glacier retreat, SCIENCE DAILY.

Morlighem M., et al. (2020) Deep glacial troughs and stabilizing ridges unveiled beneath the margins of the Antarctic ice sheet, NAT. GEOSCI. 13: 132–137; discussed in ThwaitesGlacier.org (last visited 2 May 2022) (“7. Thwaites Glacier ice loss currently contributes around 4% of all global sea-level rise (assuming 3.5 mm annual sea-level rise) and has the potential to contribute significantly more.”).

Groh A., & Horwath M. (2021) Antarctic Ice Mass Change Products from GRACE/GRACE-FO Using Tailored Sensitivity Kernels, REMOTE SENS. 13(9): 1736, 1–25; discussed in ThwaitesGlacier.org (last visited 2 May 2022) (“10. Since 2000, the glacier has had a net loss of more than 1000 billion tons of ice. (Source and calculation: https://data1.geo.tu-dresden.de/ais_gmb/ Over the period 2002–2016 (14 years), Basin AIS21, which is slightly larger than just TG, has lost a total of 748 Gt. Assuming the last 4 years lost ice at the same rate gives a total of 1068 Gt.”)

Witze A. (11 January 2022) Giant cracks push imperilled Antarctic glacier closer to collapse, NATURE NEWS (“The fractures are propagating through the ice at speeds of several kilometres per year. They are heading into weaker and thinner ice, where they could accelerate and lead to the demise of this part of the ice shelf within five years, Pettit estimates.”). See also Gilbert E. (3 January 2022) What Antarctica’s ‘Doomsday’ Glacier Could Mean For The World, SCIENCE ALERT (“But scientists have just confirmed that this ice shelf is becoming rapidly destabilized. The eastern ice shelf now has cracks crisscrossing its surface and could collapse within ten years, according to Erin Pettit, a glaciologist at Oregon State University. This work supports research published in 2020 which also noted the development of cracks and crevasses on the Thwaites ice shelf. These indicate that it is being structurally weakened. This damage can have a reinforcing feedback effect because cracking and fracturing can promote further weakening, priming the ice shelf for disintegration.”); and Scambos T. & Weeman K. (13 December 2021, updated 31 January 2022) The Threat from Thwaites: The Retreat of Antarctica’s Riskiest Glacier, COOPERATIVE INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH IN ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES (“Thwaites sits in West Antarctica, flowing across a 120km stretch of frozen coastline. A third of the glacier, along its eastern side, flows more slowly than the rest—it’s braced by a floating ice shelf, a floating extension of the glacier that is held in place by an underwater mountain. The ice shelf acts like a brace that prevents faster flow of the upstream ice. But the brace of ice slowing Thwaites won’t last for long, said Erin Pettit, an associate professor at Oregon State University. Beneath the surface, warmer ocean water circulating beneath the floating eastern side is attacking this glacier from all angles, her team has found. This water is melting the ice directly from beneath, and as it does so, the glacier loses its grip on the underwater mountain. Massive fractures have formed and are growing as well, accelerating its demise, said Pettit. This floating extension of the Thwaites Glacier will likely survive only a few more years.”; “The “chain reaction,” beginning with the potential collapse of Thwaites’ Eastern Ice Shelf would set in motion a long-term process which would eventually result in global sea level rise. While the initial steps of ice shelf collapse, glacier speed-up, and increased ice-cliff failure might happen within a couple of decades, the “2 to 10 feet” of sea level rise will require centuries to unfold—and impacts can still be mitigated depending on how humans respond in coming decades. Risk of multiple feet of sea level rise will not happen this decade (and likely not even in the next few decades.”).”

Cheng L., Abraham J., Hausfather Z., & Trenberth K. E. (2019) How fast are the oceans warming?, SCIENCE 363(6423): 128–129, 128 (“About 93% of the energy imbalance accumulates in the ocean as increased ocean heat content (OHC).”).

Solomon S., Daniel J. S., Sanford T. J., Murphy D. M., Plattner G.-K., Knutti R., & Friedlingstein P. (2010) Persistence of climate changes due to a range of greenhouse gases, PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 107(43): 18354–18359, 18357 (“In the case of a gas with a 10-y lifetime, for example, energy is slowly stored in the ocean during the period when concentrations are elevated, and this energy is returned to the atmosphere from the ocean after emissions cease and radiative forcing decays, keeping atmospheric temperatures somewhat elevated for several decades. Elevated temperatures last longer for a gas with a 100-y lifetime because, in this case, radiative forcing and accompanying
further ocean heat uptake continue long after emissions cease. As radiative forcing decays further, the energy is ultimately restored from the ocean to the atmosphere. Fig. 3 shows that the slow timescale of ocean heat uptake has two important effects. It limits the transfer of energy to the ocean if emissions and radiative forcing occur only for a few decades or a century. However, it also implies that any energy that is added to the ocean remains available to be transferred back to the atmosphere for centuries after cessation of emissions.”). See also MacDougall A. H., et al. (2020) Is there warming in the pipeline? A multi-model analysis of the Zero Emissions Commitment from CO₂, BIOGEOSCI. 17(11): 2987–3016, 3003 (“Overall, the most likely value of ZEC on decadal timescales is assessed to be close to zero, consistent with prior work. However, substantial continued warming for decades or centuries following cessation of emissions is a feature of a minority of the assessed models and thus cannot be ruled out purely on the basis of models.”).

161 Cheng L., Foster G., Hausfather Z., Trenberth K. E., & Abraham J. (2022) Improved Quantification of the Rate of Ocean Warming, J. CLIM. 35(14): 4827–4840, 4836 (“A robust increase of ocean warming for the upper 2000 m has occurred since 1958 from about 0 to 0.06 6 0.08 W m22 for 1958–73 to 0.58 6 0.08 W m22 in 2003–18. With the new methods, the rates of OHC change and EEI since 1958 have been recalculated and updated. The total ocean warming for the upper 2000 m is 341.3 6 21.0 ZJ from 1958 to 2020 (with the 95% confidence interval). The new estimate suggests a dramatic increase of ocean heat uptake and EEI from 1980s to early 2000s. For the most recent period with better data quality (2005–19) and another estimate of land–ice–atmosphere heat content (Trenberth 2022), the EEI is estimated to 153.9 ZJ (10.99 ZJ yr21 ) with the ocean heat uptake of 139.7 ZJ (9.98 ZJ yr21 ) for 2005–19. This estimate is slightly lower than that using von Schuckmann et al. (2020) in Fig. 8, indicating uncertainty in land–ice–atmosphere heat content.”).

162 Arias P. A., et al. (2021) Technical Summary, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), TS-40 (“It is virtually certain that the global ocean has warmed since at least 1971, representing about 90% of the increase in the global energy inventory (TS.3.1). The ocean is currently warming faster than at any other time since at least the last deglacial transition (medium confidence), with warming extending to depths well below 2000 m (very high confidence). It is extremely likely that human influence was the main driver of ocean warming. Ocean warming will continue over the 21st century (virtually certain), and will likely continue until at least 2300 even for low CO₂ emissions scenarios. Ocean warming is irreversible over centuries to millennia (medium confidence), but the magnitude of warming is scenario-dependent from about the mid-21st century (medium confidence)... Global mean SST has increased since the beginning of the 20th century by 0.88 [0.68 to 1.01] °C, and it is virtually certain it will continue to increase throughout the 21st century with increasing hazards to marine ecosystems (medium confidence). Marine heatwaves have become more frequent over the 20th century (high confidence), approximately doubling in frequency (high confidence) and becoming more intense and longer since the 1980s (medium confidence).”).

163 Dreyfus G. B., Xu Y., Shindell D. T., Zaelke D., & Ramanathan V. (2022) Mitigating climate disruption in time: A self-consistent approach for avoiding both near-term and long-term global warming, PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 119(22): e2123536119, 1–8, 1 (“We find that mitigation measures that target only decarbonization are essential for strong long-term cooling but can result in weak near-term warming (due to unmasking the cooling effect of co-emitted aerosols) and lead to temperatures exceeding 2°C before 2050. In contrast, pairing decarbonization with additional mitigation measures targeting short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs) and N₂O, slows the rate of warming a decade or two earlier than decarbonization alone and avoids the 2°C threshold altogether. These non-CO₂ targeted measures when combined with decarbonization can provide net cooling by 2030, reduce the rate of warming from 2030 to 2050 by about 50%, roughly half of which comes from methane, significantly larger than decarbonization alone over this timeframe.”). See also Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2022) Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Shukla P. R., et al. (eds.), SPM-31 (“In modelled global low emission pathways, the projected reduction of cooling and warming aerosol emissions over time leads to net warming in the near- to mid-term. In these mitigation pathways, the projected reductions of cooling aerosols are mostly due to reduced fossil fuel combustion that was not equipped with effective air pollution controls.”); Naik V., et al. (2021) Chapter 6: Short-lived climate forcers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 6–8 (“Additional CH₄ and BC mitigation would contribute to offsetting the additional warming associated with SO₂ reductions that would accompany decarbonization (high confidence).”); Ramanathan V. & Feng Y. (2008) On avoiding dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system: Formidable challenges ahead, PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 105(38): 14245–14250, 14248 (“Switching from coal to “cleaner” natural gas will
reduce CO₂ emission and thus would be effective in minimizing future increases in the committed warming. However, because it also reduces air pollution and thus the ABC [Atmospheric Brown Cloud] masking effect, it may speed up the approach to the committed warming of 2.4°C (1.4–4.3°C).” and United Nations Environment Programme & World Meteorological Organization (2011) Integrated Assessment of Black Carbon and Tropospheric Ozone, 254 (“Evaluating global mean temperature change, it was found that the targeted measures to reduce emissions of methane and BC could greatly reduce warming rates over the next few decades (Figure 6.1; Box 6.1). When all measures are fully implemented, warming during the 2030s relative to the present would be only half as much as in the reference scenario. In contrast, even a fairly aggressive strategy to reduce CO₂ emissions, as for the CO₂-measures scenario, does little to mitigate warming until after the next 20-30 years (Box 6.2). In fact, sulphur dioxide (SO₂) is coemitted with CO₂ in some of the most highly emitting activities, coal burning in large-scale combustion such as in power plants, for example, that are obvious targets for reduced usage under a CO₂-emissions mitigation strategy. Hence such strategies can lead to additional near-term warming (Figure 6.1), in a well-known temporary effect (e.g. Raes and Seinfeld, 2009), although most of the nearterm warming is driven by CO₂ emissions in the past. The CO₂-measures scenario clearly leads to long-term benefits however, with a dramatically lower warming rate at 2070 under that scenario than under the scenario with only CH₄ and BC measures (see Figure 6.1 and timescales in Box 6.2). Hence the near-term measures clearly cannot be substituted for measures to reduce emissions of long-lived GHGs. The near-term measures largely target different source sectors for emissions than the CO₂ measures, so that the emissions reductions of the short-lived pollutants are almost identical regardless of whether the CO₂ measures are implemented or not, as shown in Chapter 5. The near-term measures and the CO₂ measures also impact climate change over different timescales owing to the different lifetimes of these substances. In essence, the near-term CH₄ and BC measures are effectively uncoupled from CO₂ measures examined here.”).

164 Climate scientist and IPCC author Joeri Rogelj, as quoted in Berwyn B. (15 September 2021) The Rate of Global Warming During Next 25 Years Could Be Double What It Was in the Previous 50, a Renowned Climate Scientist Warns, Inside Climate News (“James Hansen, a climate scientist who shook Washington when he told Congress 33 years ago that human emissions of greenhouse gases were cooking the planet, is now warning that he expects the rate of global warming to double in the next 20 years. While still warning that it is carbon dioxide and methane that are driving global warming, Hansen said that, in this case, warming is being accelerated by the decline of other industrial pollutants that they’ve cleaned from it…. In Hansen’s latest warning, he said scientists are dangerously underestimating the climate impact of reducing sulfate aerosol pollution. ‘Something is going on in addition to greenhouse warming,’ Hansen wrote, noting that July’s average global temperature soared to its second-highest reading on record even though the Pacific Ocean is in a cooling La Niña phase that temporarily damps signs of warming. Between now and 2040, he wrote that he expects the climate’s rate of warming to double in an ‘acceleration that can be traced to aerosols.’ That acceleration could lead to total warming of 2 degrees Celsius by 2040, the upper limit of the temperature range that countries in the Paris accord agreed was needed to prevent disastrous impacts from climate change. What’s more, Hansen and other researchers said the processes leading to the acceleration are not adequately measured, and some of the tools needed to gauge them aren’t even in place…. A doubling of the rate of global warming would put the planet in the fast lane of glacial melting, sea level rise and coral reef ecosystem die-offs, as well as escalating heatwaves, droughts and floods. But that future is not yet set in stone, said Michael Mann, a climate scientist at Penn State. He said Hansen’s prediction appears inconsistent with the scientific literature assessed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The IPCC’s latest report advises “that reductions of carbon emissions by 50 percent over the next decade and net-zero by 2100, along with a ramp-down in both aerosols and other short-term agents, including black carbon and other trace anthropogenic greenhouse gases, stabilizes warming well below 2 degrees Celsius,” Mann said. But the IPCC report also highlighted that declining aerosol pollution will speed warming. “The removal of air pollution, either through air quality measures or because combustion processes are phased out to get rid of CO₂, will result in an increase in the resulting rate of warming,” said climate scientist and IPCC report author Joeri Rogelj, director of research at the Imperial College London’s Grantham Institute. There’s a fix for at least some of this short-term increase in the rate of warming, he said. “The only measures that can counteract this increased rate of warming over the next decades are methane reductions,” Rogelj said. “I just want to highlight that methane reductions have always been part of the portfolio of greenhouse gas emissions reductions that are necessary to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement. This new evidence only further emphasizes this need.”).
from past CO₂ emissions is irreversible on human timescales, the aerosol warming will be unleashed during the phaseout (11, 19–22).” See also Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2021) Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), SPM-2 (Figure SPM.2c shows that Sulphur dioxide (SO₂) contributes ~0.49 °C (~0.10 to ~0.93 °C) to observed warming in 2010–2019 relative to 1850–1900); Samset B. H., Sand M., Smith C. J., Bauer S. E., Forster P. M., Fuglestvedt J. S., Osprey S., & Schleussner C.-F. (2018) Climate impacts from a removal of anthropogenic aerosol emissions. GEOPHYS. RES. LETT. 45(2): 1020–1029, 1020 (“Limiting global warming to 1.5 or 2.0°C requires strong mitigation of anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Concurrently, emissions of anthropogenic aerosols will decline, due to coemission with GHG, and measures to improve air quality. ... Removing aerosols induces a global mean surface heating of 0.5–1.1°C, and precipitation increase of 2.0–4.6%. Extreme weather indices also increase. We find a higher sensitivity of extreme events to aerosol reductions, per degree of surface warming, in particular over the major aerosol emission regions. ... “Plain Language Summary. To keep within 1.5 or 2° of global warming, we need massive reductions of greenhouse gas emissions. At the same time, aerosol emissions will be strongly reduced. We show how cleaning up aerosols, predominantly sulfate, may add an additional half a degree of global warming, with impacts that strengthen those from greenhouse gas warming. The northern hemisphere is found to be more sensitive to aerosol removal than greenhouse gas warming, because of where the aerosols are emitted today. This means that it does not only matter whether or not we reach international climate targets. It also matters how we get there.”); and Feijoo F., Mignone B. K., Kheshgi H. S., Hartin C., McJeon H., & Edmonds J. (2019) Climate and carbon budget implications of linked future changes in CO₂ and non-CO₂ forcing. ENVIRON. RES. LETT. 14(4): 04407, 1–11.

166 Bodansky D. & Pomerance R. (2021) Sustaining the Arctic in Order to Sustain the Global Climate System. SUSTAINABILITY 13(19): 10622, 1–5, 1 (“Volcanic eruptions provide proof-of-concept that stratospheric aerosols cool the planet. The sulfur aerosols injected into the stratosphere by the eruption of Mount Pinatubo in 1991 cooled the planet by about 0.5 °C.”). See also NASA Earth Observatory (2001) Global Effects of Mount Pinatubo (“Pinatubo injected about 15 million tons of sulfur dioxide into the stratosphere, where it reacted with water to form a hazy layer of aerosol particles composed primarily of sulfuric acid droplets. Over the course of the next two years strong stratospheric winds spread these aerosol particles around the globe. ... In the case of Mount Pinatubo, the result was a measurable cooling of the Earth’s surface for a period of almost two years. Because they scatter and absorb incoming sunlight, aerosol particles exert a cooling effect on the Earth’s surface. The Pinatubo eruption increased aerosol optical depth in the stratosphere by a factor of 10 to 100 times normal levels measured prior to the eruption. (“Aerosol optical depth” is a measure of how much light airborne particles prevent from passing through a column of atmosphere.) Consequently, over the next 15 months, scientists measured a drop in the average global temperature of about 1 degree F (0.6 degrees C).”); and Dutton E. G. & Christy J. R. (1992) Solar radiative forcing at selected locations and evidence for global lower tropospheric cooling following the eruptions of El Chichón and Pinatubo, GEOPHYS. RES. LETT. 19(23): 2313–2316, 2313 (“By September 1992 the global and northern hemispheric lower tropospheric temperatures had decreased 0.5°C and 0.7°C, respectively compared to pre-Pinatubo levels.”).

167 Quaas J., et al. (2022) Robust evidence for reversal of the trend in aerosol effective climate forcing, ATMOS. CHEM. PHYS. 22(18): 12221–12239, 12231 (“In conclusion, there are clear, robust and consistent signals for net declining anthropogenic aerosol influence on climate in the period since 2000, i.e. the period, for which high-quality satellite retrievals of all relevant quantities are available. The regions in which aerosol emissions declined (in particular North America, Europe and East Asia) dominate over regions with increasing trends. ... The overall climate-relevant signal is a decline in negative [aerosol effective radiative forcing] by about 0.1 to 0.3 W m⁻², i.e. between 15 and 50% of the 0.6 W m⁻² increase in CO₂ ERF (Forster et al., 2021) in the same time period. This signal will most likely continue in the future, increasing the urgency for strong measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (McKenna et al., 2021).”).


169 Xu Y. & Ramanathan V. (2017) Well below 2 °C: Mitigation strategies for avoiding dangerous to catastrophic climate changes, Proc. Nat’l. Acad. Sci. 114(39): 10315–10323, 10320, Table S1 (“Hence, the CO₂ measures implemented in 2020 will unmask some of the aerosol cooling (red lines in S1 Appendix, Fig. S5) and offset the warming reduction by CO₂ and SLCP mitigation. In the baseline scenarios of this study, the cooling aerosols are regulated gradually between 2020 and 2100 (SI Appendix, Fig. S6), whereas in the mitigation scenario examined here, CO₂ mitigation is implemented starting from 2020 and CO₂ emission is brought to net zero in about three decades (SI
Appendix, Fig. S2B). As a result, the unmasking of coemitted aerosol cooling (a net warming effect) is more rapid in the decreasing CO₂ emissions beginning in 2020 (CN2020) mitigation scenario (SI Appendix, Fig. S5B vs. S7), Table S1 [graph depicting warming potential based on cumulative emissions from CO₂; only, aerosols only, and short-lived climate pollutants only from the 1970’s into the 2090’s]). See also Xu Y. (2020, personal communication). The baseline-fast warming scenario against which these mitigation scenarios are compared includes “unmasking” as emissions of cooling aerosols are reduced in the baseline-fast (RCP6.0) scenarios. If these aerosol emissions continued at current emission levels, undesired from air quality perspective, the warming in 2100 would be 0.6°C smaller.

Xu Y. & Ramanathan V. (2017) Well below 2 °C: Mitigation strategies for avoiding dangerous to catastrophic climate changes, Proc. Nat’l. Acad. Sci. 114(39): 10315–10323, Supplemental Information, 1 (“In the Baseline-default scenario for CO₂, the emission keeps increasing throughout the 21st century (RCP8.5). The 5% to 95% range of baseline-default is also adopted (Fig. S1b). In the baseline-fast scenario for CO₂ (pre-INDCs), emissions effectively increase at a rate of 1.1%/year before 2030 and then following Representative Concentration Pathway 6.0 (Fig. S1a). In the mitigation scenario for CO₂ (i.e. INDCs and post-2030 decarbonization), emissions effectively increase at a rate of 0.8%/year before 2030 (following INDCs) and then decrease at a rate of 5.5%/year after 2030 (CN2030 in Fig. S2a).”).

Xu Y. & Ramanathan V. (2017) Well below 2 °C: Mitigation strategies for avoiding dangerous to catastrophic climate changes, Proc. Nat’l. Acad. Sci. 114(39): 10315–10323, Supplemental Information, 1 (“In the Baseline-default scenario for CO₂, the emission keeps increasing throughout the 21st century (RCP8.5). The 5% to 95% range of baseline-default is also adopted (Fig. S1b). In the baseline-fast scenario for CO₂ (pre-INDCs), emissions effectively increase at a rate of 1.1%/year before 2030 and then following Representative Concentration Pathway 6.0 (Fig. S1a). In the mitigation scenario for CO₂ (i.e. INDCs and post-2030 decarbonization), emissions effectively increase at a rate of 0.8%/year before 2030 (following INDCs) and then decrease at a rate of 5.5%/year after 2030 (CN2030 in Fig. S2a). The CN2020 scenario is the same as CN2030, except that the peak of emission is reached at 2020 (Fig. S2b).”). See also Id. Supplemental Information, 7 (Table S1. The contribution of individual mitigation measures to the warming in the 21st century.).

Shindell D. & Smith C. J. (2019) Climate and air-quality benefits of a realistic phase-out of fossil fuels, Nature 573: 408–411, 409–410, Addendum “Methods” (“These results differ greatly from the idealized picture of a near-instantaneous response to the removal of aerosol cooling followed by a slow transition to dominance by the effects of CO₂. In these more plausible cases, the temperature effects of the reduction in CO₂, SO₂ and CH₄ roughly balance one another until about 2035. After this, the cooling effects of reduced CO₂ continue to increase, whereas the warming induced by a reduction in SO₂ and the cooling induced by the reduction in CH₄ taper off, such that the cooling induced by the reduction in CO₂ dominates (Fig. 3). Examining the effects of CO₂ and SO₂ alone (Fig. 3d), the faster response of SO₂ to the changes in emissions means that the net effect of these two pollutants would indeed be a short-term warming—but a very small one, of between 0.02 °C and 0.10 °C in the ensemble mean temperature response (up to 0.30 °C for the 95th percentile across pathways). Accounting for all fossil-related emissions (Fig. 3e), any brief climate penalty decreases to no more than 0.05 °C (0.19 °C at the 95th percentile), with the smaller value largely due to the additional near-term cooling from reductions in methane. Nearly all the warming in the 2020s and 2030s (Fig. 2) is therefore attributable to the effect of the residual emissions (mainly of CO₂) during the gradual fossil phase-out, as well as the response to historical emissions.”; “We note that, although this study focuses on the effects of fossil-fuel related emissions, accounting for the effects of reductions in greenhouse gases from non-fossil sources—including fluorinated gases and both methane and nitrous oxide from agriculture—along with biofuels that are a large source of warming black carbon, could eliminate any near-term penalty entirely. In fact, given that the net effect of the fossil-fuel phase-out on temperature is minimal during the first 20 years (Fig. 3, reducing those other emissions is the only plausible way in which to decrease warming during that period.”. See also Lelieveld J., Klingmüller K., Pozzer A., Burnett R. T., Haines A., & Ramanathan V. (2019) Effects of fossil fuel and total anthropogenic emission removal on public health and climate, Proc. Nat’l. Acad. Sci. 116(15): 7192–7197, 7194 (“Some near-term mitigation can be achieved from the simultaneous reduction of short-lived greenhouse gases such as methane (CH₄), O₃, and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) (15, 23–25). Fossil-fuel-related CH₄ emissions constitute nearly 20% of the total source, and removing all anthropogenic CH₄ (nearly 60% of the source), in addition to anthropogenic O₃, would limit the near-term warming to 0.36(±0.06) °C. While the current climate forcing of HFCs is still small, it will be critical to prevent increases in the future, as they are potent greenhouse gases (26). Table 1 presents the unavoidable net warming from emission control measures that simultaneously affect aerosols and greenhouse gases, which have many sources in common. SI Appendix, Table S1 lists these results for all countries, including the uncertainty intervals.”).
Naik V., et al. (2021) *Chapter 6: Short-lived climate forcers*, in *CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS*, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 6-7, 6-8 (“Across the SSPs, the collective reduction of CH₄, ozone precursors and HFCs can make a difference of global mean surface air temperature of 0.2 with a very likely range of [0.1–0.4 °C] in 2040 and 0.8 with a very likely range of [0.5–1.3 °C] at the end of the 21st century (comparing SSP3-7.0 and SSP1-1.9), which is substantial in the context of the Paris Agreement. Sustained methane mitigation, wherever it occurs, stands out as an option that combines near- and long-term gains on surface temperature (*high confidence*) and leads to air quality benefits by reducing surface ozone levels globally (*high confidence*). {6.6.3, 6.7.3, 4.4.4}.”

United Nations Environment Programme & Climate & Clean Air Coalition (2021) *GLOBAL METHANE ASSESSMENT: BENEFITS AND COSTS OF MITIGATING METHANE EMISSIONS*, 21 (“This is because a realistically paced phase-out of fossil fuels, or even a rapid one under aggressive decarbonization, is likely to have minimal net impacts on near-term temperatures due to the removal of co-emitted aerosols (Shindell and Smith 2019). As methane is the most powerful driver of climate change among the short-lived substances (Myhre et al. 2013), mitigation of methane emissions is very likely to be the most powerful lever in reducing near-term warming. This is consistent with other assessments; for example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC AR5) showed that methane controls implemented between 2010 and 2030 would lead to a larger reduction in 2040 warming than the difference between RCPs 2.6, 4.5 and 6.0 scenarios. (The noted IPCC AR5-era scenarios are called representative concentration pathways (RCPs, with the numerical value indicating the target radiative forcing in 2100 (Kirtman et al. 2013)).”). See also Shindell D. & Smith C. J. (2019) *Climate and air-quality benefits of a realistic phase-out of fossil fuels*, NATURE 573: 408–411, Addendum “Methods” (“We note that, although this study focuses on the effects of fossil-fuel related emissions, accounting for the effects of reductions in greenhouse gases from non-fossil sources—including fluorinated gases and both methane and nitrous oxide from agriculture—along with biofuels that are a large source of warming black carbon, could eliminate any near-term penalty entirely. In fact, given that the net effect of the fossil-fuel phase-out on temperature is minimal during the first 20 years (Fig. 3), reducing those other emissions is the only plausible way in which to decrease warming during that period.”).

Dreyfus G. B., Xu Y., Shindell D. T., Zaelke D., & Ramanathan V. (2022) *Mitigating climate disruption in time: A self-consistent approach for avoiding both near-term and long-term global warming*, PROC. NAT’L ACADEM. SCI. 119(22): e2123536119, 1–8, 5 (“Aggressive decarbonization to achieve net-zero CO₂ emissions in the 2050s (as in the decarb-only scenario) results in weakly accelerated net warming compared to the reference case, with a positive warming up to 0.03 °C in the mid-2030s, and no net avoided warming until the mid-2040s due to the reduction in co-emitted cooling aerosols (Figure 3a). By 2050, decarbonization measures result in very limited net avoided warming (0.07°C), consistent with Shindell and Smith (43), but rise to a likely detectable 0.25°C by 2060 and a major benefit of 1.4°C by 2100 (Table S5). In contrast, pairing decarbonization with mitigation measures targeting CH₄, BC, HFC, and N₂O (not an SLCP due to its longer lifetime) independent from decarbonization are essential to slowing the rate of warming by the 2030s to under 0.3°C per decade (Table 1, Figure 3b), similar to the 0.2°C to 0.25°C per decade warming prior to 2020 (38, 53). Recent studies suggest that rate of warming rather than level of warming controls likelihood of record-shattering extreme weather events (54, 55). By 2050, the net avoided warming from the targeted non-CO₂ measures is 0.26°C, almost 4 times larger than the net benefit of decarbonization alone (0.07°C) (Table S5).”).

Xu Y. & Ramanathan V. (2017) *Well below 2 °C: Mitigation strategies for avoiding dangerous to catastrophic climate changes*, PROC. NAT’L ACADEM. SCI. 114(39): 10315–10323, 10321 (“The SP [super pollutant] lever targets SLCPs. Reducing SLCP emissions thins the SP blanket within few decades, given the shorter lifetimes of SLCPs (weeks for BC to about 15 years for HFCs). The mitigation potential of the SP lever with a maximum deployment of current technologies... is about 0.6 °C by 2050 and 1.2 °C by 2100 (SI Appendix, Fig. S5B and Table S1).”). See also Naik V., et al. (2021) *Chapter 6: Short-lived climate forcers*, in *CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS*, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 6-7 (“Across the SSPs, the collective reduction of CH₄, ozone precursors and HFCs can make a difference of global mean surface air temperature of 0.2 with a very likely range of [0.1–0.4 °C] in 2040 and 0.8 with a very likely range of [0.5–1.3 °C] at the end of the 21st century (comparing SSP3-7.0 and SSP1-1.9), which is substantial in the context of the Paris Agreement. Sustained methane mitigation, wherever it occurs, stands out as an option that combines near- and long-term gains on surface temperature (*high confidence*) and leads to air quality benefits by reducing surface ozone levels globally (*high confidence*). {6.6.3, 6.7.3, 4.4.4}”).
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paramount. Currently the largest contributor to the departure from an idealized path to the 2°C target used in the
United Nations (UN) Paris Agreement to succeed, reducing anthropo
Leach et al., 2018).”). See also United Nations Environment Programme & World Meteorological
Organization (2011) INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF BLACK CARBON AND TROPOSPHERIC OZONE, 254, 262
(“Evaluating global mean temperature change, it was found that the targeted measures to reduce emissions of methane and BC could greatly reduce warming rates over the next few decades (Figure 6.1; Box 6.1). When all measures are
fully implemented, warming during the 2030s relative to the present would be only half as much as in the reference scenario. In contrast, even a fairly aggressive strategy to reduce CO₂ emissions, as for the CO₂-measures scenario, does little to mitigate warming until after the next 20-30 years (Box 6.2).”;
“Large impacts of the measures examined here were also seen for the Arctic despite the minimal amount of emissions currently taking place there. This occurs due to the high sensitivity of the Arctic both to pollutants that are transported there from remote sources and to radiative forcing that takes place in areas of the northern hemisphere outside the Arctic. The 16 measures examined here, including the measures on pellet stoves and coal briquettes, reduce warming in the Arctic by 0.7 ºC (range 0.2 to 1.3 ºC) at 2040. This is a large portion of the 1.1 ºC (range 0.7 to 1.7 ºC) warming projected under the reference scenario for the Arctic, and hence implementation of the measures would be virtually certain to substantially slow, but not halt, the pace of Arctic climate change.”).

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2022) Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Shukla P. R., et al. (eds.), SPM-22 (“C.1.2 In modelled pathways that limit warming to 2 ºC (>67%) assuming immediate action, global net CO₂ emissions are reduced compared to modelled 2019 emissions by 27% [11–46%] in 2030 and by 52% [36-70%] in 2040; and global CH₄ emissions are reduced by 24% [9–53%] in 2030 and by 37% [20–60%] in 2040. In pathways that limit warming to 1.5 ºC (>50%) with no or limited overshoot global net CO₂ emissions are reduced compared to modelled 2019 emissions by 48% [36–69%] in 2030 and by 80% [61-109%] in 2040; and global CH₄ emissions are reduced by 34% [21–57%] in 2030 and 44% [31-63%] in 2040. There are similar reductions of non-CO₂ emissions by 2050 in both types of pathways: CH₄ is reduced by 45% [25–70%]; N₂O is reduced by 20% [-5 – 55%]; and F-Gases are reduced by 85% [20–90%]. [FOOTNOTE 44] Across most modelled pathways, this is the maximum technical potential for anthropogenic CH₄ reductions in the underlying models (high confidence). Further emissions reductions, as illustrated by the IMP-SP pathway, may be achieved through changes in activity levels and/or technological innovations beyond those represented in the majority of the pathways (medium confidence). Higher emissions reductions of CH₄ could further reduce peak warming. (high confidence) (Figure SPM.5) {3.3}).

Allen M. R., et al. (2018) Chapter 1: Framing and Context, in GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5 ºC, Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 61 (“If emission reductions do not begin until temperatures are close to the proposed limit, pathways remaining below 1.5 ºC necessarily involve much faster rates of net CO₂ emission reductions (Figure 1.4, green lines), combined with rapid reductions in non-CO₂ forcing and these pathways also reach 1.5 ºC earlier. Note that emissions associated with these schematic temperature pathways may not correspond to feasible emission scenarios, but they do illustrate the fact that the timing of net zero emissions does not in itself determine peak warming: what matters is total cumulative emissions up to that time. Hence every year’s delay before initiating emission reductions decreases by approximately two years the remaining time available to reach zero emissions on a pathway still remaining below 1.5 ºC (Allen and Stocker, 2013; Leach et al., 2018.”). See also United Nations Environment Programme & Climate & Clean Air Coalition (2021) GLOBAL METHANE ASSESSMENT: BENEFITS AND COSTS OF MITIGATING METHANE EMISSIONS, 20 (“For the 2015 United Nations (UN) Paris Agreement to succeed, reducing anthropogenic methane in addition to carbon dioxide is paramount. Currently the largest contributor to the departure from an idealized path to the 2 ºC target used in the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report is the growth in methane amounts (Figure 1.3). Achieving the more stringent 1.5 ºC target requires even larger decreases in methane. The IPCC’s 2018 Special Report concluded that reaching a sustainable mitigation pathway to 1.5 º C can only be achieved with deep and simultaneous reductions of carbon
dioxide and all non-carbon dioxide climate forcing emissions, including short-lived climate pollutants such as methane.”).


182 Ripple W. J., Wolf C., Newsome T. M., Gregg J. W., Lenton T. M., Palomo I., Eikelboom J. A. J., Law B. E., Huq S., Duffy P. B., & Rockström J. (2021) World Scientists’ Warning of a Climate Emergency 2021. BioSci. 71(9): biob079, 1–5, 4 (“Given the impacts we are seeing at roughly 1.25 degrees Celsius (°C) warming, combined with the many reinforcing feedback loops and potential tipping points, massive-scale climate action is urgently needed. The remaining carbon budget for 1.5°C was recently estimated to have a 17% chance of being negative, indicating that we may already have lost the opportunity to limit warming to this level without overshoot or risky geoeengineering (Matthews et al. 2021). Because of the limited time available, priorities must shift toward immediate and drastic reductions in dangerous short-lived greenhouse gases, especially methane (UNEP/CCAC 2021).”).

183 Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change are required to report emissions on a gas-by-gas basis in units of mass. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 18/CMA.1, FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.2, at Annex ¶47 (2019) (“47. Each Party shall report estimates of emissions and removals for all categories, gases and carbon pools considered in the GHG inventory throughout the reported period on a gas-by-gas basis in units of mass at the most disaggregated level, in accordance with the IPCC guidelines referred to in paragraph 20 above, using the common reporting tables, including a descriptive summary and figures underlying emission trends, with emissions by sources listed separately from removals by sinks, except in cases where it may be technically impossible to separate information on emissions and removals in the LULUCF sector, and noting that a minimum level of aggregation is needed to protect confidential business and military information.”). See also Allen M. R., et al. (2022) Indicate separate contributions of long-lived and short-lived greenhouse gases in emission targets. NPI CLIM. ATMOS. SCI. 5(5): 1–4, 1 (“As researchers who have published over recent years on the issue of comparing the climate effects of different greenhouse gases, we would like to highlight a simple innovation that would enhance the transparency of stocktakes of progress towards achieving any multi-decade-timescale global temperature goal. In addition to specifying targets for total CO2-equivalent emissions of all greenhouse gases, governments and corporations could also indicate the separate contribution to these totals from greenhouse gases with lifetimes around 100 years or longer, notably CO2 and nitrous oxide, and the contribution from Short-Lived Climate Forcers (SLCFs), notably methane and some hydrofluorocarbons. This separate indication would support an objective assessment of the implications of aggregated emission targets for global temperature, in alignment with the UNFCCC Parties’ Decision (4/CMA.1)) to provide ‘information necessary for clarity, transparency and understanding’ in nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and long-term low-emission development strategies (LT-LEDSS).”)

184 Abernethy S. & Jackson R. B. (2022) Global temperature goals should determine the time horizons for greenhouse gas emission metrics. Environ. Res. Lett. 17(2): 024019, 1–10, 7 (“Although NDCs and long-term national pledges are currently insufficient to keep warming below 2 °C, let alone 1.5 °C [50–52], the time horizons used for emission metrics should nevertheless be consistent with that central goal of the Paris Agreement. We therefore support the use of the 20 year time horizon over the 100 year version, when binary choices between these two must be made, due to the better alignment of the former with the temperature goals of the Paris Agreement. The 50 year time horizon, not yet in widespread use but now included in IPCC AR6, is in fact the only time horizon that the IPCC presents that falls within the range of time horizons that align with the Paris Agreement temperature goals (24–58 years). However, to best align emission metrics with the Paris Agreement 1.5 °C goal, we recommend the use of the 24 year time horizon, using 2045 as the end point time, with its associated GWP15°C = 75 and GTP1.5°C = 41.”); discussed in McKenna P. (9 February 2022) To Counter Global Warming, Focus Far More on Methane, a New Study Recommends, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (“The Environmental Protection Agency is drastically undervaluing the potency of methane as a greenhouse gas when the agency compares methane’s climate impact to that of carbon dioxide, a new study concludes. The EPA’s climate accounting for methane is “arbitrary and unjustified” and three times too low to meet the goals set in the Paris climate agreement, the research report, published Wednesday in the journal Environmental Research Letters, found.”); and Rathi A. (15 February 2022) The Case Against Methane Emissions Keeps Getting Stronger. BLOOMBERG.

Lynch J., Cain M., Pierrehumbert R., & Allen M. (2020) Demonstrating GWP*: a means of reporting warming-equivalent emissions that captures the contrasting impacts of short- and long-lived climate pollutants, ENVIRON. RES. LETT. 15(4): 044023, 1–13, 2 (“Following these behaviours, sustained emissions of an SLCP therefore result in a similar impact to a one-off release of a fixed amount of CO₂: both lead to a relatively stable long-term increase in forcing. Thus an alternative means of equivalence can be derived, relating a change in the rate of emissions of SLCPs to a fixed quantity of CO₂…”). See also Mar K. A., Unger C., Walderdorff L. & Butler T. (2022) Beyond CO₂ equivalence: The impacts of methane on climate, ecosystems, and health, ENVIRON. SCI. POLICY 134: 127–136, 132 (“However, this practice of assigning “equivalence” belies the physical reality, namely that CH₄’s impact on climate is distinct from CO₂’s in several important ways, as described in Section 3. In effect, only the long-term climate impact of CH₄ (i.e., its radiative forcing over a 100-year time horizon) is robustly taken into account under the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. Among other things, this means that CH₄’s outsized contribution to near-term climate warming is overlooked. . . . The focus on CO₂ equivalence under the UNFCCC also leads to an information and transparency gap. The common practice of expressing mitigation targets in terms of aggregate CO₂e, without specifying which reductions come from which GHGs, compromises the ability of modelers to evaluate in detail how the climate will respond to pledged emission reductions; this is because the climate responds differently to the different climate forcers (Fig. 2.”).

Cain M., Lynch J., Allen M. R., Fuglestvedt J. S., Frame D. J., & Macey A. H. (2019) Improved calculation of warming-equivalent emissions for short-lived climate pollutants, NPJ CLIM. ATMOS. SCI. 2(29): 1–7, 1 (“We have used an empirical method to find a definition of GWP* that preserves the link between an emission and the warming it generates in the medium term up to 2100. The physical interpretation of equation 1 is that the flow term (with coefficient r) represents the fast climate response to a change in radiative forcing, generated by the atmospheric and ocean mixed-layer response.30 The timescale of this response is about 4 years here.31 The stock term (with coefficient s) represents the slower timescale climate response to a change in radiative forcing, due to the deep ocean response. This effect means that the climate responds slowly to past changes in radiative forcing, and is why the climate is currently far from equilibrium. We have approximated this response by treating a quarter of the climate response to a SLCP as “cumulative”.”).

Rogelj J. & Schleussner C.-F. (2021) Reply to Comment on ‘Unintentional unfairness when applying new greenhouse gas emissions metrics at country level’, ENVIRON. RES. LETT. 16(6): 068002, 1–8, 2 (“These ethical issues arise from moving away from an emissions centered metric like GWP-100—where every unit of emissions of a certain GHG is treated equally and independent of the emitter or timing of emissions—to metrics like GWP*—which focus on additional warming and where the treatment of a unit of emissions depends on the emitter and their emission history… Meanwhile, a group of the world’s biggest diary producers seems happy to consider the grandfathering GWP* perspective and explicitly dismisses other fairness perspectives that would increase their companies’ responsibility for reducing methane emissions (Cady 2020.”); citing Cady R. (2020) A Literature Review of GWP*: A proposed method for estimating global warming potential (GWP*) of short-lived climate pollutants like methane, GLOBAL DAIRY PLATFORM; discussed in Elgin B. (19 October 2021) Beef Industry Tries to Erase Its Emissions With Fuzzy Methane Math, BLOOMBERG GREEN.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2021) Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), Figure SPM.2.
4th and r; that is, it absorbs and re-short lifetime of methane, and offset the decreases even though there are significant natural sources. Simply put, natural emissions because it leads to the production of other GHGs (Fig. 1). A quantitative overview of radiative forcing due to CH\(_4\) and its associated photochemical products is provided in Table 1. The chemical reactions of CH\(_4\) also alter the atmospheric concentration of oxidants, especially the OH radical. This in turn has an indirect effect on the abundance of other trace gases and aerosols in the troposphere. In particular, increased atmospheric CH\(_4\) provides an increased sink for OH, reducing the formation of sulfate aerosol (via SO\(_2\) + OH). Since sulfate aerosol has a cooling effect on the climate (see also Fig. 2) its reduction can be seen as an additional, indirect positive radiative forcing attributable to CH\(_4\) (Shindell et al., 2009). Shindell et al. (2009) calculate that this effect is equivalent to a radiative forcing of approximately +0.1 W m\(^{-2}\) (Table 1), comparable to the CH\(_4\)-induced radiative forcing due to stratospheric water vapor.

White House (18 September 2021) Joint US-EU Press Release on the Global Methane Pledge, Statements and Releases (“Methane is a potent greenhouse gas and, according to the latest report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, accounts for about half of the 1.0 degree Celsius net rise in global average temperature since the pre-industrial era. Rapidly reducing methane emissions is complementary to action on carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, and is regarded as the single most effective strategy to reduce global warming in the near term and keep the goal of limiting warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius within reach.”).

Yahoo Finance (8 November 2021) LIVE: President Obama delivers a speech at COP26 climate summit in Glasgow, Scotland, YOUTUBE (from 23:12–23:19).

United Nations Environment Programme & Climate & Clean Air Coalition (2021) Global Methane Assessment: Benefits and Costs of Mitigating Methane Emissions, 17 (“Mitigation of methane is very likely the strategy with the greatest potential to decrease warming over the next 20 years.”). See also Ross K., Waskow D., & Ge M. (17 September 2021) How Methane Emissions Contribute to Climate Change, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE.

United Nations Environment Programme & Climate & Clean Air Coalition (2021) Global Methane Assessment: Benefits and Costs of Mitigating Methane Emissions, 8 (“Reducing human-caused methane emissions is one of the most cost-effective strategies to rapidly reduce the rate of warming and contribute significantly to global efforts to limit temperature rise to 1.5\(^{\circ}\)C. Available targeted methane measures, together with additional measures that contribute to priority development goals, can simultaneously reduce human-caused methane emissions by as much as 45 per cent, or 180 million tonnes a year (Mt/yr) by 2030. This will avoid nearly 0.3\(^{\circ}\)C of global warming by the 2040s and complement all long-term climate change mitigation efforts. It would also, each year, prevent 255 000 premature deaths, 775 000 asthma related hospital visits, 73 billion hours of lost labour from extreme heat, and 26 million tonnes of crop losses globally.”).

United Nations Environment Programme & Climate & Clean Air Coalition (2021) Global Methane Assessment: Benefits and Costs of Mitigating Methane Emissions, 78 (“The total valuation per tonne of methane for all market and non-market assessments here is roughly US$ 4 300 using a cross-nation income elasticity for WTP of 1.0 and US$ 7 900 using an elasticity of 0.4 (Figure 3.19) – values are ~US$ 150 per tonne larger for fossil-related emissions. This value is dominated by mortality effects, of which US$ 2 500 are due to ozone and ~US$ 700 are due to heat using the more conservative 500 deaths per million tonnes of methane of this analysis’ two global-scale estimates and a WTP income elasticity of 1.0, followed by climate impacts.”).

United Nations Environment Programme & Climate & Clean Air Coalition (2021) Global Methane Assessment: Benefits and Costs of Mitigating Methane Emissions, 21 (“The short lifetime of methane, and the quick response of methane abundance to reduced emissions described earlier, mean that any action taken to reduce emissions will have an immediate pay off for climate in addition to the current and near-future human health and agricultural production. Observations over the past few decades have shown that decreased emissions lead quickly to lower methane levels relative to those that could be expected in the absence of the decreases. That is, there are no mechanisms that offset the decreases even though there are significant natural sources. Simply put, natural emissions do not make up for the decrease in anthropogenic emission. Indeed, the expectation that a reduction in emissions will yield quick results, in the order of a decade, is confirmed and emphasizes the importance of methane.”).
the short-lived substances (Myhre et al. 2013), mitigation of methane emissions is very likely to be the most powerful lever in reducing near-term warming. This is consistent with other assessments; for example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC AR5) showed that methane controls implemented between 2010 and 2030 would lead to a larger reduction in 2040 warming than the difference between RCPs 2.6, 4.5 and 6.0 scenarios. (The noted IPCC AR5-era scenarios are called representative concentration pathways (RCPs), with the numerical value indicating the target radiative forcing in 2100 (Kirtman et al. 2013)). See also Ocko I. B., Sun T., Shindell D., Oppenheimer M., Hristov A. N., Pacala S.W., Mauzerall D. L., Xu Y., & Hamburg S. P. (2021) Acting rapidly to deploy readily available methane mitigation measures by sector can immediately slow global warming, ENVIRON. RES. LETT. 16(5): 054042, 1–11, 1 (“Pursuing all mitigation measures now could slow the global-mean rate of near-term decadal warming by around 30%, avoid a quarter of a degree centigrade of additional global-mean warming by midcentury, and set ourselves on a path to avoid more than half a degree centigrade by end of century. On the other hand, slow implementation of these measures may result in an additional tenth of a degree of global-mean warming by midcentury and 5% faster warming rate (relative to fast action), and waiting to pursue these measures until midcentury may result in an additional two tenths of a degree centigrade by midcentury and 15% faster warming rate (relative to fast action).”).

United Nations Environment Programme & World Meteorological Organization (2011) INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF BLACK CARBON AND TROPOSPHERIC OZONE, 254 (“Evaluating global mean temperature change, it was found that the targeted measures to reduce emissions of methane and BC could greatly reduce warming rates over the next few decades (Figure 6.1, Box 6.1). When all measures are fully implemented, warming during the 2030s relative to the present would be only half as much as in the reference scenario. In contrast, even a fairly aggressive strategy to reduce CO₂ emissions, as for the CO₂-measures scenario, does little to mitigate warming until after the next 20-30 years (Box 6.2.”); 262 (“Large impacts of the measures examined here were also seen for the Arctic despite the minimal amount of emissions currently taking place there. This occurs due to the high sensitivity of the Arctic both to pollutants that are transported there from remote sources and to radiative forcing that takes place in areas of the northern hemisphere outside the Arctic. The 16 measures examined here, including the measures on pellet stoves and coal briquettes, reduce warming in the Arctic by 0.7 ºC (range 0.2 to 1.3 ºC) at 2040. This is a large portion of the 1.1 ºC (range 0.7 to 1.7 ºC) warming projected under the reference scenario for the Arctic, and hence implementation of the measures would be virtually certain to substantially slow, but not halt, the pace of Arctic climate change.”).
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2022) Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Shukla P. R., et al. (eds.), SPM-30–SPM-31 (“Deep GHG emissions reductions by 2030 and 2040, particularly reductions of methane emissions, lower peak warming, reduce the likelihood of overshooting warming limits and lead to less reliance on net negative CO2 emissions that reverse warming in the latter half of the century. Reaching and sustaining global net zero GHG emissions results in a gradual decline in warming. (high confidence) (Table SPM.1) {3.3, 3.5, Box 3.4, Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 3, AR6 WG I SPM D1.83}).

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2022) Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Shukla P. R., et al. (eds.), SPM-22 (“C.1.2 In modelled pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) assuming immediate action, global net CO2 emissions are reduced compared to modelled 2019 emissions by 27% [11–46%] in 2030 and by 52% [36-70%] in 2040; and global CH4 emissions are reduced by 24% [9–53%] in 2030 and by 37% [20–60%] in 2040. In pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot global net CO2 emissions are reduced compared to modelled 2019 emissions by 48% [36–69%] in 2030 and by 80% [61-109%] in 2040; and global CH4 emissions are reduced by 34% [21–57%] in 2030 and 44% [31-63%] in 2040. There are similar reductions of non-CO2 emissions by 2050 in both types of pathways: CH4 is reduced by 45% [25–70%]; N2O is reduced by 20% [-5 – 55%]; and F-Gases are reduced by 85% [20–90%]. [FOOTNOTE 44] Across most modelled pathways, this is the maximum technical potential for anthropogenic CH4 reductions in the underlying models (high confidence). Further emissions reductions, as illustrated by the IMP-SP pathway, may be achieved through changes in activity levels and/or technological innovations beyond those represented in the majority of the pathways (medium confidence). Higher emissions reductions of CH4 could further reduce peak warming. (high confidence) (Figure SPM.5) {3.3}3”).

Saunois M., et al. (2020) The Global Methane Budget 2000-2017, EARTH SYST. SCI. DATA 12(3): 1561–1623, 1561 (“For the 2008–2017 decade, global methane emissions are estimated by atmospheric inversions (a top-down approach) to be 576 Tg CH4 yr−1 (range 550–594, corresponding to the minimum and maximum estimates of the model ensemble). Of this total, 359 Tg CH4 yr−1 or ~ 60 % is attributed to anthropogenic sources, that is emissions caused by direct human activity (i.e. anthropogenic emissions; range 336–376 Tg CH4 yr−1 or 50%–65 %).”).

United Nations Environment Programme & Climate & Clean Air Coalition (2021) GLOBAL METHANE ASSESSMENT: BENEFITS AND COSTS OF MITIGATING METHANE EMISSIONS, 25 (“Anthropogenic methane emissions come primarily from three sectors: fossil fuels, ~35 per cent; agriculture, ~40 per cent; and waste, ~20 per cent.”).


Jackson R. B., et al. (2020) Increasing anthropogenic methane emissions arise equally from agricultural and fossil fuel sources, ENVIRON. RES. LETT. 15(7): 071002, 1–7, 6 (“Increased emissions from both the agriculture and waste sector and the fossil fuel sector are likely the dominant cause of this global increase (figures 1 and 4), highlighting the need for stronger mitigation in both areas. Our analysis also highlights emission increases in agriculture, waste, and fossil fuel sectors from southern and southeastern Asia, including China, as well as increases in the fossil fuel sector in the United States (figure 4). In contrast, Europe is the only continent in which methane emissions appear to be decreasing. While changes in the sink of methane from atmospheric or soil uptake remains possible (Turner et al 2019), atmospheric chemistry and land-surface models suggest the timescales for sink responses are too slow to explain most of the increased methane in the atmosphere in recent years. Climate policies overall, where present for methane mitigation, have yet to alter substantially the global emissions trajectory to date.”).

Clean Air Task Force, Oil and Gas Mitigation Program (last visited 2 August 2022) (“Fortunately, most leaks are straightforward to repair (and fixing leaks is paid for by the value of the gas that is saved by repairing them). Further, finding leaks has become efficient with modern technology. The standard approach today is to use special cameras that can detect infrared light (think of night-vision goggles) which are tuned to make methane, which is invisible to our eyes, visible. They allow inspectors to directly image leaking gas in real time, with the ability to inspect entire
components (not just connections and other areas most likely to leak) and pinpoint the precise source, making repair more straightforward. And, technology promises to make this process even more efficient (and cheaper) over the coming years. These technologies can be utilized to reduce harmful leak emissions, by using regular inspections as the lynchpin of rigorous “leak detection and repair” (LDAR) programs. These programs require operators to regularly survey all of their facilities for leaks and improper emissions, and repair all the leaks they identify in a reasonable time. For example, California requires operators to survey all sites four times a year. Colorado has a different approach, requiring operators of the largest sites to survey them monthly, but requiring less frequent inspections for site with smaller potential emissions.”).

Clean Air Task Force, Oil and Gas Mitigation Program (last visited 2 August 2022) (Listing pneumatic equipment venting, compressor seal venting, tank venting, well completion venting, oil well venting and flaring, and dehydrator venting as sources of the “biggest mitigation opportunities.”).

Clean Air Task Force, Oil and Gas Mitigation Program (last visited 2 August 2022) (“Venting is even more harmful than flaring, since methane warms the climate so powerfully, and VOC and toxic pollutants are released unabated. Venting of this gas should be prohibited in all cases as an absolutely unnecessary source of harmful air pollution. There are numerous lowcost (and usually profitable) ways to utilize natural gas from oil wells. Flaring should be a last resort: only in the most extreme cases should oil producers be allowed to flare gas, and it should be strictly a temporary measure. Rules prohibiting venting of natural gas can easily reduce emissions by 95 percent.”).

Clean Air Task Force, Oil and Gas Mitigation Program (last visited 2 August 2022) (“Operators often vent and flare natural gas at oil wells. This waste occurs when oil producers, driven by the rush to sell oil, simply dispose of the gas from producing oil wells instead of building infrastructure (such as pipelines) to capture gas as soon as production begins. (In some cases, pipelines are never built and all of the gas the well produces over its lifetime is wasted in this way, as can be seen in sales records for individual wells available from state regulators.) While a substantial portion of this gas is flared off—wasting energy and producing large amounts of carbon dioxide and other pollutants—some is just dumped into the air, or vented. Even in cases where a gas pipeline is not connected, there are a variety of other technologies that operators can use to reduce associated gas flaring at oil wells. Venting is even more harmful than flaring, since methane warms the climate so powerfully, and VOC and toxic pollutants are released unabated. Venting of this gas should be prohibited in all cases as an absolutely unnecessary source of harmful air pollution. There are numerous lowcost (and usually profitable) ways to utilize natural gas from oil wells. Flaring should be a last resort: only in the most extreme cases should oil producers be allowed to flare gas, and it should be strictly a temporary measure. Rules prohibiting venting of natural gas can easily reduce emissions by 95 percent.”).

See also World Bank, Zero Routine Flaring by 2030 (last visited 4 February 2021) (“This “Zero Routine Flaring by 2030” initiative (the Initiative), introduced by the World Bank, brings together governments, oil companies, and development institutions who recognize the flaring situation described above is unsustainable from a resource management and environmental perspective, and who agree to cooperate to eliminate routine flaring no later than 2030.”).

U.S. Climate Alliance (2018) FROM SLCP CHALLENGE TO ACTION: A ROADMAP FOR REDUCING SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANTS TO MEET THE GOALS OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT, 13 (“Actions to improve manure management and to reduce methane from enteric fermentation have the potential to significantly reduce agricultural methane emissions across U.S. Climate Alliance states. Improving manure storage and handling, composting manure, utilizing pasture-based systems, or installing anaerobic digesters significantly reduces methane from manure management on dairy, swine, and other livestock operations. These practices may reduce methane from manure management by as much as 70 percent in U.S. Climate Alliance states (Appendix A) and can help improve soil quality and fertility, reduce water use and increase water quality, reduce odors, and decrease the need for synthetic fertilizers and associated greenhouse gas emissions. Promising technologies are also emerging that may cut methane emissions from enteric fermentation by 30 percent or more (Appendix A). Developing strategies that work for farmers and surrounding communities can significantly reduce methane emissions, increase and diversify farm revenues, and support water quality and other environmental benefits.”). See also Höglund-Isaksson L., Gómez-Sanabria A., Klimont Z., Rafaj P., & Schöpp W. (2020) Technical potentials and costs for reducing global anthropogenic methane emissions in the 2050 timeframe—results from the GAINS model, ENVIRON. RES. COMM. 2(2): 025004, 1–21, 13–14 (“The technical abatement potential for agricultural sources is assessed at 21 percent below baseline emissions in year 2050. This includes relatively limited abatement potentials for livestock of 12 percent due to applicability limitations (see section S3.4. in the SI for details). Large farms with more than 100 LSU contribute about a third of global CH4 emissions from livestock and for this group we find it technically feasible to reduce emissions by just over 30 percent below baseline emissions in year 2050 (see figures S6–2 in the SI). The available options include reduction of enteric
fermentation emissions through animal feed changes (Gerberetal 2013, Hristov et al 2013) combined with implementation of breeding schemes that simultaneously target genetic traits for improved productivity and enhanced animal health/longevity and fertility. Increased productivity reduces system emissions by enabling the production of the same amount of milk using fewer animals. The dual objective in breeding schemes is important as a one-eyed focus on increased productivity leads to deteriorating animal health and fertility and a risk that system emissions increase due to a need to keep a larger fraction of unproductive replacement animals in the stock (Lovett et al 2006, Berglund 2008, Bell et al 2011). The enteric fermentation options are considered economically feasible for commercial/industrial farms with more than 100 LSU but not for smaller- and medium-sized farms. Breeding schemes are assumed to deliver impacts on emissions only after 20 years and feed changes are assumed applicable only while animals are housed indoor. Emissions from manure management can be reduced through treatment of manure in anaerobic digesters (ADs) with biogas recovery. To be efficient from both an economic and environmental point of view, a certain scale is needed to accommodate both the fixed investment of the AD plant and the time farmers spend carefully attending to and maintaining the process (for details see section 3.3.1.3 in Höglund-Isaksson et al 2018)."

and Borgonovo F., et al. (2019) Improving the sustainability of dairy slurry with a commercial additive treatment. SUSTAINABILITY 11(18): 4988, 1–14, 8 (“N₂O, CO₂, and CH₄ emissions, from the treated slurry, were respectively 100%, 22.9% and 21.5% lower than the control at T4 when the emission peaks were recorded.”).

214 Höglund-Isaksson L., Gómez-Sanabria A., Zbigniew K., Rafaj P., & Schöpp W. (2020) Technical potentials and costs for reducing global anthropogenic methane emissions in the 2050 timeframe—results from the GAINS model, ENVIRON. RES. COMM. 2(2): 025004, 1–21, 16–17 (“An additional almost 10 percent of baseline emissions in 2050 could be removed at a marginal cost below 20 €/t CO₂-eq by implementing proper waste and wastewater handling in China, India and the rest of South-East Asia. This would likely come with considerable co-benefits in the form of reduced air and water pollution.”).

215 U.S. Climate Alliance (2018) FROM SLCP CHALLENGE TO ACTION: A ROADMAP FOR REDUCING SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANTS TO MEET THE GOALS OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT, 15 (”Significant opportunities for reducing methane emissions from landfills and capturing value can be seized by reducing food loss and waste, diverting organic waste to beneficial uses, and improving landfill management. These and other actions collectively could reduce methane emissions from waste by an estimated 40-50 percent by 2030 (Appendix A). Such efforts could add value in our states by reducing emissions of volatile organic compounds and toxic air contaminants from landfills, recovering healthy food for human consumption in food insecure communities, supporting healthy soils and agriculture, generating clean energy and displacing fossil fuel consumption, and providing economic opportunities across these diverse sectors. Many of these benefits will accrue in low-income and disadvantaged communities.”).

216 Jackson R. B., et al. (2021) Atmospheric methane removal: a research agenda, PHILOS. TRANS. R. SOC. A 379(2210): 20200454, 1–17, 1 (“Atmospheric methane removal may be needed to offset continued methane release and limit the global warming contribution of this potent greenhouse gas. Eliminating most anthropogenic methane emissions is unlikely this century, and sudden methane release from the Arctic or elsewhere cannot be excluded, so technologies for negative emissions of methane may be needed. Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) has a well-established research agenda, technological foundation and comparative modelling framework [23–28]. No such framework exists for methane removal. We outline considerations for such an agenda here. We start by presenting the technological Mt CH₄ yr−1 considerations for methane removal: energy requirements (§2a), specific proposed technologies (§2b), and air processing and scaling requirements (§2c). We then outline the climate and air quality impacts and feedbacks of methane removal (§3a) and argue for the creation of a Methane Removal Model Intercomparison Project (§3b), a multi-model framework that would better quantify the expected impacts of methane removal. In §4, we discuss some broader implications of methane removal.”). See also Abernethy S., O’Connor F. M., Jones C. D., & Jackson R. B. (2021) Methane removal and the proportional reductions in surface temperature and ozone, PHILOS. TRANS. R. SOC. A 379(2210): 20210104, 1–13, 6 (“Due to the temporal nature of effective cumulative removal, comparisons between methane and carbon dioxide depend on the timescale of interest. The equivalent of MCR for carbon dioxide, the TCRE, is 0.00048 ± 0.0001°C per Pg CO₂ [38], two orders of magnitude smaller than our MCR estimate of 0.21 ± 0.04°C per effective Pg CH₄ removed (figure 2). Accounting for the time delay for carbon dioxide removal due to the lagged response of the deep ocean, the TCRE for CO2 removal may be even lower [39]. If 1 year of anthropogenic emissions was removed (0.36 Pg CH₄ [3] and 41.4 Pg CO₂ [40]), the transient temperature impact would be almost four times larger for methane than for CO₂ (0.075°C compared to 0.02°C). Using this example, however, maintaining a steady-state response of 0.36 Pg CH₄ effectively removed would require the ongoing removal of roughly 0.03Pg CH₄ yr−1, since a removal rate of E/τ is required to maintain an effective cumulative removal of E.”).
Support from seven additional countries, the Global Methane Pledge commit to a collective goal of reducing global methane emissions by at least 30%

Organizations Partner and Commit to Over $328M to Reducing Methane Emissions

Recent history has hosted a major event on methane, with 103 countries, in recent three years joining the Global Methane Pledge commit to a collective goal of reducing global methane emissions by at least 30%

The analyses, published Sept. 27 in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A, reveal that removal of approximately 0.21 degrees Celsius while reducing ozone levels enough to prevent roughly 50,000 premature deaths annually. The findings open the door to direct comparisons with carbon dioxide removal due to the lagged response of the deep ocean, the TCRE for CO2 removal may be even lower [39]. If 1 year of anthropogenic emissions was removed (0.36 Pg CH4 [3] and 41.4 Pg CO2 [40]), the transient temperature impact would be almost four times larger for methane than for CO2 (0.075°C compared to 0.02°C). Using this example, however, maintaining a steady-state response of 0.36 Pg CH4 effectively removed would require the ongoing removal of roughly 0.03 Pg CH4 yr−1, since a removal rate of E/τ is required to maintain an effective cumulative removal of E.

To slow global warming, some researchers want to pull methane out of the air. SCIENCE (“At a side event at the summit, researchers with the advocacy group Methane Action argued that so-called negative emission technologies—alongside every trick in the book to reduce emissions—could restore methane to pre-industrial levels and trim an estimated 0.4°C to 0.6°C of warming.”).
percent from 2020 levels by 2030 and moving towards using highest tier IPCC good practice inventory methodologies to quantify methane emissions, with a particular focus on high emission sources. Successful implementation of the Pledge would reduce warming by at least 0.2 degrees Celsius by 2050.”).

225 United Nations Environment Programme & Climate & Clean Air Coalition (2021) Global Methane Assessment: Benefits and Costs of Mitigating Methane Emissions, 9 (“Currently available measures could reduce emissions from these major sectors by approximately 180 Mt/yr, or as much as 45 per cent, by 2030. This is a cost-effective step required to achieve the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 1.5°C C target. According to scenarios analysed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), global methane emissions must be reduced by between 40–45 per cent by 2030 to achieve least-cost pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C this century, alongside substantial simultaneous reductions of all climate forcers including carbon dioxide and short-lived climate pollutants. (Section 4.1).”).

226 United Nations Environment Programme & Climate & Clean Air Coalition (2021) Global Methane Assessment: Benefits and Costs of Mitigating Methane Emissions, 8 (“Available targeted methane measures, together with additional measures that contribute to priority development goals, can simultaneously reduce human-caused methane emissions by as much as 45 per cent, or 180 million tonnes a year (Mt/yr) by 2030. This will avoid nearly 0.3°C of global warming by the 2040s and complement all long-term climate change mitigation efforts.”).

227 U.S. Department of State (17 June 2022) U.S.-EU Joint Press Release on the Global Methane Pledge Energy Pathway, Press Release (“Today, the United States, the European Union, and 11 countries launched the Global Methane Pledge Energy Pathway to catalyze methane emissions reductions in the oil and gas sector, advancing both climate progress and energy security…. Countries and supporting organizations announced nearly $60 million in dedicated funding to support implementation of the Pathway. Countries and supporting organizations have announced $59 million in dedicated funding and in-kind assistance in support of the GMP Energy Pathway that was announced at today’s MEF, including: $4 million to support the World Bank Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership (GGFR). The United States intends to support the transfer by the World Bank of at least $1.5 million in funding to the GGFR. Germany intends to provide $1.5 million, and Norway intends to provide approximately $1 million to GGFR. $5.5 million to support the Global Methane Initiative (GMI). The United States will provide $3.5 million. Guided by the recommendations of the GMI, Canada will contribute $2 million over the next four years, as part of its global climate finance commitment, to support methane mitigation projects in developing countries including in the oil and gas sector. Up to $9.5 million from the UNEP International Methane Emissions Observatory to support scientific assessments of methane emissions and mitigation potential in the oil and gas sector that are aligned with the Global Methane Pledge Energy Pathway. Up to $40 million annually from the philanthropic Global Methane Hub to support methane mitigation in the fossil energy sector. These funds will be critical to improve methane measurements in the oil and gas sector, identify priority areas for methane mitigation, develop technical assessments for project development, strengthen regulator and operator capacity, support policy development and enforcement, and other essential activities to achieve reductions in methane emissions.”).

228 See Inflation Reduction Act, Pub. L. No. 117-169, §21001, 60114 (2022); and U.S. Senate (28 July 2022) Summary of the Energy Security and Climate Change Investments in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022; discussed in Friedman L. & Plumer B. (28 July 2022) Surprise Deal Would Be Most Ambitious Climate Action Undertaken by U.S., The NEW YORK TIMES (“The bill would also crack down on leaks of methane, a powerful greenhouse gas, from oil and gas wells, pipelines and other infrastructure. By 2026, polluters would face a penalty of $1,500 per ton of methane that escaped into the atmosphere in excess of federal limits. The methane fee will raise $6.3 billion from the oil and gas industry over a decade, much of which will be reinvested in measures to help prevent methane leaks.”). For further information on what is in the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act, see Paris F., Parlapiano A., Sanger-Katz M., & Washington E. (13 August 2022) A Detailed Picture of What’s in the Democrats’ Climate and Health Bill, The NEW YORK TIMES.

United Nations Environment Programme & Climate & Clean Air Coalition (2021) **GLOBAL METHANE ASSESSMENT: BENEFITS AND COSTS OF MITIGATING METHANE EMISSIONS**, 51–57 (“Long-term exposure to ozone can cause inflammation and allergic responses leading to respiratory mortality, as well as the development of a systemic oxidative, proinflammatory environment that can increase the risk of cardiovascular diseases... It should be noted that the larger impact of ozone on health has been reported in several previous studies. Malley et al. (2017) used the new health exposure relationships (Turner et al. 2016) along with modelled ozone distributions, and found a 125 per cent increase in respiratory deaths attributable to ozone exposure in 2010 compared to previous estimates – 1.04–1.23 million deaths compared to 0.40–0.55 million... Further to this, a bias-adjusted model recently reported total worldwide ozone-related premature deaths of 1.0 ± 0.3 million (Shindell et al. 2018). The value for respiratory-related premature deaths due to ozone was 0.6 ± 0.2 million for 2010, and 1.0 ± 0.3 million without bias adjustment, the latter being consistent with the value reported by Malley et al. (2017).”).

Feng Z., Xu Y., Kobayashi K., Dai L., Zhang T., Agathokleous E., Calatayud V., Paoletti E., Mukherjee A., Agrawal M., Park R. J., Oak Y. J., & Yue X. (2022) **Ozone pollution threatens the production of major staple crops in East Asia**, NAT. FOOD 3: 47–56, 47 (“East Asia is a hotspot of surface ozone (O₃) pollution, which hinders crop growth and reduces yields. Here, we assess the relative yield loss in rice, wheat and maize due to O₃ by combining O₃ elevation experiments across Asia and air monitoring at about 3,000 locations in China, Japan and Korea. China shows the highest relative yield loss at 33%, 23% and 9% for wheat, rice and maize, respectively. The relative yield loss is much greater in hybrid than inbred rice, being close to that for wheat. Total O₃-induced annual loss of crop production is estimated at US$63 billion.”). See also United Nations Environment Programme & Climate & Clean Air Coalition (2021) **GLOBAL METHANE ASSESSMENT: BENEFITS AND COSTS OF MITIGATING METHANE EMISSIONS**, 68 (“Methane also plays a significant role in reducing crop yields and the quality of vegetation. Ozone exposure is estimated to result in yield losses in wheat, 7.1 per cent; soybean, 12.4 per cent; maize, 6.1 per cent; and rice, 4.4 per cent for near-present-day global totals (Mills et al. 2018; Shindell et al. 2016; Avnery et al. 2011a)”; and Shindell D., Faluvegi G., Kasibhatla P., & Van Dingenen R. (2019) **Spatial Patterns of Crop Yield Change by Emitted Pollutant**, EARTH’S FUTURE 7(2): 101–112, 101 (“Our statistical modeling indicates that for the global mean, climate and composition changes have decreased wheat and maize yields substantially whereas rice yields have increased. Well-mixed greenhouse gases drive most of the impacts, though aerosol-induced cooling can be important, particularly for more polluted area including India and China. Maize yield losses are most strongly attributable to methane emissions (via both temperature and ozone.”)).

Mar K. A., Unger C., Walderdorff L., & Butler T. (2022) **Beyond CO₂ equivalence: The impacts of methane on climate, ecosystems, and health**, Env. Sci. Pol. 134: 127–136, 129 (“Methane is an important contributor to the formation of tropospheric O₃. In addition to acting as a greenhouse gas and being directly harmful to human health (see Section 3.3), it also harms plants by causing cellular damage within the leaves, adversely affecting plant production, reducing the rate of photosynthesis, and requiring increased resource allocation to detoxify and repair leaves (Ashmore, 2005, Sitch et al., 2007). This results in an estimated $11-$18 billion worth of global crop losses annually (Avnery et al., 2011b). Beyond this, however, O₃ damage to plants may significantly reduce the ability of terrestrial ecosystems to absorb carbon, negating some of the enhanced carbon uptake due to CO₂ fertilization that is expected to partially offset rising atmospheric CO₂ concentrations (Sitch et al., 2007, Ciais et al., 2013, Arneth et al., 2010, Ainsworth et al., 2012).”).

of the Northern Hemisphere annual average surface mixing ratio, which is more than any other source of reactive carbon.”).

234 Mar K. A., Unger C., Walderdorff L. & Butler T. (2022) *Beyond CO₂ equivalence: The impacts of methane on climate, ecosystems, and health*, ENV'T'L. SCIENCE & POL’Y 134: 127–136, 130 (“Importantly, the role of methane’s contribution to O₃ production is expected to increase in the future, as emissions of other anthropogenic precursors (primarily NOₓ and VOCs) are anticipated to decrease as a result of current and planned air quality regulations across much of the globe. For instance, Young et al. (2013) showed that rising CH₄ concentrations could be a major driver of increased surface O₃ by 2100 under the high-emission scenario developed for the IPCC 5th Assessment report. Turlock et al. (2018) showed that increased O₃ production from rising CH₄ concentrations could offset the reduction in surface O₃ due to reductions in emissions of shorter-lived O₃ precursors.”).

235 Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-level Ozone, 2319 U.N.T.S. 81 (2005) (Entered into force in accordance with article 17 which reads as follows: “1. The present Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day following the date on which the sixteenth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited with the Depositary. 2. For each State and organization that meets the requirements of article 14, paragraph 1, which ratifies, accepts or approves the present Protocol or accedes thereto after the deposit of the sixteenth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, the Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit by such Party of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.”).


237 Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-level Ozone, 2319 U.N.T.S. 81 (2005) (Entered into force in accordance with article 17 which reads as follows: “1. The present Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day following the date on which the sixteenth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited with the Depositary. 2. For each State and organization that meets the requirements of article 14, paragraph 1, which ratifies, accepts or approves the present Protocol or accedes thereto after the deposit of the sixteenth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, the Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit by such Party of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.”).

238 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2021) *Summary for Policymakers, in Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis*, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), SPM-36 (“Strong, rapid and sustained reductions in CH₄ emissions would also limit the warming effect resulting from declining aerosol pollution and would improve air quality.”). See also Naik V., et al. (2021) *Chapter 6: Short-lived climate forcers*, in Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 6-7 (“Sustained methane mitigation, wherever it occurs, stands out as an option that combines near- and long-term gains on surface temperature (high confidence) and leads to air quality benefits by reducing surface ozone levels globally (high confidence). {6.6.3, 6.7.3, 4.4.4}”).

239 The Climate & Clean Air Coalition to Reduce Short-Lived Climate Pollutants (The CCAC identifies solutions to reduce SLCP emissions, conducts relevant scientific research, and promotes policy development. It is the only institution focusing solely on SLCP mitigation, although it does not have any regulatory authority.).

240 Bond T. C., et al. (2013) *Bounding the role of black carbon in the climate system: A scientific assessment*, J. GEOPHYS. RES. ATMOS. 118(11): 5380–5552, 5420 (“Major sources of BC are also major sources of PM₂.5, but the converse is not always true; major sources of PM₂.5 may produce little BC if their emissions are primarily inorganic. Sources that are BC and OC emitters are shown in the table. Resuspended dust, secondary pollutants like sulfate and nitrate, or sea salt, could also be contributors to PM₂.5 at some locations but are not included in Table 11.”); major sources in Table 11 include (in order of decreasing importance): transport (vehicle exhaust including gasoline and diesel); IN = industry including coal and oil and biomass burning; coal burning power plants; RE = residential energy; OB= open burning of biomass and refuse; SA = secondary aerosols; O= Others.

241 Lelieveld J., Klingmüller K., Pozzer A., Burnett R. T., Haines A., & Ramanathan V. (2019) *Effects of fossil fuel and total anthropogenic emission removal on public health and climate*, PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 116(15): 7192–7197, 7193 (“We find that the global total excess mortality rate is 8.79 million per year, with a 95% confidence interval
of 7.11–10.41 million per year”.

See also Vohra K., Vodonos A., Schwartz J., Marais E. A., Sulprizio M. P., & Mickley L. J. (2021) Global mortality from outdoor fine particle pollution generated by fossil fuel combustion: Results from GEOS-Chem. Environ. Res. 195: 110754 (“We used the chemical transport model GEOS-Chem to estimate global exposure levels to fossil-fuel related PM$_{2.5}$ in 2012. Relative risks of mortality were modeled using functions that link long-term exposure to PM$_{2.5}$ and mortality, incorporating nonlinearity in the concentration response. We estimate a global total of 10.2 (95% CI: -47.1 to 17.0) million premature deaths annually attributable to the fossil-fuel component of PM$_{2.5}$. The greatest mortality impact is estimated over regions with substantial fossil fuel related PM$_{2.5}$, notably China (3.9 million), India (2.5 million) and parts of eastern US, Europe and Southeast Asia. The estimate for China predates substantial decline in fossil fuel emissions and decreases to 2.4 million premature deaths due to 43.7% reduction in fossil fuel PM$_{2.5}$ from 2012 to 2018 bringing the global total to 8.7 (95% CI: -1.8 to 14.0) million premature deaths.”).

United Nations Environment Programme & World Meteorological Organization (2011) INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF BLACK CARBON AND TROPOSPHERIC OZONE, 193, 201 (“Implementing all measures could avoid 2.4 million premature deaths (within a range of 0.7–4.6 million) associated with reductions in PM$_{2.5}$, associated with 5.3–37.4 million years of life lost (YLL), based on the 2030 population.”; “Total global production gains of all crops ranges between 30 and 140 million tonnes (model mean: 52 million tonnes). The annual economic gains for all four crops in all regions ranges between US$4billion and US$33 billion, of which US$2–28 billion in Asia.”).

Climate & Clean Air Coalition, Black Carbon (last visited 2 August 2022) (Listing solutions to reach 70% reduction in black carbon by 2030).

1999 Protocol to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-Level Ozone (Gothenburg Protocol), Decision 2012/8: Adoption of guidance document on control techniques for emissions of sulphur, nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds and particulate matter (including PM$_{10}$, PM$_{2.5}$, and black carbon) from stationary sources. See also Matthews B. & Paunu V.-V. (2019) Review of Reporting Systems for National Black Carbon Emissions Inventories. EU Action on Black Carbon in the Arctic - Technical Report 2, 1–2 (“Emissions reporting systems are thus in need of further improvement. In evaluating needs for improvement, the EU Action on Black Carbon in the Arctic review identified the following priority areas . . . 4. Enhanced cooperation between CLRTAP and the Arctic Council to expand and harmonise black carbon emissions reporting by countries whose black carbon emissions impact the Arctic.”). Compare with Expert Group on Black Carbon and Methane (2019) Summary of Progress and Recommendations, Arctic Council Secretariat, 32, Table 5 (Showing US with 9.5bcm of flaring based on World Bank satellite observations); and Energy Information Administration, Flaring and Venting Data (last visited 5 February 2021) (showing combined flaring and venting volumes of 255bcf for 2017).

World Bank (2014) REDUCING BLACK CARBON EMISSIONS FROM DIESEL VEHICLES: IMPACTS, CONTROL STRATEGIES, AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, 17 (“A vehicle emissions reduction program often focuses on three areas: new vehicles, fuels, and the in-use fleet. In some countries it may make sense to start with the in-use fleet and transportation demand management. In certain cases, fiscal policies can be effective tools to complement mandatory regulatory requirements. The order or priority in approach should be dictated by the baseline technology, the rate of growth of the fleet, the feasibility of available options, the institutional capacity to support the intervention, and other local considerations. Successful strategies tend to take a holistic approach that integrates all maximum feasible and cost-effective emissions reduction strategies.”). See also Bond T. C., et al. (2013) Bounding the role of black carbon in the climate system: A scientific assessment, J. Geophys. Res. Atmos. 118(11): 5380–5552, 5525 (“Diesel sources of BC appear to offer the most promising mitigation opportunities in terms of near-term forcing and maturity of technology and delivery programs. Although some options, such as diesel retrofits, may be costly relative to other BC mitigation options, they may also deliver significant health benefits. Mitigating emissions from residential solid fuels may yield a reduction in net positive forcing. The near-term net effect remains uncertain because of uncertain knowledge regarding the impacts of co-emitted species on clouds, but longer-term forcing by co-emitted species interacting with the methane budget is positive. Furthermore, the evolution of feasibility is still in the emerging phase for these sources.”).

Clean Air Task Force, Oil and Gas Mitigation Program (last visited 2 August 2022) (Operators often vent and flare natural gas at oil wells. This waste occurs when oil producers, driven by the rush to sell oil, simply dispose of the gas from producing oil wells instead of building infrastructure (such as pipelines) to capture gas as soon as production begins. (In some cases, pipelines are never built and all of the gas the well produces over its lifetime is wasted in this way, as can be seen in sales records for individual wells available from state regulators.) While a substantial portion of this gas is flared off—wasting energy and producing large amounts of carbon dioxide and other
pollutants—some is just dumped into the air, or vented. Even in cases where a gas pipeline is not connected, there are a variety of other technologies that operators can use to reduce associated gas flaring at oil wells. Venting is even more harmful than flaring, since methane warms the climate so powerfully, and VOC and toxic pollutants are released unabated. Venting of this gas should be prohibited in all cases as an absolutely unnecessary source of harmful air pollution. There are numerous lowcost (and usually profitable) ways to utilize natural gas from oil wells. Flaring should be a last resort: only in the most extreme cases should oil producers be allowed to flare gas, and it should be strictly a temporary measure. Rules prohibiting venting of natural gas can easily reduce emissions by 95 percent."

See also World Bank, Zero Routine Flaring by 2030 (last visited 4 February 2021) (“This “Zero Routine Flaring by 2030” initiative (the Initiative), introduced by the World Bank, brings together governments, oil companies, and development institutions who recognize the flaring situation described above is unsustainable from a resource management and environmental perspective, and who agree to cooperate to eliminate routine flaring no later than 2030.”); and Saunier S., Bergauer M-A., & Isakova I. (2019) Best Available Techniques Economically Achievable to Address Black Carbon from Gas Flaring, EU Action on Black Carbon in the Arctic, Technical Report 3 (“Although the effectiveness of BATEA largely depends on site-specific economic and technical parameters, they have a substantial potential to achieve meaningful and measurable environmental and financial benefits. Quantifying resultant reductions in BC emissions as a result of mitigation strategies remains challenging, however, implementing BATEA should still be considered a best practice for reducing flaring-associated BC emissions. Along with other newly available technologies, use of the BATEA described herein will support existing efforts to mitigate short-term climate change, as well as address other energy, environmental, and safety issues that are likely to result from gas flaring in Arctic regions.”).

247 International Energy Agency, International Renewable Energy Agency, United Nations Statistics Division, World Bank, & World Health Organization (2020) Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report, 6 (“The share of the global population with access to clean fuels and technologies for cooking increased from 56 percent in 2010 (uncertainty interval 52–61 percent) to 63 percent in 2018 (56–68), leaving approximately 2.8 billion people without access.1 That number has been largely unchanged over the past two decades owing to population growth outpacing the number of people gaining access to clean cooking solutions.”). Cleaner cookstoves must also be reliable for interventions to succeed: see Ramanathan T., Molin Valdés H., & Coldrey O. (7 September 2020) Reliability matters: Achieving affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all by 2030, SUSTAINABLE ENERGY FOR ALL (“A cooking solution (improved biomass, gas, electric, etc.) is reliable when it offers a household the predictable ability to cleanly cook essential foods on a daily basis and to continue to do so into the foreseeable future. Reliability is a holistic concept that encompasses not only the verifiability of emissions reduction, but also accounts for end users’ needs (e.g. usability of design, long-term durability, affordability, and strength of supply chain). Compromising any of those factors can mean that even if a cooking solution is perceived as beneficial, it may not be well suited and will therefore ultimately not meet its targeted goal of cleaner air.”).

248 Comer B., Osipova L., Georgeff E., & Mao X. (2020) The International Maritime Organization’s proposed arctic heavy fuel oil ban: likely impacts and opportunities for improvement, International Council on Clean Transportation, 1 (“In February 2020, delegates at the seventh session of the United Nations International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) Pollution Prevention and Response Sub-Committee (PPR 7) agreed on draft amendments to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) that would ban the carriage and use of heavy fuel oil (HFO) as fuel in Arctic waters beginning on July 1, 2024 (IMO Secretariat, 2020). If it were comprehensive, such a ban would dramatically reduce the potential for HFO spills and, in the likely cases where ships that stop using HFO switch to distillates, reduce the amount of black carbon (BC) they emit (Comer, Olmer, Mao, Roy, & Rutherford, 2017a). However, the text of the ban as currently proposed includes exemptions and waivers that would allow HFO to be carried and used in the Arctic until 2029. As proposed, the ban would enter into force for some ships on July 1, 2024, and implementation would be delayed for others. Ships with certain fuel tank protections, where the fuel tank is separated from the outer hull of the ship by at least 76 centimeters (cm), would be exempt until July 1, 2029. Additionally, countries with a coastline that borders IMO’s definition of Arctic waters can waive the HFO ban’s requirements until July 1, 2029 for ships that fly their flag when those ships are in waters subject to their sovereignty or jurisdiction.”). See also Farand C. (3 September 2020) Loopholes in Arctic heavy fuel oil ban defer action to the end of the decade, CLIMATE HOME NEWS (“Under draft plans being negotiated at the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) – the UN body responsible for international shipping – restrictions on heavy fuel oil (HFO), a dirty fuel which propels most of marine transport, would come into effect in July 2024. But a host of exemptions and waivers would allow most ships using and carrying HFO to continue to pollute Arctic waters until 2029.”).

early warning of the effects of CFCs (MR74 scenario), estimated ODS emissions would have reached 24–76 GtCO₂-eq yr 1 in 2010. Thus, in the current decade, in a world without ODS restrictions, annual ODS emissions using only the GWP metric could be as important for climate forcing as those of CO₂.”).

250 Young P. J., Harper A. B., Huntingford C., Paul N. D., Morgenstern O., Newman P. A., Oman L. D., Madronich S., & Garcia R. R. (2021) The Montreal Protocol protects the terrestrial carbon sink, NATURE 596(7872): 384–388, 384 (“Overall, at the end of the century, worldAvd warms by an additional 2.5 K (2.4–2.7 K) above the RCP 6.0 baseline in worldProj. Of this warming, 1.7 K comes from the previously explored additional radiative forcing due to the higher CFC concentrations in worldProj. Newly quantified here is the additional warming of global-mean air temperature of 0.85 K (0.65–1.0 K)—half as much again—that arises from the higher atmospheric CO₂ concentrations due to the damaging effect of UV radiation on terrestrial carbon stores.”). See also United Nations Environment Programme, Ozone Secretariat (16 September 2022) World Ozone Day 2022: Global cooperation protecting life on Earth (“This action has protected millions of people from skin cancer and cataracts over the years. It allowed vital ecosystems to survive and thrive. It safeguarded life on Earth. And it slowed climate change: if ozone-depleting chemicals had not been banned, we would be looking at a global temperature rise of an additional 2.5°C by the end of this century. This would have been a catastrophe.”).

251 Xu Y., Zaelke D., Velders G. J. M., & Ramanathan V. (2013) The role of HFCs in mitigating 21st century climate change, ATMOS. CHEM. & PHYS. 13(12): 6083–6089, 6083 (“Here we show that avoiding production and use of high-GWP (global warming potential) HFCs by using technologically feasible low-GWP substitutes to meet the increasing global demand can avoid as much as another 0.5°C warming by the end of the century. This combine mitigation on SLCPs would cut the cumulative warming since 2005 by 50% at 2050 and by 60% at 2100 from the CO₂-only mitigation scenarios, significantly reducing the rate of warming and lowering the probability of exceeding the 2°C warming threshold during this century.”). For an updated assessment of HFC mitigation from policy adopted in the lead-up to the Kigali Amendment and locked-in with the entry into force of the Kigali Amendment, see Velders G. J. M., Daniel J. S., Montzka S. A., Vimont I., Rigby M., Krummel P. B., Muhle J., O’Doherty S., Prinn R. G., Weiss R. F., & Young D. (2022) Projections of hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) emissions and the resulting global warming based on recent trends in observed abundances and current policies, ATMOS. CHEM. PHYS. 22(9): 6087–6101, 6099 (“Projected mixing ratios, radiative forcing, and globally averaged temperature changes are calculated from the projected HFC emissions. The 2050 radiative forcing is 0.13–0.18 Wm⁻² in the current policies K-I scenario and drops to 0.08–0.09 Wm⁻² when the additional Kigali Amendment controls are considered (in KA-2022). In the current policies K-I scenario, the HFCs are projected to contribute 0.14–0.31 °C to the global surface warming in 2100, compared to 0.28–0.44 °C without policies. Following the Kigali Amendment, the surface warming of HFCs is reduced to about 0.05 °C in 2050 and 0.04 °C in 2100 (KA-2022. In a hypothetical scenario with a full phaseout of HFCs production and consumption in 2023, the contribution is reduced to about 0.01 °C in 2100.”).

252 Montzka S. A., Velders G. J. M., Krummel P. B., Mühle J., Orkin V. L., Park S., Shah N., & Walter-Terrinoni H. (2018) Chapter 2: Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), in SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT OF OZONE DEPLETION: 2018, Global Ozone Research and Monitoring Project–Report No. 58, World Meteorological Organization, 2.40–2.41 (“With the Kigali Amendment and national and regional regulations, the future production and consumption of HFCs is strongly limited (Table 2-1). Under the provisions of the Amendment, the contribution of HFCs to the global average surface temperature is projected to reach a maximum around 2060, after which it slowly decreases to about 0.06°C by 2100 (Figure 2-20). In contrast, the surface temperature contribution from HFCs in the baseline scenario is 0.3–0.5°C in 2100 (based on Xu et al., 2013 and Velders et al., 2015). The difference in projected temperatures is relevant in the context of the 2015 UNFCCC Paris Agreement, which aims to limit the global temperature increase to well below 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels.”).

253 Purohit P., Borgford-Parnell N., Klimont Z., & Höglund-Isaksson L. (2022) Achieving Paris climate goals calls for increasing ambition of the Kigali Amendment, NAT. CLIM. CHANGE 12: 339–342, 339 (“Hydrofluorocarbon emissions have increased rapidly and are managed by the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol. Yet the current ambition is not consistent with the 1.5 °C Paris Agreement goal. Here, we draw on the Montreal Protocol start-and-strengthen approach to show that accelerated phase-down under the Kigali Amendment could result in additional reductions of 72% in 2050, increasing chances of staying below 1.5 °C throughout this century.”).

from a baseline of 0.3-0.5 °C to less than 0.1 °C (Figure ES-4). If the global production of HFCs were to cease in 2020, the surface temperature contribution of the HFC emissions would stay below 0.02 °C for the whole 21st century. The magnitude of the avoided temperature increase, due to the provisions of the Kigali Amendment (0.2 to 0.4 °C) is substantial in the context of the 2015 UNFCCC Paris Agreement, which aims to limit global temperature rise to well below 2.0 °C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 °C.”); 2.40–2.41 (“With the Kigali Amendment and national and regional regulations, the future production and consumption of HFCs is strongly limited (Table 2-1). Under the provisions of the Amendment, the contribution of HFCs to the global average surface temperature is projected to reach a maximum around 2060, after which it slowly decreases to about 0.06°C by 2100 (Figure 2-20). In contrast, the surface temperature contribution from HFCs in the baseline scenario is 0.3–0.5°C in 2100 (based on Xu et al., 2013 and Velders et al., 2015). The difference in projected temperatures is relevant in the context of the 2015 UNFCCC Paris Agreement, which aims to limit the global temperature increase to well below 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels.”).


256 Dreyfus G., Borgford-Parnell N., Christensen J., Fahey D. W., Motherway B., Peters T., Picolotti R., Shah N., & Xu Y. (2020) Assessment of Climate and Development Benefits of Efficient and Climate-Friendly Cooling, Molina M. & Zaelke D., Steering Committee Co-Chairs, xii (“Transitioning to high efficiency cooling equipment can more than double the climate benefits of the HFC phasedown in the near-term by reducing emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and black carbon from the electricity and diesel used to run air conditioners and other cooling equipment. This also will provide significant economic, health, and development co-benefits. … Robust policies to promote the use of best technologies currently available for efficient and climate-friendly cooling have the potential to reduce climate emissions from the stationary air conditioning and refrigeration sectors by 130–260 GtCO2e by 2050, and 210–460 GtCO2e by 2060. A quarter of this mitigation is from phasing down HFCs and switching to alternatives with low global warming potential (GWP), while three-quarters is from improving energy efficiency of cooling equipment and reducing electricity demand, which helps achieve a more rapid transition to carbon free electricity worldwide. The mobile air conditioning sector, where energy consumption is expected to nearly triple by 2050, offers significantly more mitigation potential.”). See also Purohit P., Höglund-Isaksson L., Dulac J., Shah N., Wei M., Rafaj P., & Schöpp W. (2020) Electricity savings and greenhouse gas emission reductions from global phase-down of hydrofluorocarbons, Atmos. Chem. Phys. 20(19): 11305–11327, 11305 (“The combined effect of HFC phase-down, energy efficiency improvement of the stationary cooling technologies, and future changes in the electricity generation fuel mix would prevent between 411 and 631 PgCO2 equivalent of GHG emissions between 2018 and 2100, thereby making a significant contribution towards keeping the global temperature rise below 2 °C.”).

257 United Nations Treaty Collection, Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (last visited 16 August 2022).


259 See HFCBans.com (last visited 2 August 2022) (States with finalized HFC prohibitions include: California, Colorado, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Washington, Vermont, and Virginia. States with proposed bans include: Connecticut, Hawaii, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas.).

260 168 Cong. Rec. D1,006 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2022) (“By 69 yeas to 27 nays (Vote No. EX. 343), two-thirds of the Senators present having voted in the affirmative, Senate agreed to the resolution of Advise and Consent to Ratification, as amended, to Treaty Document 117–1, the amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (the ‘‘Montreal Protocol’’), adopted at Kigali on October 15, 2016, by the Twenty-Eighth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol (the ‘‘Kigali Amendment’’), with 1 declaration...”). See also White House (21 September 2022) Statement by President Joe Biden on Senate Ratification of the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol; and White House (16 November 2021) A Message to the Senate on the Amendment to the Montreal Protocol
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Briefing Room ("TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES: With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith the Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (the “Montreal Protocol”), adopted at Kigali on October 15, 2016, by the Twenty-Eighth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol (the “Kigali Amendment”). The report of the Department of State is also enclosed for the information of the Senate. The principal features of the Kigali Amendment provide for a gradual phasedown in the production and consumption of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), which are alternatives to ozone-depleting substances being phased out under the Montreal Protocol, as well as related provisions concerning reporting, licensing, control of trade with non-Parties, and control of certain byproduct emissions."); discussed in Mason J. (16 November 2021) White House sends Kigali amendment on climate-warming gases to Senate, REUTERS.

Portmann R. W., Daniel J. S., & Ravishankara A. R. (2012) Stratospheric Ozone Depletion Due to Nitrous Oxide: Influences of Other Gases, PHILOS. TRANS. R SOC. LOND. B BIOL. SCI. 367(1593): 1256–1264, 1262 (“By 2008, anthropogenic N2O was the most significant ozone-destroying compound being emitted. Owing to the phase-out of anthropogenic halocarbon emissions, it is likely to become even more dominant in the near future.”). See also Porter I. (2019) Mitigation of Nitrous Oxide Emissions, Presentation at 31st Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol ("By 2050, lack of controls on N2O will undo 25% of the benefit gained by the Montreal Protocol to reducing ODS from the ozone layer.").

World Meteorological Organization, United Nations Environment Programme, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, & European Commission (2018) Executive Summary: Scientific Assessment of Ozone Depletion: 2018, Global Ozone Research and Monitoring Project Report No. 58, 1-61. ("As a result of this growth, the contribution of N2O to radiative forcing has continued to rise, reaching 0.19 W m\(^{-2}\) in 2016, approximately 10% that of CO\(_2\).”).


Environmental Protection Agency (2012) GLOBAL ANTHROPOGENIC NON-CO\(_2\) GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: 1990–2030, 41 (“Between 1990 and 2005, N2O emissions from production of nitric and adipic acid has decreased 37 percent, from 200 MtCO\(_2\)e to 126 MtCO\(_2\)e (see Table 4-2). Over this time period, production of nitric and adipic acid has increased. The decline in historical emissions is mostly due to widespread installation of abatement technologies in the adipic acid industry (Reimer et al, 1999). Most production capacity in these industries has been located in the OECD, but the proportion of emissions in the OECD has declined. In 1990, the OECD accounted for 83 percent of global N2O emissions from this source, whereas the OECD is estimated to account for 68 percent of global emissions in 2005.”).

Environmental Protection Agency (2019) GLOBAL NON-CO\(_2\) GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION PROJECTIONS & MITIGATION: 2015–2050, 29 (“Taken together, the top 5 countries in terms of baseline emissions represent 85% of all potential global abatement in the source category in 2030. China alone represents 67% of total abatement potential, in part because of its high production capacity and lower adoption of emission controls relative to other large producers of nitric and adipic acid.”).


Butler A. H., Daniel J. S., Portmann R. W., Ravishankara A. R., Young P. J., Fahey D. W., & Rosenlof K. H. (2016) Diverse policy implications for future ozone and surface UV in a changing climate, ENV. RES. LETT. 11(6): 064017, 1–7, 4 (“A key point is that if the world were to achieve reductions of CO\(_2\) and CH\(_4\) concentrations to RCP 2.6 levels, N\(_2\)O mitigation would become important to avoid exacerbation of both climate change and ozone layer depletion.”).

SOP, Save Our Planet (last visited 11 May 2022).
The storage of manure as well as hydrolytic microorganisms and their excreted enzymes that biodegrade organic nitrogen into ammonium.”. See also Maris S. C., Capra F., Ardenti F., Chiodini M. E., Boselli R., Taskin E., Puglisi E., Bertora C., Poggianella L., Amaducci S., Tabaglio V., & Fiorini A. (2021) Reducing N Fertilization without Yield Penalties in Maize with a Commercially Available Seed Dressing, AGRONOMY 11(3): 407, 1–19, 1 “[W]e concluded that under our experimental conditions SCM [SOP® COCUS MAIZE+] may be used for reducing N [nitrogen] input (-30%) and N₂O emissions (-23%), while contemporarily maintaining maize yield. Hence, SCM can be considered an available tool to improve agriculture’s alignment to the United Nation Sustainable Development Goals (UN SDGs) and to comply with Europe’s Farm to Fork strategy for reducing N-fertilizer inputs.”.

United Nations Environment Programme & Climate & Clean Air Coalition (2021) GLOBAL METHANE ASSESSMENT: BENEFITS AND COSTS OF MITIGATING METHANE EMISSIONS, Figure 5.1.

United Nations Environment Programme & World Meteorological Organization (2011) INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF BLACK CARBON AND TROPOSPHERIC OZONE, 239, 246 (“Evaluating global mean temperature change, it was found that the targeted measures to reduce emissions of methane and BC could greatly reduce warming rates over the next few decades (Figure 6.1: Box 6.1). When all measures are fully implemented, warming during the 2030s relative to the present would be only half as much as in the reference scenario. In contrast, even a fairly aggressive strategy to reduce CO₂ emissions, as for the CO₂-measures scenario, does little to mitigate warming until after the next 20-30 years (Box 6.2):”.” Large impacts of the measures examined here were also seen for the Arctic despite the minimal amount of emissions currently taking place there. This occurs due to the high sensitivity of the Arctic both to pollutants that are transported there from remote sources and to radiative forcing that takes place in areas of the northern hemisphere outside the Arctic. The 16 measures examined here, including the measures on pellet stoves and coal briquettes, reduce warming in the Arctic by 0.7 °C (range 0.2 to 1.3 °C) at 2040. This is a large portion of the 1.1 °C (range 0.7 to 1.7 °C) warming projected under the reference scenario for the Arctic, and hence implementation of the measures would be virtually certain to substantially slow, but not halt, the pace of Arctic climate change.”.).

Sand M., Berntsen T. K., Seland Ø., & Kristjánsson J. E. (2013) Arctic surface temperature change to emissions of black carbon within Arctic or midlatitudes, J. GEOPHYS. RES. 118(14): 7788–7798, 7788 (“The climate model includes a snow model to simulate the climate effect of BC deposited on snow. We find that BC emitted within the Arctic has an almost five times larger Arctic surface temperature response (per unit of emitted mass) compared to emissions at midlatitudes. Especially during winter, BC emitted in North-Eurasia is transported into the high Arctic at low altitudes. A large fraction of the surface temperature response from BC is due to increased absorption when BC is deposited on snow and sea ice with associated feedbacks.”). See also Stohl A., Klimont Z., Eckhardt S., Kupiainen K., Shevchenko V. P., Kopeikin V. M., & Novigatsky A. N. (2013) Black carbon in the Arctic: the underestimated role of gas flaring and residential combustion emissions, ATMOS. CHEM. PHYS. 13(17): 8833–8855, 8848 (Fig. 9. Time series of measured EBC and carbon monoxide as well as modeled BC split into different source categories for the Zeppelin station for the period 12 February until 4 March 2010.).

Qian Y., Yasunari T. J., Doherty S. J., Flanner M. G., Lau W. K. M., Ming J., Wang H., Wang M., Warren S. G., & Zhang R. (2014) Light-absorbing Particles in Snow and Ice: Measurement and Modeling of Climatic and Hydrological impact, ADV. ATMOS. SCI. 32: 64–91, 64 (“Light absorbing particles (LAP, e.g., black carbon, brown carbon, and dust) influence water and energy budgets of the atmosphere and snowpack in multiple ways. In addition to their effects associated with atmospheric heating by absorption of solar radiation and interactions with clouds, LAP in snow on land and ice can reduce the surface reflectance (a.k.a., surface darkening), which is likely to accelerate the snow aging process and further reduces snow albedo and increases the speed of snowpack melt. LAP in snow and ice (LAPSI) has been identified as one of major forcings affecting climate change, e.g. in the fourth and fifth assessment reports of IPCC. However, the uncertainty level in quantifying this effect remains very high. In this review paper, we document various technical methods of measuring LAPSI and review the progress made in measuring the LAPSI in Arctic, Tibetan Plateau and other mid-latitude regions. We also report the progress in modeling the mass concentrations, albedo reduction, radiative forcing, and climatic and hydrological impact of LAPSI at global and regional scales. Finally we identify some research needs for reducing the uncertainties in the impact of LAPSI on global and regional climate and the hydrological cycle.”). See also Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (2017) ADAPTATION ACTIONS FOR A CHANGING ARCTIC: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE BARENTS AREA, 72 (“Highly reflective surfaces, such as snow and ice in the Arctic increase light absorption by BC particles in the atmosphere. BC also absorbs light after deposition onto (and then into) snow and ice, where it accelerates the melt process (Pedersen
et al., 2015). BC has made an important contribution to the observed rise in Arctic surface temperature through the 20th century (although carbon dioxide is still the major factor driving the rise in Arctic temperature) (Quinn et al., 2008; Koch et al., 2011; AMAP, 2015a). It may be technically possible to reduce global anthropogenic BC emissions by up to 75% by 2030 (Shindell et al., 2012; AMAP, 2015a; Stohl et al., 2015). As well as helping to slow warming, BC emission reductions would also have significant health benefits (Anenberg et al., 2012; Shindell et al., 2012)."

International Energy Agency (2016) *World Energy Outlook Special Report: Energy and Air Pollution*, 115 ("Two areas of clear cross-benefit (for air quality and climate change) are actions to reduce emissions of black carbon, a major component of PM, and of methane (Box 3.4). Black carbon – emitted due to incomplete combustion, particularly from household biomass stoves and diesel vehicles – affects the climate in multiple ways. It absorbs incoming sunlight, leading to warming in the atmosphere, settles on the ground accelerating the melting of Arctic and alpine ice and, along with other pollutants that form aerosols, it affects the formation of clouds, so having a knock-on influence on increased warming."); and World Bank & International Cryosphere Climate Initiative (2013) *On Thin Ice: How Cutting Pollution Can Slow Warming and Save Lives*, 2 ("Climate benefits for cryosphere regions from black carbon reductions carry less uncertainty than they would in other parts of the globe and are sometimes very large. This is because emissions from sources that emit black carbon—even with other pollutants—almost always lead to warming over reflective ice and snow.").

274 International Maritime Organization, *Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC 76), 10 to 17 June 2021 (remote session) (last visited 13 October 2021)* ("The MEPC adopted amendments to MARPOL Annex I (addition of a new regulation 43A) to introduce a prohibition on the use and carriage for use as fuel of heavy fuel oil (HFO) by ships in Arctic waters on and after 1 July 2024. The prohibition will cover the use and carriage for use as fuel of oils having a density at 15°C higher than 900 kg/m3 or a kinematic viscosity at 50°C higher than 180 mm2/s. Ships engaged in securing the safety of ships, or in search and rescue operations, and ships dedicated to oil spill preparedness and response would be exempted. Ships which meet certain construction standards with regard to oil fuel tank protection would need to comply on and after 1 July 2029. A Party to MARPOL with a coastline bordering Arctic waters may temporarily waive the requirements for ships flying its flag while operating in waters subject to that Party’s sovereignty or jurisdiction, up to 1 July 2029.").

275 Comer B., Osipova L., Georgeff E., & Mao X. (2020) *The International Maritime Organization’s proposed arctic heavy fuel oil ban: likely impacts and opportunities for improvement*, International Council on Clean Transportation, 2–3 (“HFO has already been banned in the Antarctic since 2011, without any exemptions or waivers. In the Antarctic, defined by the IMO’s MARPOL Convention as a neat circle below 60°S latitude, ships are not only forbidden from using HFO and carrying HFO in their fuel tanks, they cannot even carry HFO as cargo or ballast. There is little commercial shipping activity in the Antarctic region, and this made the decision less contentious. The Arctic, meanwhile, has substantial amounts of commercial shipping activity, including fishing and the transport of oil, gas, and minerals from the region. The carriage and use of HFO is especially common for oil tankers, general cargo ships, and bulk carriers in the region, as we will show later in this analysis. The Arctic HFO ban, as currently proposed, would start to apply on July 1, 2024 and would forbid using or carrying HFO as fuel, but would allow HFO cargoes to be transported. In addition to the cargo exemption, the text of the HFO ban allows for exemptions and waivers, as follows.”). See also Farand C. (3 September 2020) *Loopholes in Arctic heavy fuel oil ban defer action to the end of the decade, Climate Home News* ("Burning and carrying HFO has been banned in Antarctic waters since 2011, but plans for similar restrictions in the resource-rich Arctic have met with resistance. Russia, which could benefit from the opening of more shipping routes in the region as Arctic sea ice melts, is one of the most vocal opponents.").

276 Comer B., Osipova L., Georgeff E., & Mao X. (2020) *The International Maritime Organization’s proposed arctic heavy fuel oil ban: likely impacts and opportunities for improvement*, International Council on Clean Transportation, 10–11, 19 ("As shown in Figure 8, had the proposed HFO ban been in place in 2019, it would have banned just 30% of HFO carried as fuel and 16% of the HFO used by ships in the Arctic. Total BC emissions in the Arctic would have fallen by only 5% because the majority of HFO use would have been allowed by virtue of exemptions or waivers. Of the 700 HFO-fueled ships in the Arctic in 2019, 151, or 22% of the fleet, would have been exempt. Of these, 18 would have been eligible for a waiver had they not already been exempt. The flag state with the most exempt ships was Panama, with 31 ships, followed by Marshall Islands with 27, Liberia with 15, Russia with 11, and the Netherlands with 11. Other flag states had fewer than 10 ships exempt. An additional 366 ships, or 52% of the HFO-fueled fleet, would have been eligible for a waiver, including 325 ships flagged to Russia, 20 to Canada, 10 to Norway, 10 to Denmark, and one to the United States. Together, exemptions and waivers would have allowed 74% of the HFO-fueled fleet, by number of ships, to continue to use HFO in the Arctic.").
The proposed technique to increase freezing would be to spray seawater on saving Arctic ice directly, either by increasing the rate of freezing or by decreasing the rate of melting. One strategy for restoring sea ice and arresting the strongest feedbacks in the climate system."

We propose that disallowing exemptions and limiting waivers only to IW results in banning 75% of HFO carriage and 82% of HFO use, which would cut BC emissions by 24%. The third bar in the figures shows the impact of allowing waivers in both IW and TS. In this case, 70% of HFO carriage and 75% of HFO use would be banned, and this would cut BC emissions by 22%. Figure 20 shows the location and amount of HFO used that would have been allowed in 2019 under this alternative. Comparing this with Figure 19 shows that HFO remains available for use near shore; this could allow for domestic transportation while banning HFO in the offshore areas. This alternative may strike a balance between allowing HFO to be carried and used for domestic shipping and community resupply while banning a significant amount of HFO carriage and use. However, an HFO spill close to shore would result in larger direct impacts to Arctic coastlines and coastal communities. The most protective alternative is a ban without exemptions and waivers."

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277 Comer B., Osipova L., Georgeff E., & Mao X. (2020) *The International Maritime Organization’s proposed arctic heavy fuel oil ban: likely impacts and opportunities for improvement*, International Council on Clean Transportation, 19 (“Moving down Figures 15, 16, and 17, the top bars show the HFO ban without exemptions or waivers, in which case 100% of HFO carriage and use would be banned and BC emissions would decrease by 30%. The second bars show that disallowing exemptions and limiting waivers only to IW results in banning 75% of HFO carriage and 82% of HFO use, which would cut BC emissions by 24%. The third bar in the figures shows the impact of allowing waivers in both IW and TS. In this case, 70% of HFO carriage and 75% of HFO use would be banned, and this would cut BC emissions by 22%. Figure 20 shows the location and amount of HFO used that would have been allowed in 2019 under this alternative. Comparing this with Figure 19 shows that HFO remains available for use near shore; this could allow for domestic transportation while banning HFO in the offshore areas. This alternative may strike a balance between allowing HFO to be carried and used for domestic shipping and community resupply while banning a significant amount of HFO carriage and use. However, an HFO spill close to shore would result in larger direct impacts to Arctic coastlines and coastal communities. The most protective alternative is a ban without exemptions and waivers.”).


281 International Maritime Organization (1 December 2021) *IMO moves ahead on GHG emissions, Black Carbon and marine litter* (“The International Maritime Organization (IMO) in view of the urgency for all sectors to accelerate their efforts to reduce GHG emissions - as emphasized in the recent IPCC reports and the Glasgow Climate Pact - recognized the need to strengthen the ambition of the Initial IMO GHG Strategy during its revision process. IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), meeting virtually for its 77th session, 22-26 November 2021, agreed to initiate the revision of its GHG strategy. The MEPC also adopted a resolution on voluntary use of cleaner fuels in the Arctic, to reduce black carbon emissions. In other work, the MEPC adopted a strategy to address marine plastic litter from ships; adopted revised guidelines for exhaust gas cleaning systems (EGCS) and agreed the scope of work on discharge water of EGCS; and considered matters related to the Ballast Water Management Convention.”). See also Humpert M. (6 December 2021) *IMO adopts new measures to reduce black carbon in Arctic shipping*, ARCTICTODAY.

282 Guzman J. (1 December 2020) *Every major US bank has now come out against Arctic drilling*, THE HILL.

283 Marsh A. & Dlouhy J. A. (19 November 2020) *Arctic Oil Fight Comes to Insurers as Trump Plans Lease Sale*, BLOOMBERG GREEN.

284 Desch S. J., Smith N., Groppi C., Vargas P., Jackson R., Kalyaan A., Nguyen P., Probst L., Rubin M. E., Singleton H., Spacek A., Truitt A., Zaw P. P., & Hartnett H. E. (2017) *Arctic ice management*, EARTH’S FUTURE 5: 107–27, 107 (“Here we investigate a means for enhancing Arctic sea ice production by using wind power during the Arctic winter to pump water to the surface, where it will freeze more rapidly. We show that where appropriate devices are employed, it is possible to increase ice thickness above natural levels, by about 1 m over the course of the winter. We examine the effects this has in the Arctic climate, concluding that deployment over 10% of the Arctic, especially where ice survival is marginal, could more than reverse current trends of ice loss in the Arctic, using existing industrial capacity. We propose that winter ice thickening by wind-powered pumps be considered and assessed as part of a multipronged strategy for restoring sea ice and arresting the strongest feedbacks in the climate system.”). See also Field L., Ivanova D., Bhattacharyya S., Mlaker V., Sholz A., Decca R., Manzara A., Johnston D., Christodoulou E., Walter P., & Katuri K. (2018) *Increasing Arctic Sea Ice Albedo Using Localized Reversible Geoengineering*, EARTH’S FUTURE 6(6): 882–901 (discussing testing hollow silica beads to enhance albedo of Arctic sea ice); and Bodansky D. & Hunt H. (2020) *Arctic Climate Interventions*, INT. J. MAR. COAST. LAW 35(3): 596–617, 605–606 (“Arctic ice management focuses on saving Arctic ice directly, either by increasing the rate of freezing or by decreasing the rate of melting. One proposed technique to increase freezing would be to spray seawater directly on top of the ice during the Arctic winter, when despite global warming it is still generally very cold. Ice is an insulator and slows the freezing of the water...
beneath it. Pumping water from under sea ice and spraying it on top, where it would be directly exposed to frigid air, would thus increase the rate of freezing and result in thicker ice… A second option focuses on decreasing the rate of melting of Arctic ice by spraying reflective beads on top of the ice in order to increase its albedo.

Grison B. W., et al. (2017) *Natural climate solutions*, PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 114(44): 11645–11650, 11645 (“Better stewardship of land is needed to achieve the Paris Climate Agreement goal of holding warming to below 2 ºC; however, confusion persists about the specific set of land stewardship options available and their mitigation potential. To address this, we identify and quantify “natural climate solutions” (NCS): 20 conservation, restoration, and improved land management actions that increase carbon storage and/or avoid greenhouse gas emissions across global forests, wetlands, grasslands, and agricultural lands. We find that the maximum potential of NCS—when constrained by food security, fiber security, and biodiversity conservation—is 23.8 petagrams of CO2 equivalent (PgCO2e) y⁻¹ (95% CI 20.3–37.4). This is ≥30% higher than prior estimates, which did not include the full range of options and safeguards considered here. About half of this maximum (11.3 PgCO2e y⁻¹) represents cost-effective climate mitigation, assuming the social cost of CO2 pollution is ≥100 USD MgCO2e⁻¹ by 2030. Natural climate solutions can provide 37% of cost-effective CO2 mitigation needed through 2030 for a >66% chance of holding warming to below 2 ºC. One-third of this cost-effective NCS mitigation can be delivered at or below 10 USD MgCO2e⁻¹. Most NCS actions—if effectively implemented—also offer water filtration, flood buffering, soil health, biodiversity habitat, and enhanced climate resilience. Work remains to better constrain uncertainty of NCS mitigation estimates. Nevertheless, existing knowledge reported here provides a robust basis for immediate global action to improve ecosystem stewardship as a major solution to climate change.”).

Bloomer L., Sun X., Dreyfus G., Ferris T., Zaelke D., & Schiff C. (2022) *A Call to Stop Burning Trees in the Name of Climate Mitigation*, VT. J. ENVTL. LAW 23: 94–123, 94 (“Burning trees for energy delivers a one-to-two punch against climate change mitigation efforts. Harvesting woody biomass reduces the sequestration potential of forest carbon sinks, while the combustion of woody biomass releases large quantities of carbon into the air. Forest regrowth may not offset these emissions for many decades—well beyond the time the world has left to slow warming to avoid catastrophic impacts from climate change.”). See also Moomaw W. R., Masino S. A., & Faison E. K. (2019) *Intact Forests in the United States: Proforestation Mitigates Climate Change and Serves the Greatest Good*, Perspective, FRONT. FOR. GLOB. CHANGE 2(27): 1–10, 1 (“Climate change and loss of biodiversity are widely recognized as the foremost environmental challenges of our time. Forests annually sequester large quantities of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2), and store carbon above and below ground for long periods of time. Intact forests—largely free from human intervention except primarily for trails and hazard removals—are the most carbon-dense and biodiverse terrestrial ecosystems, with additional benefits to society and the economy. … The recent 1.5 Degree Warming Report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change identifies reforestation and afforestation as important strategies to increase negative emissions, but they face significant challenges: afforestation requires an enormous amount of additional land, and neither strategy can remove sufficient carbon by growing young trees during the critical next decade(s). In contrast, growing existing forests intact to their ecological potential—termed proforestation—is a more effective, immediate, and low-cost approach that could be mobilized across suitable forests of all types. Proforestation serves the greatest public good by maximizing co-benefits such as nature-based biological carbon sequestration and unparalleled ecosystem services such as biodiversity enhancement, water and air quality, flood and erosion control, public health benefits, low impact recreation, and scenic beauty.”); World Wildlife Fund (2020) *Living Planet Report 2020 – Bending the curve of biodiversity loss*, Almond R. E. A., Groten M., & Petersen T. (eds.), 5 (“The global Living Planet Index continues to decline. It shows an average 68% decrease in population sizes of mammals, birds, amphibians, reptiles and fish between 1970 and 2016… It matters because biodiversity is fundamental to human life on Earth, and the evidence is unequivocal – it is being destroyed by us at a rate unprecedented in history. Since the industrial revolution, human activities have increasingly destroyed and degraded forests, grasslands, wetlands and other important ecosystems, threatening human well-being. Seventy-five per cent of the Earth’s ice-free land surface has already been significantly altered, most of the oceans are polluted, and more than 85% of the area of wetlands has been lost.”); and Raven P., et al. (11 February 2021) *Letter Regarding Use of Forests for Bioenergy*, WOODWELL CLIMATE RESEARCH CENTER (“Trees are more valuable alive than dead both for climate and for biodiversity. To meet future net zero emission goals, your governments should work to preserve and restore forests and not to burn them.”).

Lenton T. M., Rockstrom J., Gaffney O., Rahmstorf S., Richardson K., Steffen W., & Schellnhuber H. J. (2019) *Climate tipping points—too risky to bet against*, Comment, NATURE, 575: 592–595, 593 (“Estimates of where an Amazon tipping point could lie range from 40% deforestation to just 30% forest-cover loss. About 17% has been lost since 1970. The rate of deforestation varies with changes in policy. Finding the tipping point requires models that include deforestation and climate change as interacting drivers, and that incorporate fire and climate feedbacks as
interacting tipping mechanisms across scales.”). See also Taylor L. (5 September 2022) The Amazon rainforest has already reached a crucial tipping point, New Scientist (“Marlene Quintanilla at the Amazon Geo-Referenced Socio-Environmental Information Network (RAISG) and her colleagues, working in partnership with various groups, including the Coordinator of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon River Basin, used forest coverage data to map how much of the Amazon was lost between 1985 and 2020 and also looked at forest density, rainfall patterns and carbon storage. …The report finds that 33 per cent of the Amazon remains pristine and 41 per cent of areas have low degradation and could restore themselves. But 26 per cent of areas have been found to have gone too far to restore themselves: 20 per cent is lost entirely and 6 per cent is highly degraded and would need human support to be restored.”).

Lovejoy T. E. & Nobre C. (2018) Amazon’s Tipping Point, Sci. Adv. 4(2): eaat2340, 1 (“We believe that negative synergies between deforestation, climate change, and widespread use of fire indicate a tipping point for the Amazon system to flip to nonforest ecosystems in eastern, southern and central Amazonia at 20–25% deforestation.”). See also Hoegh-Guldberg O., Jacob D., & Taylor M. (2018) Chapter 3: Impacts of 1.5 °C of Global Warming on Natural and Human Systems, in Global Warming of 1.5 °C, Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 3-263 (“Global warming of 3°C is projected to reduce the extent of tropical rainforest in Central America, with biomass being reduced by about 40%, which can lead to a large replacement of rainforest by savanna and grassland (Lyra et al., 2017). Overall, modelling studies (Huntingford et al., 2013; Nobre et al., 2016) and observational constraints (Cox et al., 2013) suggest that pronounced rainforest dieback may only be triggered at 3°C–4°C (medium confidence), although pronounced biomass losses may occur at 1.5°C– 2°C of global warming.”).

Douville H., et al. (2021) Chapter 8: Water Cycle Changes, in Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 8-112 (“Both deforestation and drying are projected to increase by 2100, resulting in a worst-case scenario of up to a 50% loss in forest cover by 2050 (Soares-Filho et al., 2006; Boisier et al., 2015; Steege et al., 2015; Gomes et al., 2019).”).

Wang-Erlandsson L., et al. (2022) A planetary boundary for green water, Nat. Rev. Earth Environ. 3: 380–392, 380 (“Green water — terrestrial precipitation, evaporation and soil moisture — is fundamental to Earth system dynamics and is now extensively perturbed by human pressures at continental to planetary scales. However, green water lacks explicit consideration in the existing planetary boundaries framework that demarcates a global safe operating space for humanity. In this Perspective, we propose a green water planetary boundary and estimate its current status. The green water planetary boundary can be represented by the percentage of ice-free land area on which root-zone soil moisture deviates from Holocene variability for any month of the year. Provisional estimates of departures from Holocene-like conditions, alongside evidence of widespread deterioration in Earth system functioning, indicate that the green water planetary boundary is already transgressed. Moving forward, research needs to address and account for the role of root-zone soil moisture for Earth system resilience in view of ecohydrological, hydroclimatic and sociohydrological interactions.”); discussed in Stockholm Resilience Center (26 April 2022) Freshwater boundary exceeds safe limits (“Now researchers have explored the water boundary in more detail. The authors argue that previous assessments did not sufficiently capture the role of green water and particularly soil moisture for ensuring the resilience of the biosphere, for securing land carbon sinks, and for regulating atmospheric circulation. “The Amazon rainforest depends on soil moisture for its survival. But there is evidence that parts of the Amazon are drying out. The forest is losing soil moisture as a result of climate change and deforestation,” says Arne Tobian, second author and PhD candidate at the Stockholm Resilience Centre and Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. “These changes are potentially pushing the Amazon closer to a tipping point where large parts could switch from rainforest to savannah-like states,” he adds.”).

Boulton C. A., Lenton T. M., & Boers N. (2022) Pronounced loss of Amazon rainforest resilience since the early 2000s, Nat. Clim. Chang. 12(3): 271–78, 277 (“Other factors, including rising atmospheric temperatures in response to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, may additionally have negative effects on Amazon resilience (and are contributing to the warming of northern tropical Atlantic SSTs; Fig. 6a). Furthermore, the rapid change in climate is triggering ecological changes but ecosystems are having difficulties in keeping pace. In particular, the replacement of drought-sensitive tree species by drought-resistant ones is happening slower than changes in (hydro)meteorological conditions, potentially reducing forest resilience further. In summary, we have revealed empirical evidence that the Amazon rainforest has been losing resilience since the early 2000s, risking dieback with profound implications for biodiversity, carbon storage and climate change at a global scale. We further provided empirical evidence suggesting that overall drier conditions, culminating in three severe drought events, combined with pronounced increases in
human land-use activity in the Amazon, probably played a crucial role in the observed resilience loss. The amplified loss of Amazon resilience in areas closer to human land use suggests that reducing deforestation will not just protect the parts of the forest that are directly threatened but also benefit Amazon rainforest resilience over much larger spatial scales.”).

292 Lenton T. M., Held H., Kriegler E., Hall J. W., Lucht W., Rahmstorf S., & Schellnhuber H. J. (2008) *Tipping elements in the Earth’s climate system*, PROCI. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 105(6): 1786–1793, 1790 (“A large fraction of precipitation in the Amazon basin is recycled, and, therefore, simulations of Amazon deforestation typically generate 20–30% reductions in precipitation (78), lengthening of the dry season, and increases in summer temperatures (79) that would make it difficult for the forest to reestablish, and suggest the system may exhibit bistability.”). See also Staal A., Fetzer I., Wang-Erlandsson L., Bosmans J. H. C., Dekker S. C., van NES E. H., Rockström J., & Tuinenburg O. A. (2020) *Hysteresis of tropical forests in the 21st century*, NAT. COMMUN. 11(4978): 1–8, 5 (“Whether the Amazon in particular is an important global ‘tipping element’ in the Earth system is a question of great scientific and societal interest36,37. Despite our incomplete understanding of Amazon tipping, it is generally considered to be true that the forest’s role in the hydrological cycle is so large that deforestation and/or climate change may trigger a tipping point2,36–38. More recently, the possibility of fire-induced tipping has also been suggested 5,6. Although fire occurs at a local scale, a considerable portion of the Amazon would be susceptible to this kind of tipping; by accounting for the feedbacks at both local and regional scales, it becomes more likely that the Amazon is a tipping element. Although under the current climate a majority of the Amazon forest still appears resilient to disturbance (also see ref. 39), we show that this resilience may deteriorate as a result of redistributions of rainfall due to global climate change.”).

293 Gatti L. V., et al. (2021) *Amazonia as a carbon source linked to deforestation and climate change*, NATURE 595(7867): 388–393, 388 (“Southeastern Amazonia, in particular, acts as a net carbon source (total carbon flux minus fire emissions) to the atmosphere. Over the past 40 years, eastern Amazonia has been subjected to more deforestation, warming and moisture stress than the western part, especially during the dry season… the intensification of the dry season and an increase in deforestation seem to promote ecosystem stress, increase in fire occurrence, and higher carbon emissions in the eastern Amazon. This is in line with recent studies that indicate an increase in tree mortality and a reduction in photosynthesis as a result of climatic changes across Amazonia.”). See also Brien R. J. W., et al. (2015) *Long-term decline of the Amazon carbon sink*, NATURE 519(7543): 344–348, 344 (“While this analysis confirms that Amazon forests have acted as a long-term net biomass sink, we find a long-term decreasing trend of carbon accumulation. Rates of net increase in above-ground biomass declined by one-third during the past decade compared to the 1990s. This is a consequence of growth rate increases levelling off recently, while biomass mortality persistently increased throughout, leading to a shortening of carbon residence times.”).

294 Canadell J. G., et al. (2021) *Chapter 5: Global Carbon and other Biogeochemical Cycles and Feedbacks*, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), Table 5.6, 5-740 (“To estimate an upper limit on the impact of Amazon forest dieback on atmospheric CO2, we consider the very unlikely limiting case of negligible direct-CO2 effects (Section 5.4.1). Emergent constraint approaches (Section 5.4.6) may be used to estimate an overall loss of tropical land carbon due to climate change alone, of around 50 PgC per °C of tropical warming (Cox et al., 2013; Wenzel et al., 2014). This implies an upper limit to the release of tropical land carbon of <200 PgC per the 21 st century (assuming tropical warming of <4°C and no CO2-fertilization), which translates to dCO2/dt<0.5 ppm yr t. Boreal forest dieback is not expected to change the atmospheric CO2 concentration substantially because forest loss at the southern part is partly compensated by: (i) temperate forest invasion into previously boreal areas; and (ii) boreal forest gain at the north (Friend et al., 2014; Kicklighter et al., 2014; Schaphoff et al., 2016) (medium confidence). An upper estimate of this magnitude, based on statistical modelling of climate change alone, is of 27 Pg vegetation carbon loss in the southern boreal forest, which is roughly balanced by gains in the northern zone (Koven, 2013).”).

295 Goldstein A., Noon M. L., Ledezma J. C., Roehrdanz P. R., Raghav S., McGreevey M., Stone C., Shrestha S., Golden Kroner R., Hole D., & Turner W. (2021) IRRRECOVERABLE CARBON: THE PLACES WE MUST PROTECT TO AVERT CLIMATE CATASTROPHE, Conservation International, 7 (“‘Irrecoverable carbon’ refers to the vast stores of carbon in nature that are vulnerable to release from human activity and, if lost, could not be restored by 2050 — when the world must reach net-zero emissions to avoid the worst impacts of climate change... There are high concentrations of irrecoverable carbon in the Amazon (31.5 Gt), the Congo Basin (8.1 Gt), and New Guinea (7.3 Gt). Other important irrecoverable carbon reserves are located in the Pacific Northwest of North America, the Valdivian forests of Chile, the mangroves and swamp forests of Guyana, the peatlands of Northern Scotland, Niger Delta’s mangroves, Cambodia’s Tonle Sap Lake, the Scandinavian and Siberian boreal forests, and the eucalyptus forest of Southeast
296 Duffy K. A., Schwalm C. R., Arcus V. L., Koch G. W., Liang L. L., & Schipper L. A. (2021) *How close are we to the temperature tipping point of the terrestrial biosphere?*, Sci. Adv. 7(3): eaa1052, 1–8, 1 (“The temperature dependence of global photosynthesis and respiration determine land carbon sink strength. While the land sink currently mitigates ~30% of anthropogenic carbon emissions, it is unclear whether this ecosystem service will persist and, more specifically, what hard temperature limits, if any, regulate carbon uptake. Here, we use the largest continuous carbon flux monitoring network to construct the first observationally derived temperature response curves for global land carbon uptake. We show that the mean temperature of the warmest quarter (3-month period) passed the thermal maximum for photosynthesis during the past decade. At higher temperatures, respiration rates continue to rise in contrast to sharply declining rates of photosynthesis. Under business-as-usual emissions, this divergence elicits a near halving of the land sink strength by as early as 2040.”). See also Hubau W., et al. (2020) *Asynchronous carbon sink saturation in African and Amazonian tropical forests*, Nature 579: 80–87, 85 (“In summary, our results indicate that although intact tropical forests remain major stores of carbon and are key centres of biodiversity, their ability to sequester additional carbon in trees is waning. In the 1990s intact tropical forests removed 17% of anthropogenic CO₂ emissions. This declined to an estimated 6% in the 2010s, because the pan-tropical weighted average per unit area sink strength declined by 33%, forest area decreased by 19% and anthropogenic CO₂ emissions increased by 46%. Although tropical forests are more immediately threatened by deforestation46 and degradation47, and the future carbon balance will also depend on secondary forest dynamics48 and forest restoration plans49, our analyses show that they are also affected by atmospheric chemistry and climatic changes. Given that the intact tropical forest carbon sink is set to end sooner than even the most pessimistic climate driven vegetation models predict4,5, our analyses suggest that climate change impacts in the tropics may become more severe than predicted. Furthermore, the carbon balance of intact tropical forests will only stabilize once CO₂ concentrations and the climate stabilizes.”). See also Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2021) *Summary for Policymakers*, in *CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS*, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), SPM-26 (“Based on model projections, under the intermediate scenario that stabilizes atmospheric CO₂ concentrations this century (SSP2-4.5), the rates of CO₂ taken up by the land and oceans are projected to decrease in the second half of the 21st century (high confidence). Under the very low and low GHG emissions scenarios (SSP1-1.9, SSP1-2.6), where CO₂ concentrations peak and decline during the 21st century, land and oceans begin to take up less carbon in response to declining atmospheric CO₂ concentrations (high confidence) and turn into a weak net source by 2100 under SSP1-1.9 (medium confidence). It is very unlikely that the combined global land and ocean sink will turn into a source by 2100 under scenarios without net negative emissions32 (SSP2-4.5, SSP3-7.0, SSP5-8.5). Additional ecosystem responses to warming not yet fully included in climate models, such as CO₂ and CH₄ fluxes from wetlands, permafrost thaw and wildfires, would further increase concentrations of these gases in the atmosphere (high confidence).”).

297 Duffy K. A., Schwalm C. R., Arcus V. L., Koch G. W., Liang L. L., & Schipper L. A. (2021) *How close are we to the temperature tipping point of the terrestrial biosphere?*, Sci. Adv. 7(3): eaa1052, 1–8, 1 (“This…calls into question the future viability of the land sink, along with Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) within the Paris Climate Accord, as these rely heavily on land uptake of carbon to meet pledges. In contrast to Representative Concentration Pathway 8.5 (RCP8.5), warming associated with scenario RCP2.6 could allow for near-current levels of biosphere productivity, preserving the majority land carbon uptake (~10 to 30% loss).”).

298 Girardin C. A. J., Jenkins S., Seddon N., Allen M., Lewis S. L., Wheeler C. E., Griscom B. W., & Malhi Y. (2021) *Nature-based solutions can help cool the planet — if we act now*, Comment, Nature 593: 191–194 (“A subset of nature-based solutions can be used specifically to limit warming. These ‘natural climate solutions’ aim to reduce atmospheric greenhouse-gas concentrations in three ways. One is to avoid emissions by protecting ecosystems and thus reducing carbon release; this includes efforts to limit deforestation. Another is to restore ecosystems, such as wetlands, so that they sequester carbon. The third is to improve land management — for timber, crops and grazing — to reduce emissions of carbon, methane and nitrous oxide, as well as to sequester carbon (see ‘Three steps to natural cooling’).”).

299 Moomaw W. R., Masino S. A., & Faison E. K. (2019) *Intact Forests in the United States: Proforestation Mitigates Climate Change and Serves the Greatest Good*, FRONT. FOR. GLOB. CHANGE 2(27): 1–10, 1 (“The recent 1.5 Degree Warming Report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change identifies reforestation and afforestation as...
important strategies to increase negative emissions, but they face significant challenges: afforestation requires an enormous amount of additional land, and neither strategy can remove sufficient carbon by growing young trees during the critical next decade(s). In contrast, growing existing forests intact to their ecological potential—termed proforestation—is a more effective, immediate, and low-cost approach that could be mobilized across suitable forests of all types. Proforestation serves the greatest public good by maximizing co-benefits such as nature-based biological carbon sequestration and unparalleled ecosystem services such as biodiversity enhancement, water and air quality, flood and erosion control, public health benefits, low impact recreation, and scenic beauty.”).

300 United Nations Environment Programme & GRID-Arendal (2017) Smoke on Water: Countering Global Threats from Peatlands Loss and Degradation, A Rapid Response Assessment, Crump J. (ed.), 9 (“Current greenhouse gas emissions from drained or burning peatlands are estimated to be up to five percent of all emissions caused by human activity – in the range of two billion tonnes of CO2 per year. If the world has any hope of keeping the global average temperature increase under two degrees Celsius then urgent action must be taken to keep the carbon locked in peatlands where it is – wet, and in the ground to prevent an increase in emissions. Furthermore, already drained peatlands must be rewetted to halt their ongoing significant emissions. However, this is not as simple as it seems. Knowing the location of peatlands continues to be a challenge.”). See also Humpenöder F., Karstens K., Lotze-Campen H., Leifeld J., Menichetti L., Barthelmes A., & Popp A. (2020) Peatland Protection and Restoration are Key for Climate Change Mitigation, Environ. Res. Lett. 15(10): 1–12, 10 (“However, in line with other studies (Leifeld et al 2019), our results indicate that it is possible to reconcile land use and GHG emissions in mitigation pathways through a peatland protection and restoration policy (RCP2.6 + PeatRestor). Our results suggest that the land system would turn into a global net carbon sink by 2100, as projected by current mitigation pathways, if about 60% of present-day degraded peatlands, mainly in the tropical and boreal climate zone, would be rewetted in the coming decades, next to the protection of intact peatlands. Therefore, peatland protection and restoration are key for climate change mitigation. At the same time, our results indicate that the implementation costs of peatland protection and restoration measures are low, and that there are almost no impacts on regional food security.”).

301 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2019) Summary for Policymakers, in The Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate, Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., et al. (eds.), SPM-30 (“Restoration of vegetated coastal ecosystems, such as mangroves, tidal marshes and seagrass meadows (coastal ‘blue carbon’ ecosystems), could provide climate change mitigation through increased carbon uptake and storage of around 0.5% of current global emissions annually (medium confidence). Improved protection and management can reduce carbon emissions from these ecosystems.”).

302 Booth M. S. (2018) Not Carbon Neutral: Assessing the Net Emissions Impact of Residues Burned for Bioenergy, Environ. Res. Lett. 13(3): 1–10, 8 (“For bioenergy to offer genuine climate mitigation, it is essential to move beyond the assumption of instantaneous carbon neutrality. The [net emissions impact (NEI)] approach provides a simple means to estimate net bioenergy emissions over time, albeit one that tends to underestimate actual impacts. The model finds that for plants burning locally sourced wood residues, from 41% (extremely rapid decomposition) to 95% (very slow decomposition) of cumulative direct emissions should be counted as contributing to atmospheric carbon loading by year 10. Even by year 50 and beyond, the model shows that net emissions are a significant proportion of direct emissions for many fuels.”). See also Sterman J. D., Siegel L., & Rooney-Varga J. N. (2018) Does Replacing Coal with Wood Lower CO2 Emissions? Dynamic Lifecycle Analysis of Wood Bioenergy, Environ. Res. Lett. 13(015007): 1–10, 8 (“Scenario 2 shows the realistic case with the combustion efficiency and supply chain emissions estimated for wood pellets (supplementary table S5), again assuming 25% of the biomass is harvested by thinning. Because production and combustion of wood generate more CO2 than coal, the first impact of bioenergy use is an increase in atmospheric CO2. Regrowth gradually transfers C from the atmosphere to biomass and soil C stocks, leading to a carbon debt payback time of 52 years; after 100 years CO2 remains 62% above the zero C case.”). and Bloomer L., Sun X., Dreyfus G., Ferris T., Zaelke D., & Schiff C. (2022) A Call to Stop Burning Trees in the Name of Climate Mitigation, VT. J. Envtl. Law 23: 94–123.

303 UN Climate Change Conference (2 November 2021) Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration on Forests and Land Use (“We therefore commit to working collectively to halt and reverse forest loss and land degradation by 2030 while delivering sustainable development and promoting an inclusive rural transformation.”).

304 UN Climate Change Conference (2 November 2021) The Global Forest Finance Pledge: Financing the protection, restoration, and sustainable management of forests (“Here in Glasgow at COP26, we announce our intention to collectively provide US$12 billion for forest-related climate finance between 2021-2025. This will incentivise results and support action in Official Development Assistance (ODA) eligible forest countries where increased ambition and
Concrete steps are shown towards ending deforestation by no later than 2030.”); and UN Climate Change Conference (3 November 2021) COP26 World Leaders Summit – Presidency Summary (“Over 120 countries covering more than 90% of the world’s forests endorsed the Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration on Forests & Land Use committing to work collectively to halt and reverse forest loss and land degradation by 2030, backed by the biggest ever commitment of public funds for forest conservation and a global roadmap to make 75% of forest commodity supply chains sustainable.”). See also Einhorn C. & Buckley C. (1 November 2021, updated 10 November 2021) Global Leaders Pledge to End Deforestation by 2030, THE NEW YORK TIMES; and Rannard G. & Gillett F. (2 November 2021) COP26: World leaders promise to end deforestation by 2030, BBC NEWS.

The White House (2021) PLAN TO CONSERVE GLOBAL FORESTS: CRITICAL CARBON SINKS; discussed in U.S. Department of State (3 November 2021) Plan to Conserve Global Forests: Critical Carbon Sinks, Fact Sheet (“At COP26 during the World Leaders Summit Forest Day session on November 2, 2021, the United States announced the Plan to Conserve Global Forests: Critical Carbon Sinks. This decade-long, whole-of-government Plan sets forth the U.S. approach to conserving critical global terrestrial carbon sinks, deploying a range of diplomatic, policy, and financing tools. The first-of-its-kind plan for the U.S. government seeks to catalyze the global effort to conserve and restore the forests and other ecosystems that serve as critical carbon sinks. Subject to Congressional appropriations, by 2030, the United States intends to dedicate up to $9 billion of our international climate funding to support the objectives of the Plan…. The Plan supports collective goals the United States has previously endorsed, including efforts to end natural forest loss by 2030; to significantly increase the rate of global restoration of degraded landscapes and forestlands; and to slow, halt, and reverse forest cover and carbon loss. The Plan outlines the initial approaches the United States intends to deploy to achieve four key objectives: Incentivize forest and ecosystem conservation and forest landscape restoration; Catalyze private sector investment, finance, and action to conserve critical carbon sinks; Build long-term capacity and support the data and monitoring systems that enhance accountability; Increase ambition for climate and conservation action.”).

Jackson R. B., et al. (2021) Atmospheric methane removal: a research agenda, PHILOS. TRANS. R. SOC. A 379(2210): 20200454, 1–17, 1, 11 (“Atmospheric methane removal may be needed to offset continued methane release and limit the global warming contribution of this potent greenhouse gas. Eliminating most anthropogenic methane emissions is unlikely this century, and sudden methane release from the Arctic or elsewhere cannot be excluded, so technologies for negative emissions of methane may be needed. Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) has a well-established research agenda, technological foundation and comparative modelling framework [23–28]. No such framework exists for methane removal. We outline considerations for such an agenda here. We start by presenting the technological Mt CH$_4$ yr$^{-1}$ considerations for methane removal: energy requirements (§2a), specific proposed technologies (§2b), and air processing and scaling requirements (§2c). We then outline the climate and air quality impacts and feedbacks of methane removal (§3a) and argue for the creation of a Methane Removal Model Intercomparison Project (§3b), a multi-model framework that would better quantify the expected impacts of methane removal. In §4, we discuss some broader implications of methane removal.”); “Another consideration for active methane-removal systems is the volume of air needed to be processed to remove teragrams of methane. If air handling is to be undertaken at large scales, it would make economic sense to convert other greenhouse gases simultaneously, particularly the catalytic reduction of N$_2$O to N$_2$. Although our current paper emphasizes methane removal, co-removal of other gases would reduce unit costs.”). See also Abernethy S., O’Connor F. M., Jones C. D., & Jackson R. B. (2021) Methane removal and the proportional reductions in surface temperature and ozone, PHILOS. TRANS. R. SOC. A 379(2210): 20210104, 1–13, 6 (“Due to the temporal nature of effective cumulative removal, comparisons between methane and carbon dioxide depend on the timescale of interest. The equivalent of MCR for carbon dioxide, the TCRE, is 0.00048 ± 0.0001°C per Pg CO$_2$ [38], two orders of magnitude smaller than our MCR estimate of 0.21 ± 0.04°C per effective Pg CH$_4$ removed (figure 2). Accounting for the time delay for carbon dioxide removal due to the lagged response of the deep ocean, the TCRE for CO$_2$ removal may be even lower [39]. If 1 year of anthropogenic emissions was removed (0.36 Pg CH$_4$ [3] and 41.4 Pg CO$_2$ [40]), the transient temperature impact would be almost four times larger for methane than for CO$_2$ (0.075°C compared to 0.02°C). Using this example, however, maintaining a steady-state response of 0.36 Pg CH$_4$ effectively removed would require the ongoing removal of roughly 0.03Pg CH$_4$ yr$^{-1}$, since a removal rate of $E/\tau$ is required to maintain an effective cumulative removal of $E$. ”). For more history on this proposal, see Jackson R. B., Solomon E. I., Canadell J. G., Cargnello M., & Field C. B. (2019) Methane removal and atmospheric restoration, NAT. SUSTAIN. 2: 436–438, 436 (“In contrast to negative emissions scenarios for CO$_2$ that typically assume hundreds of billions of tonnes removed over decades and do not restore the atmosphere to preindustrial levels, methane concentrations could be restored to ~750 ppb by removing ~3.2 of the 5.3 Gt of CH$_4$ currently in the atmosphere. Rather than capturing and storing the methane, the 3.2 Gt of CH$_4$ could be oxidized to CO$_2$, a thermodynamically favourable reaction…. In total, the reaction would yield 8.2 additional Gt of atmospheric CO$_2$, equivalent to a few months of current industrial CO$_2$ emissions, but it would eliminate approximately one sixth of total radiative forcing.
As a result, methane removal or conversion would strongly complement current CO₂ and CH₄ emissions-reduction activities. The reduction in short-term warming, attributable to methane’s high radiative forcing and relatively short lifetime, would also provide more time to adapt to warming from long-lived greenhouse gases such as CO₂ and N₂O."

Klaus Lackner critiqued the Jackson et al. article in a published response, arguing that implementing zeolite mechanisms to facilitate CH₄ removal is not practical. Lackner noted CH₄ removal faces the challenge of extreme dilution in the atmosphere, so “the amount of air that would need to be moved [to facilitate CH₄ removal] would simply be too great” to be economically feasible. However, Lackner did note passive methods of CH₄ removal through the use of zeolites may still be a viable solution. Lackner further argues that N₂O may be a more worthy target for removal due to its long lifetime in the atmosphere; see Lackner K. S. (2020) Practical Constraints on Atmospheric Methane Removal, NAT. SUSTAIN. 3: 357. Jackson et al. published a response to Lackner, acknowledging his stature in the greenhouse gas removal field and his concerns about the feasibility and energy requirements of their proposed mechanism, offering additional explanation about alternative options for use of the captured methane instead of just converting it to CO₂ as suggested in the original study. See Jackson R. B., Solomon E. I., Canadell J. G., Carnelino M., Field C. B., & Abernethy S. (2020) Reply to: Practical constraints on atmospheric methane removal, NAT. SUSTAIN. 3: 358–359. Another study looking at removing non-CO₂ GHGs investigated the potential of using solar chimney power plants (SCPPs) with select photocatalysts (depending on what GHGs desired to be captured). While the SCPP serves as a source of renewable energy that could remove methane and nitrous oxide among other atmospheric pollutants, scaling up the prototype would require a massive amount of land area (roughly 23 times the size of the entire Beijing municipality) and a chimney stretching 1000–1500 m into the air, which limits how practical the existing technology may be: see de Richter R., Tingzhen M., Davies P., Wei L., & Caillol S. (2017) Removal of non-CO₂ greenhouse gases by large-scale atmospheric solar photocatalysis, PROG. ENERGY COMBUST. SCI. 60: 68–96.

Nisbet-Jones P. B. R., Fernandez J. M., Fisher R. E., France J. L., Lowry D., Waltham D. A., Woolley Maisch C. A., & Nisbet E. G. (2021) Is the destruction or removal of atmospheric methane a worthwhile option? PHILOS. TRANS. R. SOC. A 380(2215): 20210108, 1–12, 5 (“Methane is relatively difficult to oxidize compared to other hydrocarbons. The major destruction options include (i) thermal-catalytic oxidation, which is typically with metal catalysts; (ii) photocatalytic oxidation; (iii) biological uptake by aerobic methanotrophic bacteria or their bio-engineered methane-oxidising enzymes and (iv) removal by uptake on zeolites or porous polymers, with the added benefit of not emitting CO₂ waste.”). See also Ming T., Li W., Yuan Q., Davies P., de Richter R., Peng C., Deng Q., Yuan Y., Caillol S., & Zhou N. (2022) Perspectives on removal of atmospheric methane, ADV. APPL. ENER. 5(100086): 1–9, 1 (“This article reviews proposed methods for atmospheric methane removal at a climatically significant scale. These methods include enhancement of natural hydroxyl and chlorine sinks, photocatalysis in solar updraft towers, zeolite catalyst in direct air capture devices, and methanotrophic bacteria.”).

Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (8 April 2021) Reducing Emissions of Methane Every Day of the Year, ARPA-E Programs (“Program Description: REMEDY (Reducing Emissions of Methane Every Day of the Year) is a three-year, $35 million research program to reduce methane emissions from three sources in the oil, gas, and coal value chains: 1) Exhaust from 50,000 natural gas-fired lean-burn engines. These engines are used to drive compressors, generate electricity, and increasingly repower ships. 2) The estimated 300,000 flares required for safe operation of oil and gas facilities. 3) Coal mine ventilation air methane (VAM) exhausted from 250 operating underground mines. These sources are responsible for at least 10% of U.S. anthropogenic methane emissions. Reducing emissions of methane, which has a high greenhouse gas warming potential, will ameliorate climate change.”).

Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (30 September 2020) Prevention and Abatement of Methane Emissions (“We’re open to all options – but specifically are looking for solutions that: Prevent methane emissions from anthropogenic activities. In other words, solutions which intervene before anthropogenic emissions escape to the atmosphere. Abate methane emissions at their source. Sources include vents, leaks, and exhaust stacks. Remove methane from the air. As mentioned above, methane only lasts about 9 years in the atmosphere. Nature is very good at getting rid of methane using reactions in the atmosphere and methanotrophs in the soil. Maybe we can learn from Nature, and help her out.”). See also Lewnard J. (16 November 2020) REMEDY – Reducing Emissions of Methane Every Day of the Year, ARPA-E Presentation, 7 (“Example Potential Approaches, Not Intended to Limit or Direct… “Geo-engineering”: Accelerate tropospheric reactions; Accelerate soil/methanotroph reactions”).

Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (2 December 2021) U.S. Department of Energy Awards $35 Million for Technologies to Reduce Methane Emissions, Press Release (“MAHLE Powertrain (Plymouth, MI) will develop a catalytic system to oxidize methane in the exhaust gas of lean-burn natural gas fired engines. (Selection amount:
Our machine process captures and permanently removes CO\(_2\) from the atmosphere. We have conducted tests on methane emissions from Arctic Circle permafrost, including a recent study at a lake in the Arctic Circle, about 67.25 degrees north. Laughlin Barker, Frost Methane’s Senior Embedded Systems Engineer, described their work: “basically a Jacuzzi, there’s so much natural gas.”

For our flagship facility, Orca, we have joined forces with the Icelandic company Carbfix to store carbon by injecting the carbon into subsurface ground, where they work with the Icelandic start-up Carbfix to store carbon by injecting the carbon into subsurface ground, where it reacts with rock formations to turn into rocks within two years. See also Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (2 December 2021) REMEDY—Reducing Emissions of Methane Every Day of the Year: Project Descriptions, Press Release.

In the U.S., the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2022 and Investment and Innovation and Jobs Act of 2021 allocated $49 million of funding per year to the Department of Energy for CDR technology and a $3.5 billion investment in four direct air capture hubs, which is expected to remove a million tonnes of CO\(_2\) a year. Additionally, the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 included several provisions relating to carbon dioxide removal, including $1 billion in funding for carbon removal research and development, establishing a Basic Energy Science Program to research carbon conversion and sequestration in geologic formations, and creating “at least two” carbon storage research centers. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 117-103, 136 Stat. 222-227 (2022); Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 117-58, § 40308 (2021) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16371); and CHIPS and Science Act, Pub. L. No. 117-167, §§ 10102, 10771 (2022).

A Swiss company, Climeworks, deployed the world’s largest direct air capture and storage plant for carbon dioxide, where they work with the Icelandic start-up Carbfix to store carbon by injecting the carbon into subsurface ground, where it reacts with rock formations to turn into rocks within two years. See Climeworks, Direct air capture: a technology to remove CO\(_2\) (last visited 15 August 2022) (“Our machines consist of modular CO\(_2\) collectors that can be stacked to build machines of any size. Climeworks’ direct air capture machines are powered solely by renewable energy or energy-from-waste. An independent life cycle assessment has shown that the grey emissions of our machines are below 10%, which means that out of 100 tons of carbon dioxide that are captured from the air, at least 90 tons are permanently removed and only up to 10 tons are re-emitted. Our CO\(_2\) collectors selectively capture carbon dioxide in a two-step process. First, air is drawn into the collector with a fan. Carbon dioxide is captured on the surface of a highly selective filter material that sits inside the collectors. Second, after the filter material is full with carbon dioxide, the collector is closed and we increase the temperature to between 80 and 100 °C - this releases the carbon dioxide. Finally, we can collect this high-purity, high-concentration carbon dioxide…. For our flagship facility Orca, the world's largest direct air capture and storage plant, we have joined forces with the Icelandic company Carbfix. Carbfix has a strong scientific backbone and is one of the world’s experts in rapid underground mineralization of carbon dioxide. Located near the Hellsheiði geothermal power plant, which provides the renewable energy we need to run the Climeworks machines, Orca removes 4,000 tons of carbon dioxide per year. Carbfix mixes the carbon dioxide that Orca captures with water and pumps it deep underground. Through natural mineralization, the carbon dioxide reacts with the basalt rock and turns into stone within a few years.”); and Carbfix, How it works (last visited 15 August 2022) (“Trees and vegetation are not the only form of carbon drawdown from the atmosphere. Vast quantities of carbon are naturally stored in rocks. Carbfix imitates and accelerates these natural processes, where carbon dioxide is dissolved in water and interacts with reactive rock formations, such as basalts, to form stable minerals providing a permanent and safe carbon sink. The Carbfix process captures and permanently removes CO\(_2\). The technology provides a complete carbon capture and injection solution, where CO\(_2\) dissolved in water – a sparkling water of sorts – is injected into the subsurface where it reacts with favorable rock formations to form solid carbonate minerals via natural processes in about 2 years. For the Carbfix technology to work, one needs to meet three requirements: favorable rocks, water, and a source of carbon dioxide.”); discussed in Ransley J. (11 August 2022) Racing against the clock to decarbonise the planet, FINANCIAL TIMES. For a discussion on carbon dioxide storage through a mineral carbonation process, see Snæbjörnsdóttir S. Ó., Sigfússon B., Marieni C., Goldberg D., Gislason S.
extreme events such as heat waves on public health by evaluating...

...and putting billions of people at immediate risk,” the Secretary...

...countries need to include fast acting strategies on SLCPs and NbS in their climate policies to...

...combined with decarbonization can provide net cooling...

...when combined with decarbonization can provide net cooling...

...than decarbonization alone and avoids the 2°C threshold altogether. These non-

...components for energy storage and renewables…. A project in Iceland will build a highly scalable onshore carbon...

...to help bring breakthrough technologies to the market in energy-intensive industries, hydrogen, renewable energy, carbon capture and storage infrastructure, and manufacturing of key components for energy storage and renewables….

...will be disbursed from the Innovation Fund to help bring breakthrough technologies to the market in energy-intensive industries, hydrogen, renewable energy, carbon capture and storage infrastructure, and manufacturing of key components for energy storage and renewables….

...in 17 large-scale innovative clean-tech projects with a third round of awards under the Innovation Fund.

...will be stored by permanently mineralizing it underground.”); and European Commission (12 July 2022)

...Finnish company Carbfix has been awarded a large EU grant to build a new carbon...

...fossil fuel burning and deforestation are choking our planet...

...targeting short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs) and NbS...

...and to lead to temperatures exceeding 2°C before 2050. In contrast, pairing decarbonization with additional mitigation measures targeting short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs) and N₂O, slows the rate of warming a decade or two earlier than decarbonization alone and avoids the 2°C threshold altogether. These non-CO₂ targeted measures when combined with decarbonization can provide net cooling by 2030, reduce the rate of warming from 2030 to 2050 by about 50%, roughly half of which comes from methane, significantly larger than decarbonization alone over this timeframe.”).

...while more than 130 countries have committed to reaching net-zero emissions, only some of these jurisdictions include non-CO₂ pollutants in their pledges (Hale et al., 2021). As demonstrated by the summary of scientific studies above, countries need to include fast acting strategies on SLCPs and NbS in their climate policies to secure the most avoided warming on the way to meeting their carbon neutrality goals.”).

...the alarm bells are deafening, and the evidence is irrefutable: greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel burning and deforestation are choking our planet and putting billions of people at immediate risk,” the Secretary-General says in a statement.”).

...global warming of 1.5 °C, Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), SPM-6 (“Human activities are estimated to have caused approximately 1.0 °C of global warming above pre-industrial levels, with a likely range of 0.8 °C to 1.2 °C. Global warming is likely to reach 1.5 °C between 2030 and 2052 if it continues to increase at the current rate. (high confidence.”). In addition to cutting CO₂ emissions and emissions of the super climate pollutants, the IPCC 1.5 °C Report also calculates the need for significant CO₂ removal. Id., at 17 (“C.3. All pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with limited or no overshoot project the use of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) on the order of 100–1000 GtCO₂ over the 21st century.”).

...have focused on the direct influence of extreme events such as heat waves on public health by evaluating...
exposure to heat stress and hyperthermia. It has been estimated that the likelihood of extreme events (defined as 3-sigma events), including heat waves, has increased 10-fold in the recent decades. Human beings are extremely sensitive to heat stress. For example, the 2013 European heat wave led to about 70,000 premature mortalities. The major finding of a recent study is that, currently, about 13.6% of land area with a population of 30.6% is exposed to deadly heat. According to this study, a 2 °C warming would double the land area subject to deadly heat and expose 48% of the population. A 4 °C warming by 2100 would subject 47% of the land area and almost 74% of the world population to deadly heat, which could pose existential risks to humans and mammals alike unless massive adaptation measures are implemented, such as providing air conditioning to the entire population or a massive relocation of most of the population to safer climates. This bottom 3 billion population comprises mostly subsistent farmers, whose livelihood will be severely impacted, if not destroyed, with a one- to five-year megadrought, heat waves, or heavy floods; for those among the bottom 3 billion of the world’s population who are living in coastal areas, a 1- to 2-m rise in sea level (likely with a warming in excess of 3°C) poses existential threat if they do not relocate or migrate. It has been estimated that several hundred million people would be subject to famine with warming in excess of 4 °C. However, there has essentially been no discussion on warming beyond 5 °C. Climate change-induced species extinction is one major concern with warming of such large magnitudes (>5°C). The current rate of loss of species is ~1,000-fold the historical rate, due largely to habitat destruction. At this rate, about 25% of species are in danger of extinction in the coming decades. Global warming of 6°C or more (accompanied by increase in ocean acidity due to increased CO2) can act as a major force multiplier and expose as much as 90% of species to the dangers of extinction. The bodily harms combined with climate change-forced species destruction, biodiversity loss, and threats to water and food security, as summarized recently, motivated us to categorize warming beyond 5°C as unknown, implying the possibility of existential threats.

320 Steffen W., et al. (2018) Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene, Proc. Nat’l. Acad. Sci. 115(33): 8252–8259, 8254, 8256 (‘‘This risk is represented in Figs. 1 and 2 by a planetary threshold (horizontal broken line in Fig. 1 on the Hothouse Earth pathway around 2 °C above preindustrial temperature). Beyond this threshold, intrinsic biogeophysical feedbacks in the Earth System (Biogeophysical Feedbacks) could become the dominant processes controlling the system’s trajectory. Precisely where a potential planetary threshold might be is uncertain (15, 16). We suggest 2 °C because of the risk that a 2 °C warming could activate important tipping elements (12, 17), raising the temperature further to activate other tipping elements in a domino-like cascade that could take the Earth System to even higher temperatures (Tipping Cascades). Such cascades comprise, in essence, the dynamical process that leads to thresholds in complex systems (section 4.2 in ref. 18). This analysis implies that, even if the Paris Accord target of a 1.5 °C to 2.0 °C rise in temperature is met, we cannot exclude the risk that a cascade of feedbacks could push the Earth System irreversibly onto a ‘‘Hothouse Earth’’ pathway. … Hothouse Earth is likely to be uncontrollable and dangerous to many, particularly if we transition into it in only a century or two, and it poses severe risks for health, economies, political stability (12, 39, 49, 50) (especially for the most climate vulnerable), and ultimately, the habitability of the planet for humans.’’).

321 Hunter D. B., Salzman J. E., & Zaelke D. (2021) Glasgow Climate Summit: COP26, UCLA School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 22-02, 3 (‘‘More generally, COP26 may also reflect an evolution (and a vindication) of the Paris Agreement’s more flexible policy approach—an evolution which supported significantly higher climate ambition than was expected and certainly more than would have occurred if COP26 had been hosted in 2020, as originally intended. Four shifts in focus reflect this new architecture; first, the near-unanimous recognition of the impending climate emergency and the need to limit warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius; second, the recognition “that 2030 is the new 2050,” as French President Emmanuel Macron said, and that major emission cuts have to be made in this decade (note also that the U.S.-China Joint Glasgow Declaration marked the first time that the United States and China acknowledged the urgency of climate action in this “critical decade” of the 2020s); third, the recognition that cutting non-CO2 emissions (particularly methane) is essential for slowing warming in the next couple of decades and that cuts to CO2 alone cannot address the near-term emergency; and fourth, the addition of sector-specific approaches in recognition that it is often more efficient and effective to address individual sectors of the economy in reaching climate solutions.”). See also Zaelke D. & Dreyfus G. (29 December 2021) The good, the bad and the ugly of climate change in 2021 — but it’s not too late to act, The Hill; Zaelke D., Picolotti R., & Dreyfus G. (14 November 2021) Glasgow climate summit: A glass half full, The Hill; Bledsoe P., Zaelke D., & Dreyfus G. (8 November 2021) How to Limit Temperature Increases in the Very Near Term, The New York Times; and Zaelke D. (21 September 2021) A new UN climate architecture is emerging focused on need for speed, The Hill.